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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to answer the following four questions: 
(RQ1) What is the percentage of crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? (RQ2) 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding 
and SMEs’ reliance on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing? (RQ3) What is 
the potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing 
demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms? (RQ4) In the context of 
crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? All 
of questions 1 and 2, and some of question 3, were quantitatively answered on the 
basis of data obtained from 1,000 German SMEs. Some of question 3 and all of 
question 4 was qualitatively answered on the basis of data from 46 experts assembled 
as part of a Delphi methodology. The purpose of using the Delphi methodology was to 
validate the regression analysis and show a proven causality of the mathematical 
regression. 
 
The main finding for RQ1 was that there was a statistically significant difference 
between technology-based SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all 
funding (6.41%. SD = 4.30) and non-technology-based SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (3.20%. SD = 1.46), t(998) = 17.575, p < 
.001. The likely meaning of this finding is that technology companies are more reliant 
on crowdfunding. The main finding for RQ2 was that there were several insignificant  
negative correlations between crowdfunding and other kinds of funding. The likely 
meaning of this finding is that crowdfunding is actively replacing other kinds of funding; 
companies that have a larger portion of their funding from crowdfunding have a smaller 
portion of funding from other kinds of funding. The main findings for RQ3 were as 
follows: (a) Crowdfunding is a niche, (b) crowdfunding has a limited future, and (c) 
crowdfunding is having and will have a limited impact on the funding market. The 
integrated meaning of these findings is that the potential impact on the traditional 
financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial institutions to 
crowdfunding platforms is small. The main findings for RQ4 were as follows: (a) The 
risks of crowdfunding are well-managed by regulation, (b) the risk of crowdfunding is 
not important from the perspective of systemic risk, and (c) the costs and benefits of 
crowdfunding can be understood through the prism of encouraging investment vs. 
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protecting investors. The integrated meaning of these findings is that there are in fact 
some regulatory gaps, but not gaps that are associated with high levels of risk. 
  
The findings were examined in terms of game theory, de-risking, and financial 
inclusion. Game theory was utilized as a means of explaining how and why companies 
might prefer crowdfunding to other kinds of funding. De-risking and financial inclusion 
were utilized to explore the findings related to regulation. Companies were 
recommended to seek higher proportions of crowdfunding as a means of avoiding the 
equity demands that accompany traditional investment. Crowdfunding platforms were 
recommended to explore means of aggregating the investment power of their 
members into demands for equity. 
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1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and context of the research 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), defined as companies with no more 
than 250-500 employees and an annual turnover between 500.000 – 25.000.000 
million EUR represent 99.8% of all European-based companies (Ridley, 2016). To put 
this figure in context, more than two-thirds of Europe’s population are employed by an 
SME. In fact, SMEs are the main drivers of innovation and economic growth in Europe 
(European Commission Horizon 2020, 2018). Innovation is mainly propelled by cost-
intensive projects and research. Therefore, SMEs require valid access to funding 
sources to undertake research and development programmes. That means that as 
regards research and development, an SME needs to be able to substitute its project 
engagement with debt capital provided by an intermediary. During normal cyclical 
market developments, the market regulates itself in such a way that the financing 
needs of SMEs can be covered by classical financing sources, such as loan stock, 
retained earnings, bank borrowing, government sources, business expansion scheme 
funds, venture capital, and franchising (Golić, 2014). The key point in this context is 
the term normal cyclical development. Since the banking crisis that started in 2007, the 
established and familiar market mechanisms no longer seem to be valid. This situation, 
coupled with a number of potential bank bankruptcies, leads to the realisation that the 
current structure of the banking industry permits banks to influence and endanger the 
entire finance system. The European Union (EU) has identified this as a systematic 
risk and intends to implement regulations which should not only protect investors but 
also reduce the complexity of bank products and thus lessen the potential risks. 
 
While the main source of SME funding before the crisis starting in 2007 was a 
traditional loan issued by a bank, regulatory changes for banks have significantly 
reduced the availability of this kind of financing. Ridley (2016) has argued that this 
financing method is subject to a process of regulatory changes that influence a financial 
institution’s lending policies. At the time, European politicians were seeking to reduce 
the default risk of traditional financial institutions and to strengthen their net equity 
base. As a result, the Basel III and MiFID/MiFIR regulations were adjusted, increasing 
the number of requirements for SMEs wanting to secure loans from financial 
institutions. From a bank’s perspective, it is no longer attractive to provide SMEs with 
funding access because SMEs are often unable to offer adequate collateral and 
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securities in return. The EU has recognised this development and its impact on SMEs, 
and it intends to support SMEs’ innovation efforts with various kinds of programmes 
and frameworks. In 2014, for example, the European Commission, as the highest 
organ of the EU, implemented a framework for innovation and research called Horizon 
2020 (European Commission Horizon 2020, 2018). The aim was to maintain and 
protect the innovativeness and competitiveness of the entire EU. Horizon 2020 
provides SMEs with access to funding from sources other than traditional banks. The 
OECD Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, and Local Development explored this 
approach as well and published a consultation study describing the aforementioned 
paradox of development and proposing several new financing strategies for SMEs 
(European Commission Horizon 2020, 2018). Financing through governmental 
initiatives such as Horizon 2020 is limited in scale and unable to meet SMEs’ demands 
for financing to support innovation and growth. Consequently, economic growth has 
slowed, and innovative developments are being launched more slowly. Those SMEs 
facing this situation must identify novel ways to finance new projects. 
 
Golić (2014) has indicated that as a result of low interest rates, many enterprises are 
now interested in investing in SMEs, thus providing one potential new source of 
funding. As mentioned above, such investment has almost always been the basis for 
SMEs’ innovation and growth. As a consequence, the market is witnessing the creation 
of a new funding industry. This sector is mainly driven by the Internet and is not 
dependent on traditional banks or banking products. The new funding sources include 
crowdfunding and peer-to-peer credit platforms, with crowdfunding defined as any 
attempt to simplify the access of ordinary individuals, not necessarily professional or 
experienced investors, to meeting a company’s need for funding, often through the 
Internet and on the presumption of small investment sums (Hooghiemstra & De 
Buysere, 2016). Crowdfunding is one of the newest forms of innovative financing.  
 
According to Hooghiemstra and De Buysere (2016), crowdfunding connects the 
demand and supply operations of SMEs with potential investors via the Internet. A 
significant difference from traditional bank funding is, according to Mitra and Gilbert 
(2014), that the intermediary (i.e., a crowdfunding platform) does not report the 
financing amount on its own balance sheet.  
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Figure 1 (see below) illustrates the role of banks in crowdfunding according to Haas et 
al. (2014). In this model, traditional banking services are limited to functioning as 
traditional payment transaction providers. In terms of crowdfunding, that means that a 
bank only processes the payment transaction from one account to another. The 
ordinary lending business is following this review by crowdfunding platform as an 
intermediary. In this context, financial institutions are not allowed to intervene in the 
process. In particular, a financial institution has no way of knowing whether a 
transaction is part of a financing request made by an SME via a crowdfunding platform. 
In such a situation, the financial institution is likewise no longer privy to the underlying 
business of such financing. 
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
      
   
 
 
 
  
        
        
        
        
        
    
 
   
        
Figure 1: Crowdfunding platform mechanism and cash flows (source: Author) 
 
Crowdfunding platforms (as shown in Figure 1) bundle groups of investors, potentially 
making it easy to generate larger amounts of funding when necessary. The literature 
mentions five general forms of crowdfunding: donation based, reward based, pre-
selling based, lending based, and equity based (also known as crowdinvesting). 
According to Hemer et al. (2011), the main differences among these types of 
crowdfunding are characterised by the type of return on investment that the investor 
expects to receive.  
 
Hemer et al. (2014) have stated that donation-based crowdfunding represents an 
investment on which the investor does not expect a return. Rather, the investment is 
made as a charitable donation. Reward-based crowdfunding is similar to donation-
Crowdfunding 
Platform
Bank C
Investor
Bank B
SME
Bank A
pure payment services 
financing request provide funding 
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based crowdfunding in that investors do not expect to receive a return on their 
investment. As noted by Hemer et al. (2014), these two types are risk neutral, whereas 
for the remaining three types of crowdfunding, investors expect to receive a return on 
their investment after a defined period. The conditions are usually established by the 
project initiator, in this case, the SME. A pre-selling-based project intends for backers 
to invest in researching, developing, and finalising a product which could be of interest 
to a potential investor. The return on investment in this case could be the opportunity 
to purchase the product at a heavily discounted price or to make it possible to develop 
such a product (Hemer et al., 2014). Belleflamme et al. (2014) have reported that for 
lending-based and equity-based crowdfunding projects, the investor always expects a 
monetary return on investment. With a lending-based crowdfunding project, backers 
invest money at a guaranteed interest rate and receive a defined continuous cash flow 
return. In equity-based crowdfunding, the investor receives a part of the company in 
equity shares; here, the return primarily depends on the success of the company. The 
difference between crowdfunding and shareholding is that the ‘investment’ is 
temporary. This means that, in crowdfunding, the ‘contract’ between the company and 
‘investor’ lasts as long as it takes for the ‘investor’ to receive benefits for their 
investment, which is typically product. In shareholding, the investment is typically larger 
and the ‘contract’ lasts longer, yet results in a larger reward (Belleflamme et al., 2014). 
 
These descriptions clearly illustrate that each type of crowdfunding has its own level of 
potential risk and return. Hemer et al. (2011) have identified these dependencies (see 
Figure 2); they have further reported that the types of crowdfunding have significantly 
different degrees of risk and complexity, as well as a correlated expectation on return 
on investment. 
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Figure 2: Crowdfunding risk and return chart (Source: Hemer et al., 2011) 
 
Figure 2 also demonstrates that both the return expectations of investors and the 
related risks increase exponentially when investors expect to receive a monetary 
return. Investors are willing to invest a certain amount of money under self-specified 
conditions. That means that an investor defines the investment amount and conditions 
before participating in an investment project. In this case, the crowdfunding platform is 
merely the medium through which supply and demand are matched with financing. 
That means that the investor is aware of the risks before making an investment 
decision. Each investor also participates because of a specific motivation.  
 
According to Haas et al. (2014), crowdfunding investors can be categorised into three 
theoretical intention types: hedonism, altruism, and for-profit. An investor motivated by 
hedonism is seeking innovation and creativity. With regards to the five types of 
crowdfunding, this type of investor is mainly interested in reward-based and pre-
selling-based projects and is not focused on monetary return. The altruistic investor is 
motivated by the “greater good.” The investor assumes that the investment constitutes 
a charitable donation; this approach is typically associated with donation-based 
crowdfunding.  
 
Haas et al. (2014) have explained that with for-profit crowdfunding, the investor’s 
motivation is the desire to receive a return on investment. This type of motivation is 
similar to lending-based and equity-based crowdfunding and is associated with the 
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highest levels of complexity, risk, and return. Such investors are well informed and 
highly interested in the success of the project (Haas et al., 2014). With this type of 
crowdfunding project, in addition to offering funding, investors often provide experience 
and other resources to support the project, to increase its likelihood of success, and to 
therefore increase their probability of receiving the expected return on investment. 
According to Schwienbacher and Larralde (2012), this type of involvement is more 
complex and has a higher cost structure. For instance, most crowdfunding platforms 
keep 10% of the financing amount. However, the rate of return is higher than that of a 
bank loan. The concrete relation depends on the form of the investment and the 
position of the SME. All relevant information is provided and published by the 
crowdfunding platform. The investor enjoys a high degree of transparency and direct 
communication access to the relevant persons involved in the project. However, the 
crowdfunding platform only acts as a non-regulated financial intermediary, and it has 
no responsibility to or dependency on the SME or financed project (Verstein, 2011). 
Although crowdfunding can be conducted in many different ways, one of the most 
popular is through the use of platforms. Reasons for using platforms are commonly 
associated with expense and ease of use. Moreover, the use of platforms allows for 
easier promotion and communication with the contributors. 
 
With regard to the current market, crowdfunding is widely considered one of the most 
innovative forms of financing. In 2014, overall investment within this category totalled 
approximately €44 billion in Europe. In addition, crowdfunding’s share of total 
investment volume in 2014 equalled €3 billion, or 6.8%. This statistic indicates its 
significance as a viable financing alternative. Figure 3 illustrates crowdfunding’s 
presence in European countries in 2014 and hence serves as a first indicator of the 
strength and market share of this new industry. As can be observed, global 
crowdfunding activity increased more than tenfold between 2009 and 2014. This 
radical increase followed the market crisis of 2008, when SMEs began to seek 
financing outside of traditional bank markets. 
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Figure 3: Crowdfunding investment volume in millions of euros (Source: StatiSta, 2016) 
The above discussion highlights that the current market is in the midst of a significant 
change process. The digitalisation of products and services also functions as a kind of 
catalyst supporting this rapid change process. 
 
The crowdfunding phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, relatively new, so 
little discussion of and research about it has been recorded in the literature thus far. 
However, beginning in 2010, fundamental research discussions on the use of 
crowdfunding to close companies’ financing gaps during the founding phases began 
to occur. Hemer et al. (2011) examined crowdfunding in terms of seed-stage and early-
stage company financing. During these periods, it was not always possible to obtain 
financing from traditional banks, yet other options were available, such as 
crowdfunding. 
 
With regard to Gerber et al. (2012), the first valid research in this context was 
conducted by evaluating interviews with crowdfunding investors and project initiators 
on a qualitative basis. The first quantitative research was conducted by Ahlers et al. 
(2013) after the first crowdfunding platforms were established in the United States. 
They based their analysis on the available transaction volumes published by the 
crowdfunding platforms. According to Ahlers et al. (2013), the existing literature mainly 
describes and evaluates the term crowdfunding and the mechanism itself. That body 
2.337
154 140 107 78 62 22 17 12 8 4 4 3 3 2
0
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
Fr
an
ce
G
e
rm
an
y
Sw
ed
en
Th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
Sp
ai
n
Es
to
n
ia
Fi
n
la
n
d
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
It
al
y
P
o
la
n
d
D
en
m
ar
k
B
el
gi
u
m
Sl
o
va
ki
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
Investment Vol. (in million EUR)
Investment Vol. in Millions
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 23 
of research offers no insight into the impact of crowdfunding on the existing financing 
environment for SMEs, nor does it describe the potential effect of crowdfunding on 
financial markets and potential changes in how SMEs and financial intermediates 
function in the market. This lack of research fuels the present study through showing 
the gap in existing literature. 
 
1.2 Description of the research problem 
The aforementioned forms of innovative finance instruments clearly indicate that the 
market has responded to fluctuations. For example, the economic recession gave rise 
to a non-regulated market with massive nominal potential that eventually came to 
challenge more traditional financial instruments. The previously mentioned growth 
rates for crowdfunding demonstrate that it is necessary to evaluate these 
developments from a research perspective. Furthermore, financial institutions and 
SMEs are strongly interested in gaining a valid scientific understanding of not only the 
potential impact of innovation on the funding market but also the newly emerging 
competition they pose to more traditional financial models (Blohm et al. 2014).  
 
The new crowdfunding financing approach has heavily influenced the European 
financing market. According Blohm et al. (2014), the market will see exponential growth 
over the next seven years. The University of St. Gallen conducted a Delphi survey in 
2014 that found that by 2020, global crowdfunding volume will total $35 billion. 
Compared with the overall investment volume of €44 billion in Europe in 2014, this 
represents a major increase expected to significantly affect the traditional financing 
industry.  
 
The University of St. Gallen researchers assumed that in this context, this $35 billion 
will represent a market share of approximately 60%–80% of the profit-oriented 
financing industry. That would represent a fundamental change in the current financial 
market and its mechanisms. While banks and other financial institutions in Europe are 
regulated under the European Banking Authority, according to Rossi (2014), there are 
neither regulators nor regulations in place which cover this new financing sector. From 
a research perspective, there is a high information asymmetry between capital seekers 
and investors, financial institutions, and regulators. The market faces uncertainty 
regarding the regulatory treatment of crowdfunding, the currently unknown impact on 
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traditional financial institutions and their products and business strategies with regard 
to expected market share growth, and the expected changes in SMEs’ balance and 
financing structures. Based on this information, the research problem under 
investigation is the lack of information regarding the impact of crowdfunding on 
traditional institutions, such as banks. This research problem is informed using game 
theory. Essentially, in relation to this study, game theory asserts that companies will 
secure financing using crowdfunding in order to reduce reliance on traditional financing 
through banks. This is based on the basic model of cooperative game theory, which 
asserts that joint actions by groups (companies) taken will result in collective payoffs. 
Therefore, the research problem, based in the context of cooperative game theory, is 
the exploration of the benefits of crowdfunding for companies, as compared to the need 
for traditional financing from banks. 
 
1.3 Research aims  
The author of this research project is a senior manager at Deloitte and leading the 
Capital Markets Transformation capability in Germany. In his professional function, the 
author explored that banks as well as SMEs has responded to funding fluctuations. For 
example, the economic recession gave rise to a non-regulated market with massive 
nominal potential that would challenge the more traditional financial instruments. The 
previously mentioned growth rates for crowdfunding clearly demonstrate that it is 
necessary to evaluate and investigate developments from a research perspective. 
Furthermore, financial institutions and SMEs are strongly invested in gaining a valid 
scientific understanding of the potential impact that crowdfunding can have on the 
funding market as well as the newly emerging competitive situation they offer to the 
more traditional financial models.  
 
During the professional activities of the author, he had the chance to discuss the 
potential impact of crowdfunding with European Central Bank Innovation’s Director 
Alexander Heist, which stated clear that there are no experience, key figures or valid 
evaluation studies with regarding a potential impact of crowdfunding on the banking 
and SME market. 
 
The author was affected by the subprime crisis 2007, as his family loses a majority of 
its pension funding through the Lehmann default. This led not least to a stroke of his 
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mother. It is a passion for the author to ensure that potential systemic risks are at an 
early stage investigated academically and become transparent for the regulator. 
 
Therefore, the main aim of this research is to describe the crowdfunding phenomenon 
in relation to its impact on classical financial institutions as a new and innovative source 
of SME financing. It will also investigate which financial authorities and regulations 
need to be considered and observe crowdfunding platforms as new financial 
intermediaries. In this context, the research will explain the relationships and 
differences between crowdfunding and financial-institution funding and evaluate the 
future role of financial institutions under consideration of the expected new allocation 
of market shares for crowdfunding platforms. In addition, the research will identify the 
regulatory gap and assess the potential default risk, which can be indicated by the 
potential assumed growth. The research will indicate and evaluate potential systematic 
risk related to such worldwide-allocated platforms and investors. The research project 
will be separated into the following research objectives and associated questions. 
Objectives: 
 
• Evaluation and determination of the importance of crowdfunding and 
crowdfunding platforms as financing alternatives for SMEs. 
• Evaluation and determination of the potential impact on the traditional financing 
market caused by a shift in financing demand from financial institutions to 
crowdfunding platforms in terms of SME financing on the traditional business 
model. 
• Identification and evaluation of potential regulatory gaps which are potentially 
leading to a systematic risk. 
 
These objectives provided the basis for the research questions of the study. The 
research questions and hypotheses of the study are as follows, 
 
RQ1: What is the percentage of crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? 
 
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing? 
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RQ3:  What is the potential  impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME 
financing demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms? 
 
RQ4: In the context of crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead 
to systematic risk? 
 
This research project will close the existing gap in knowledge regarding the impact of 
crowdfunding as a source of funding, as compared to traditional funding by banks. This 
will be done through three major objectives. First, the study will investigate which 
financial authorities and regulations need to be considered in the guidance of 
crowdfunding, particularly in the treatment of crowdfunding platforms as new financial 
intermediaries. Thus, the study will explain the relationship that exists between 
crowdfunding and traditional financing (such as through banks) (addressed empirically 
in RQ2), explores the differences between the two models (crowdfunding and 
traditional financing), and evaluates the future role of financial institutions, such as 
banks, in light of the anticipated growth in the market share of crowdfunding platforms 
(addressed qualitatively in RQ3). In addition, the research identifies the regulatory 
gaps and assesses the potential default risk, which can be extrapolated based on the 
assumed growth rate. The study identifies and evaluates potential systematic risks 
related to global allocated crowdfunding platforms and investors. As the crowdfunding 
industry is innovative and new, it is necessary to set limits in terms of this research 
study. The following section outlines these boundaries.  
 
1.4 Research limitations and boundaries 
From a scientific perspective, crowdfunding as an innovative financing source is a 
relatively new phenomenon (Blohm et al., 2014). That means that valid scientific 
literature on the topic is limited. Limiting the scope of the research made it possible to 
generate valid results. In terms of the three main research objectives, the focus of the 
research was generally limited to the German market. That means the research was 
primarily centred on German crowdfunding platforms, SMEs, and regulations. 
Accordingly, the research only considered financial institutions involved in a business 
relationship with a German crowdfunding platform and or SME. The study identifies, 
evaluates, and explains the existing regulatory gaps as regards crowdfunding 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 27 
platforms as innovative financial intermediaries. It does not offer specific 
recommendations regarding changes or the introduction of new regulations. 
 
1.5 Contribution to knowledge 
The knowledge gap being closed in the present study is regarding the impact of 
crowdfunding as a source of financing, as compared to traditional financing by banks. 
This research project closes this knowledge gap regarding financial institutions 
(banks), SME financing, and crowdfunding platforms as new and innovative financing 
intermediaries. The importance of this study will be also supported by the opinion of 
the German Regulator BaFin and the European Central Bank (Director Alexander 
Heisst, 2017). This research project suggests that it could significantly reduce future 
financial uncertainly for financial institutions and SMEs. From an economic 
perspective, the information provided in this study could be beneficial for financial 
institutions, such as banks, because they could explore synergies with innovative 
financing platforms. This study also validates anticipated regulatory treatments in this 
new area of financing through the explanation of how current regulations may not be 
adequate for crowdfunding, which is important because many countries tend to model 
regulatory frameworks from European countries. 
 
It closes a significant knowledge gap, as it describes the fundamental function of 
crowdfunding platforms and their position in the market. In this regard, it may assist in 
reducing the uncertainty relating to financing regulations among the three market 
participants: SMEs, crowdfunding platforms, and traditional financial institutions, such 
as banks. There is a need for a deeper understanding of the new financing sources to 
prevent impacts to the economic environment. For example, in 2007, the world was 
impacted by the housing bust, leading to new financial regulations. Through 
understanding the new financing sources, it would be possible to update and 
implement regulations to assist in preventing such crises in the future. Moreover, the 
impact of crowdfunding may be another way that averse economic environments 
evolve if there are not sufficient regulations in place. Regulatory authorities can use 
this research to draft necessary regulations governing crowdfunding intermediaries. To 
that end, the study supports a deeper understanding of the further development of 
crowdfunding as an innovative financing source. While the main literature is not able 
to offer quantitative evidence on the development of the crowdfunding market in terms 
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of SME financing and the role of financial institutions, this study uses mixed 
quantitative-qualitative methods to contribute to different research streams and to 
reduce the aforementioned information asymmetry. 
 
1.5.1 Literature review 
Chapter 2 contains a critical literature review of the existing research on crowdfunding 
and crowdfunding platforms. It draws on multiple sources, including peer-reviewed 
journals, books, relevant conference studies, published introductions, case studies, 
and white study. Bachman et al. (2011) conducted one of two significant literature 
reviews regarding crowdfunding and crowdfunding platforms. They evaluated 43 peer-
to-peer lending-based scientific articles, which are also considered in this research 
project. Feller et al. (2013) conducted a quantitative literature review to assess the 
general growth of the crowdfunding market; that work is also considered in this 
research. The following criteria were used to select works to include: 
 The work needed to be a scientific or practice-based contribution, article, 
journal, book, or seminar study. 
 The main topic needed to be a crowdfunding platform or a related capital-
seeking SME or investor. 
Following this, the research mainly considered economics studies, except bachelor’s 
or master’s dissertations. Literature was sought through the following academic 
databases: Google Scholar, JSTOR, Business Source Complete, Academic Search 
Premier, Econlit, Emerald, Science Direct, Web of Science. In each of these 
databases, the following searchers were undertaken: 
 “Crowdfunding” AND “financing” AND “small business” 
 “Crowdfunding” AND “financing” AND “mid-sized business” 
 “Crowdfunding” AND “financing” AND “SME” 
 “Crowdfunding” AND “financing” AND “SMB” 
Abstracts for all relevant articles were read, and the works chosen for inclusion in the 
literature review conformed with the inclusion criteria listed above. 
 
This chapter reviews the key elements which lay a foundation for crowdfunding and 
crowdfunding platforms. It highlights recent developments within the financial and 
crowdfunding industry landscape with regards to SME financing through a critical 
review of relevant theories and frameworks. In addition, the literature review creates a 
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basis for identifying gaps in the SME crowdfunding literature. This chapter concludes 
by formulating concrete research questions to address these gaps and the challenges 
within the crowdfunding market. 
 
1.5.2 Research methodology, paradigm, and design 
Chapter 3 contains the research methodology, paradigm, and design, and provides a 
review of various philosophical approaches and components within the business and 
management research domain. It further describes how quantitative and qualitative 
methods in terms of a triangulation approach were used to answer the research 
questions. In addition, it outlines the research paradigm, a term Kuhn (1962) defined 
as “the set of practices that define a scientific discipline during a particular period of 
time”. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) have mentioned that the research 
paradigm is mainly determined based on researcher’s methodological, 
epistemological, and ontological premises that guide and influence the research. 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), the researcher approaches the research 
project with an established set of ideas (ontology), which determine a set of questions 
(epistemology) and thus help to shape the research instruments used to investigate 
the research problem in a specific way (methodology). 
 
1.5.3 Analysis and findings 
Chapter 4 presents the analysis and findings. It describes in detail the analytical 
approaches, which were based on the reviewed literature, used to describe the 
scientific meaning of the evaluated data. 
 
The data on the first two research objectives were analysed via a quantitative 
regression analysis (i.e., correlation analysis). It was assumed that an increased 
funding debt base for SMEs would mean funding had been issued by financial 
institutions or other financial intermediaries such as crowdfunding platforms. 
Additionally, the identification of a general increase in financing and investment activity 
for SMEs, reduced loan issuance activity among financial institutions, and increased 
sales volume for innovative financing platforms was assumed to point to a negative 
correlation over time. The related regression analysis was based on the equation 
formulated by Rajan and Zinglas (2003), as cited in Motamen-Samadian (2005).  
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The chapter also contains the evaluation of the SME survey. The survey answers were 
used to assess a potential causal correlation of the funding shifts from financial 
institutions to crowdfunding platforms in terms of SME financing. With regards to 
existing British financing regulations, this chapter identifies regulatory gaps and related 
risks for financial authorities, SMEs, and financial institutions.  
 
1.5.4 Discussion 
Chapter 5 provides information regarding the results of the analysis based on theory. 
The chapter also briefly describes the outcomes of the methodologies. 
 
1.5.5 Conclusion and directions for further research  
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and their implications; it begins with a discussion 
of the three main objectives and their scientific implications. It briefly discusses the 
applied theoretical approaches and collected data. This is followed by a conclusion 
and an explanation regarding how the outcomes contribute to the theoretical and 
practical knowledge bases. Next, the validity of the research findings is discussed, and 
a description on the limitations of the study follows. Finally, Chapter 6 ends by 
recommending directions for further research. 
 
  
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 31 
2 CHAPTER LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Much has been written about funding for SMEs. These businesses can at times 
struggle to attract funding from traditional sources, including banks and private equity 
firms, because they present several risks and also lack connections to those funding 
sources. Filling in the gap for SMEs is crowdfunding, a unique concept that allows 
anyone to provide funding for a small but innovative idea. Crowdfunding is truly an idea 
birthed on the Internet, as online portals make it much easier for people to connect to 
one another in this way. Crowdfunding of SMEs has been particularly popular in 
Germany, where companies have been able to leverage their missions and growth 
potential to attract smaller investments from people interested in accessing that upside 
or contributing to that mission. A number of studies have been written on this topic, but 
there is much more to contribute (Klafft 2008). This literature review seeks to fill the 
gap in the literature regarding the impact of crowdfunding as a source of financing, as 
compared to traditional financing by banks, by providing a clearer picture of current 
innovations regarding SME crowdfunding, with a specific focus on Germany.  
 
2.2 Early development of crowdfunding research 
The term crowdfunding is relatively new, although the concept has existed for much 
longer. With this in mind, readers should note that former names for what is now 
considered crowdfunding include peer-to-peer lending and social lending. These 
concepts differ in some ways from crowdfunding as currently constituted, but they 
helped to establish crowdfunding in its current form.  
 
Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, and Shue (2009) wrote an early study on the availability of peer-
to-peer lending for businesses that lack others means of funding. Importantly, these 
authors focused on the peer-to-peer model in part because there was a lack of 
understanding of crowdfunding’s comprehensive nature (Hemingway and Hoffman 
2010). While their focus was on the extent to which individuals could trust the 
creditworthiness of those they lent to, the overall tone made clear that peer-to-peer 
funding was, at that time, seen as something less than a full solution. It was instead 
perceived as a small-scale funding vehicle that could be utilised to fill in holes, not as 
a fully developed means of widescale funding for businesses at large. Klafft (2008) 
wrote about peer-to-peer lending early on in the process, and in his work, one can see 
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what the early market looked like. Around 2008, peer-to-peer lending was seen 
primarily as a vehicle for funding through which businesses and lenders could avoid 
the high costs associated with traditional finance. In addition, the author wrote about 
peer-to-peer lending as a platform that was not ideal for legitimate parties, calling it an 
option best used by parties that were not legitimate. The author deemed lenders and 
other parties participating in peer-to-peer transactions “inexperienced”, signalling that 
the approach was not yet perceived a legitimate form of widespread business funding. 
During the early years, the literature portrayed peer-to-peer funding as a niche model 
plagued by several problems. Rather than focusing on the opportunities presented by 
such a force, the literature emphasised the litany of problems as well as the relatively 
narrow class of parties that might be involved in such a transaction (Hemingway and 
Hoffman 2010).  
 
There have long been complex rules governing the funding of businesses in both 
Germany and the United States. In some cases, investors need to be accredited, and 
there are net worth requirements in other instances. With this in mind, some of the first 
foundational writings on crowdfunding for businesses covered the important legal 
topics surrounding the practice. Hemingway and Hoffman (2010) explored the law to 
see whether crowdfunding was even legal and questioned whether a regulatory 
structure would be put into place to limit the practice in the near term. Hemingway and 
Hoffman wrote at length about the fact that the crowdfunding movement in the United 
States ran afoul of the Securities Act of 1933, a law designed during the New Deal era 
making it more difficult for businesses to raise capital any old way. Their focus was on 
both those lending capital and those receiving it; they cautioned that the practice could 
be ended. In particular, the authors wondered whether companies that had received 
capital in this way would face heavy fines and potential shutdown. Pope (2010) took a 
similar stance, although he used the rise of crowdfunding to suggest that it was time to 
extend the opportunity to smaller public offerings. Pope’s point was that the current 
rules benefitted only large, rich institutional investors and allowed only large and 
wealthy companies to benefit from the public’s desire to put their money to work. The 
author used the movement towards crowdfunding to suggest that the regulatory 
scheme covering business funding in general was oppressing those who were not 
wealthy and well connected (Hemer 2011). 
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After a sufficient focus had been placed on this particular element of the crowdfunding 
phenomenon, others began to cover further elements of this trend. Specifically, authors 
started writing about how crowdfunding worked and different means of facilitating 
crowdfunding. More empirical studies, both quantitative and qualitative in nature, 
emerged and weighed in on whether this new trend would be sustainable and whether 
it was even proving successful at helping people. Hemer (2011) provided a snapshot 
of crowdfunding in Germany, illustrating that it had gained popularity and that many 
crowdfunding markets were running without excessive problems. Importantly, Hemer 
wrote that crowdfunding was still new and unfamiliar to some, so it had become 
widespread and popular only among true innovators in the marketplace. Also writing 
in 2011, Agrawal et al. (2011) reported that crowdfunding was enjoying much more 
success in Germany and the United States than elsewhere in the world. The authors 
stated that crowdfunding was more popular in these countries in part because of its 
informality, which matched the aggressive German and American business cultures. 
By contrast, crowdfunding did not seem to work well in Asian markets, where many 
develop relationships for funding based on own personal interactions, rather than 
dealings with strangers over the Internet. This study focusing on geography helped to 
demonstrate that the world was undergoing a shift and that states were divided 
regarding the acceptability of crowdfunding as a means of funding businesses (Hollow 
2013).  
 
Discussions on crowdfunding eventually moved to more specific inquiries. 
Crowdfunding being fully accepted in many of the largest markets around the world, 
these new inquiries have been more interesting and seek to shine a light on the 
practices undertaken by entrepreneurs around the world. For example, recent research 
has focused on topics such as determinants of crowdfunding sourcing across Germany 
(Dushnitsky et al 2016) and the compatibility of crowdfunding and civic society across 
Europe (Hollow 2013). The shift in the conversation on crowdfunding and the more 
specific questions underscore the important changes that have taken place in such a 
short period of time. In less than a decade, the literature has evolved from not even 
referring to the practice by its currently accepted name to asking simple questions 
about the legality of the practice to investigating the specifics of why and how the 
practice has emerged across Europe. Examining the development of the literature on 
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the topic can lead to a firmer understanding of how crowdfunding has evolved across 
Germany over the last few years (Hollow 2013).  
 
2.3 The literature on capital seekers 
One can categorise the literature according to many different classifications, but when 
discussing innovation in SME crowdfunding in Germany, an important distinction is 
whether the literature is dealing with those offering capital or those seeking capital. 
People in these two groups work together, and though their interests are in many ways 
aligned, there are several ways in which the experience differs for the two actors 
(Brown et al 2017). The literature on SME crowdfunding in the German context is 
extremely limited, suggesting that researchers either do not believe that crowdfunding 
is a sufficiently important or interesting funding source or that crowdfunding, as a 
phenomenon, is not well-known to academic researchers in the field. Brüntje and 
Gajda (2015) provided one of the few discussions of SME crowdfunding in Germany, 
which was limited in its empirical dimensions. 
 
2.4 Importance of crowdfunding for SMEs  
According to Brüntje and Gajda (2015), companies seeking crowdfunding in Germany 
cannot be placed within single categories. Most have multiple motivations for seeking 
this type of financing. Their book, while exploring crowdfunding in a general way to 
shed light on these multiple motivations, notes that some companies consider 
crowdfunding because they cannot access funding elsewhere. Others do so because 
they think it is the best way to avoid the bureaucratic hassle involved in seeking funding 
from other sources. Schmitz (2016) has described the problems faced by SMEs as 
follows: “In particular, a high risk of failure deters many external financiers from 
providing a young venture in their infancy with monetary amounts. A further problem 
becomes evident when comparing start-ups with established or even publicly-held 
companies. Due to the obligation to publicly disclose results, commercial and non-
commercial investors can obtain detailed information about listed firms with minimal 
effort. However, detailed information about a start-up and its core business is hardly 
accessible.” It seems that SMEs are risky ventures for backers, and this also creates 
problems when it comes to obtaining appropriate funding. Because they are perceived 
as highly risky, SMEs are avoided by many traditional funding sources; these actors 
prefer more stable investments. This author suggests, then, that it is the very nature of 
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SMEs in Germany that causes them to seek more innovative funding sources and that 
that eventually leads them to crowdfunding (Brüntje and Gajda 2015).  
 
One of the motivations for companies to seek funding in this way stems from the desire 
to have more people engaged and involved (Hossain & Oparaocha 2017). Honisch 
and Ottenbacher (2016) have written about this in the context of restaurants in 
Germany. These businesses are among the SMEs that have been most likely to 
embrace this kind of funding when they first begin operating. As the authors have 
noted, crowdfunding gives them the momentum they need during this initial stage. 
Many businesses face a dual challenge when they are first starting out. Finding funding 
is only the first step. A company also must attract attention in order to move forward. 
By relying on crowdfunding, these German restaurants have been able to not only 
attract attention and engagement early on but also to access the money that is so 
desperately needed to begin operating. While some forms of funding, including venture 
capital, are all about acquiring cash to position the company for long-term success, 
German companies that turn to crowdfunding are also seeking to use the funding 
period as a springboard to greater success (Brown et al 2017). Crowdfunding is 
different from traditional funding in that it provides investors with a real opportunity to 
get involved in a business and to generate excitement. Simply put, a crowdfunding 
campaign is fundamentally different than requesting money from a venture capitalist 
for an idea. Rather, it has to be understood as similar to a major social marketing 
campaign; the concept of getting people involved and engaged has its own value for 
any business hoping to grow rapidly (Hossain & Oparaocha 2017).  
 
Brown et al. (2017) have reported that crowdfunding comes from a place of marketing. 
When these authors broke down crowdfunding campaigns across Germany, they 
found that although there seemed to be many other reasons why people chose that 
direction, one primary factor was the desire to market their products. This makes 
sense, of course, because of the attention that many companies have received from 
these campaigns. Unless a company is going on a television show to seek funding 
from venture capitalists and angel investors, much of that activity takes place behind 
the scenes, a point that is also made by Hossain and Oparaocha (2017) and Honisch 
and Ottenbacher (2016). The founders talk to important people, solicit feedback on 
their ideas, and close a deal. The parties sign a contract, a sizable check is written, 
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and the money is paid back to the investor. These actions take place without many 
people even being aware of them. It does not represent something that brings value to 
the company unless it is in the news, and even then, in Germany, the financial page is 
not something the average consumer reads, or even cares much about. What must be 
noted, then, is the way in which crowdfunding can sometimes go viral (Brown et al. 
2017; Gierczak et al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017). 
It can achieve goals that a standard funding campaign could never realise, such as by 
bringing positive attention to how a company is willing to challenge norms and bring 
outsiders into the fold.  
 
Crowdfunding is also one of the best types of marketing (Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak 
et al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017). It helps to build 
the brand of a company by demonstrating to the public that the company wants to be 
involved in the community and by soliciting input from consumers. In an era when 
companies are using tools like Twitter to relate to customers and handle customer 
service problems, it makes sense that a firm would want to use its crowdfunding 
campaign to illustrate that it cares about public feedback so much that it wants to bring 
members of the public into the fold to invest in its idea (Gierczak et al. 2016). The 
marketing value ensures that when the campaign is over, the company is left with much 
more than just money. It finishes the campaign with brand awareness and an enhanced 
reputation based on its willingness to step outside of the box and to challenge industry 
and business norms. Some have noted that it is almost impossible to put a dollar 
amount on how important it is for companies to appear “cool”. Crowdfunding is an 
effective way to ensure that a company enjoys that reputation (Gierczak et al. 2016).  
 
Gierczak et al. (2016) have reported that crowdfunding has been sparked to life in part 
by the desire to get lots of little bites to build the bigger structure. Having many different 
people involved in the funding process distributes ownership among many. This 
approach can result in those people numbering among the most fervent supporters of 
an idea. Researchers have long reported that the best way to improve engagement 
among employees is to ensure that they enjoy some degree of ownership. Whether 
this is actual ownership of the company or simply a sense of ownership, the ultimate 
idea is that when people feel invested in this way, they are more likely to work hard to 
push a product, service, or company. Crowdfunding motivation, then, can be 
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understood to reflect, at least in part, a company’s desire to begin its life with the 
support of those people who feel legitimate ownership (Wolf & Kraemer 2015). 
Guerzoni et al. (2016) have written that in countries with struggling economies, 
crowdfunding has been a popular option for companies that might have otherwise 
struggled to finance their ventures. The authors studied Italy and found many examples 
of people who enjoyed giving to crowdfunding campaigns. While the authors did take 
a dive into the reasons why people enjoyed being a part of these movements, one of 
the more interesting takeaways regarded why companies in places like Italy have been 
seeking this kind of funding (Marchegiani 2017). They found that entrepreneurs in 
these places were able to take advantage of a sense of national pride. These 
individuals were looking for legitimacy and authenticity, rather than the same and 
economies run in the same old ways. With this in mind, the companies seeking funding 
wanted to take advantage of countrywide trends that were already in place and that 
seemed generally favourable to their operations. Marchegiani (2017) have linked this 
trend to mercantilism, noting a long tradition of national momentum when it comes to 
these ideas. Smart merchants during the Middle Ages and the Age of Exploration were 
able to leverage this power into funding for their ideas, and it may be that modern 
businesses across Germany are simply relying on an updated version of that same 
concept to obtain funding.  
 
Lasrado and Lugmayr (2013) brought to bear an important point when addressing the 
critical question of why some companies pick crowdfunding rather than another option. 
In particular, these authors studied a number of businesses in Finland and concluded 
that one reason people in positions of business power often select crowdfunding is that 
they are trying to undertake an insurgent mission. There is a near-obsession among 
some business founders today about being an insurgent company (Gierczak et al. 
2016). They want to be an Amazon or Uber, disrupting their industries with new 
technologies, new processes, and new ways of thinking. This is in line with much of 
the literature on how to start a successful new business. In some cases, the focus on 
being disruptive allows a company to envision new ways of doing business that allow 
it to compete with larger firms (Angerer et al. 2017; Lasrado & Lugmayr 2013; 
Marchegiani 2017). A company’s success in this regard can mean the difference 
between attracting more customers and being yet another business relying on old 
tactics in a tired market. When business owners are consumed with the idea of being 
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disruptive, they often want to do everything differently (Marchegiani 2017): This is 
where crowdfunding comes into play. Above all else, crowdfunding has proven itself to 
be new and different. It is challenging and disruptive in ways that all companies hope 
to be when they enter the market. If a company is trying to be disruptive in general, it 
makes sense that it might select a disruptive mechanism as well. Hence, in part, 
crowdfunding is about the culture of the company that is seeking the funding (Angerer 
et al. 2017; Lasrado & Lugmayr 2013; Marchegiani 2017). The firms want to ensure 
that it is building that culture from the ground up in a way that suggests to employees 
and the public that it is different. Angerer et al. (2017) have suggested that something 
similar is taking place among German businesses. Long a country obsessed with the 
proper procedures and the most effective ways of doing business, Germany has 
sparked an insurgent culture wherein many businesses are seeking to shake up 
industries with new and innovative technologies. Those companies are more willing to 
start in less traditional ways to signal in a tangible way that they are not just like every 
other company. They are instead in the market to introduce new approaches and more 
efficient ideas (Angerer et al. 2017).  
 
Polzin et al. (2017) have written that another major motivation for companies that seek 
out this kind of funding is that they want to take advantage of the so-called “wisdom of 
the market”. These authors have suggested that German crowdfunding is similar to a 
betting market in certain ways. It becomes efficient because people have a degree of 
wisdom. They invest in those ideas that work and do their best to avoid fewer promising 
options. This is difficult to behold because in a way, it puts the company’s future in the 
hands of random outsiders. Many businesses, however, grasp that they will be doing 
exactly that when they release products and services into the market. The 
crowdfunding period, then, is almost a test run to allow them to perfect their products 
and services before that fateful moment (Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak et al. 2016; 
Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017). If people do not like an 
idea, then they are not likely to invest in it (Marchegiani 2017). The company receives 
instant feedback, learning that it has made a mistake regarding, for example, its 
investor pitch, the product itself, or even the understanding of the market. This 
motivation might be called the “test balloon” theory. Crowdfunding becomes more than 
just a way that companies can obtain money to scale their operations and grow. 
Rather, crowdfunding can be a way to tap into the collective wisdom of the public 
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through an efficient investor market to determine whether an idea is promising (Brown 
et al. 2017; Gierczak et al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 
2017). If a firm does not get the response it is looking for, it still will have information 
more valuable than almost anything else it might be able to acquire (Marchegiani 
2017). It can then make the necessary adjustments and try again. This trial run saves 
the company from the hardship it might have faced if it had obtained funding from 
traditional sources before entering the market with a product or business idea destined 
to be rejected wholesale (Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak et al. 2016; Honisch & 
Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017).  
 
Previati (2015) agreed so much with the hypothesis that businesses were interested in 
crowdfunding because of the desire to take advantage of the efficiency and wisdom of 
the market that the author argued that this model could provide an antidote to the credit 
crunch. During the years that followed the economic downturn in Germany, banks and 
traditional lenders were simply not letting businesses, and especially SMEs, access 
the money they needed to get off the ground. In a sense, this was a sensible decision 
on the part of the banks and venture capitalists, as they had to tighten things up to 
mitigate risk during a time of uncertainty, but it produced innovation on the funding side 
(Marchegiani 2017). If banks and venture capitalists were not going to provide access 
to money, perhaps they were erring on the side of being too careful. While one might 
assume that banks and other financial institutions know best in terms of where to put 
their money, Previati (2015) and others (Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak et al. 2016; 
Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017) have written that the market 
itself tends to have the best idea of what ideas might succeed. Supporters of this idea 
see this as a market correction of sorts. While the credit markets tightened restrictions 
because of excessive risk aversion, the authors argued that crowdfunding arose in 
response. Crowdfunding emerged to give the market a chance to weigh in. Individuals 
could determine an efficient amount of risk, and the resultant approach was even more 
efficient than the model large lenders and traditional funding sources were using at that 
time.  
 
Wahjono and Marina (2017) have reported that to move researchers’ attention away 
from white-centric and Judeo-Christian businesses. There is a tendency when 
examining situations like this to view them from an ethnocentric perspective. There is 
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a tendency towards erasure as well, and the stories of those practicing different 
religions and bound by their doctrines regarding how to conduct their operations—
including fundraising—are often overlooked. Importantly, there are many SME owners 
and operators in Germany who adhere to the Muslim faith. Islam places certain 
restrictions on funding from banks and the like. For them, crowdfunding has been an 
alternative allowing them to become involved in the world of entrepreneurship while 
still staying within the banks of their religious tradition. One should not forget that for 
many, crowdfunding has been a lifeline that has allowed them to participate in the 
business world without having to compromise on their values. (Previati 2015).  
 
This speaks also to a broader point about the availability of funding. While most SME 
owners and founders are able to access funding from traditional sources according to 
their religious traditions, there are other reasons why these institutions may close their 
doors to people seeking funding (Previati, 2015; Vedantam, 2015). In most cases, the 
central motivation for business owners to use crowdfunding rather than a traditional 
bank loan or venture capital funding is that they cannot access those traditional 
sources (Previati 2015). This has become even more true over time due to certain 
changes in the Germany credit markets since the crash and the slower-than-expected 
recovery from that crash. While this has held true for some markets more than for 
others, with Greece being especially problematic, it has truly been the case in almost 
every German market to this point.  
 
Vedantam (2015) conducted work on this topic and brought to bear the idea that one 
of the top factors prompting companies to seek crowdfunding is the presence of too 
many warts to be accepted by more traditional sources of funding. This author 
suggested that the problem may be not only that the risk profile of the SME deters 
traditional funding sources but also that certain products and causes are less likely to 
catch the eye of traditional funders. In the modern world, and especially across 
Germany and the United States, there are many businesses that may intentionally limit 
their own upside to make a positive contribution to the world beyond that represented 
by their products and services (Previati 2015; Vedantam 2015). This movement 
towards extreme social corporate responsibility has been difficult for the traditional 
financing world to adjust to, as these institutions have sometimes been disinterested 
in those businesses not seeking to maximise growth at every turn. However, those 
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businesses that may not utilise a traditional approach point to a need for alternative 
and even innovative funding. It is an issue of need, and the development of non-
traditional financing came about through expediency (Previati 2015; Vedantam 2015).  
 
Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2014) drew a direct link between the financial collapse of 
2008/2009 and the need for more crowdfunding and crowdinvesting in Germany. They 
noted that firms that might have previously been able to rely on banks for debt funding 
have not been finding favour with those banks; what is more, companies that would 
have had an easy time tapping into equity financing started struggling in that domain 
following the financial collapse. The authors suggested strongly that there is a critical 
issue of need at play when it comes to why firms are willing to turn to crowdfunding 
during their early stages. Rossi (2014) has noted that because there are fewer rules 
for firms that seek crowdfunding than for those relying on traditional financing, 
crowdfunding is a much easier path for firms that might have otherwise been barred 
from the market for not having the structures needed to access that higher-end 
financing. A firm may need a high-powered team of lawyers and industry relationships 
to be able to access bank and venture capital financing. Many firms, however, only 
have an idea for a product or service, and a desire to grow (Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak 
et al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017; Kim & Moor 
2017). They have the tools needed to be successful, but they lack the front-end tools 
required to access traditional funding. These are the firms that are able to use 
crowdfunding successfully; the lack of rules and regulations makes it simpler for firms 
that do not have full legal teams and other compliance offers (Rossi 2014).  
 
Kim and Moor (2017) have noted that tech firms have been especially likely to seek 
this kind of funding, in part because they are more likely to want to move fast when 
they have an idea worth pursuing. Ultimately, the world of traditional finance moves 
slowly. Venture capitalists take a long time to conduct due diligence and to learn about 
a company. At the same time, banks are notoriously slow regarding not only their 
decision-making but also the layers of red tape one may need to cut through. Simply 
put, many rapidly growing and quickly moving tech companies that use the new types 
of financing change rapidly and need to grow quickly (Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak et 
al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017; Kim & Moor 2017). 
They may need to get a new technology or programme to the market in a matter of 
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weeks, not months, to meet a consumer need or to perhaps capitalise on an ephemeral 
trend. When traditional financing mechanisms are too slow to help them, their options 
become limited. Crowdfunding, however, gives them the ability to move more quickly 
without the hassle associated with a traditional financing market (Brown et al. 2017; 
Gierczak et al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017; Kim 
& Moor 2017; Previati 2015; Vedantam 2015). This need for speed illustrates that there 
are multiple motivations at any given time for firms that engage in this business. In 
some cases, the tech firms that are financed through crowdfunding might have been 
destined to become tech unicorns with $1 billion valuations and little trouble obtaining 
necessary financing from traditional funding source. The difference is that they needed 
to move more quickly than the traditional sources were willing, and this caused them 
to seek forms of funding more suited to their particular needs (Rossi 2014).  
 
Jegeleviciute and Valanciene (2014) are among the many authors who have written 
about another factor that motivates firms to seek such funding: issues regarding 
valuation in traditional funding markets. At the heart of venture capital funding is the 
idea that a company should have a specific value, usually four or five times its yearly 
revenue, that then leads to an investment for a certain level of equity. This is difficult 
because not all companies operate in this way. There are some companies that have 
values that the owners believe are higher than the standard revenue model might 
suggest. There are many reasons this might be the case. For instance, a company 
might be anticipating rapid growth in a year or two that would make its valuation far too 
low. According to some authors, this might make companies more apt to try to sell their 
outlook to the market at large than to attempt to entice venture capitalists likely to be 
sceptical of any request to deviate from standard valuation models. Beyond that, a 
company might have valuable intellectual property that should be pushing its value 
higher, and it may not believe that traditional funding sources would value that 
intellectual property correctly. In short, when valuation issue exists, the core is 
companies’ belief that the market itself will value them more than venture capitalists 
would (Rossi 2014).  
 
This is a risk, however, because in some cases, the elements that make the company 
more valuable are too complex to explain in a compelling way to average investors; 
such a discussion might be better suited for a presentation to savvy venture capitalists 
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(Lehner 2013). Nonetheless, many owners perceive this as a risk worth taking and 
view crowdfunding as an opportunity to protect their equity from venture capitalists 
desiring to take advantage of their situation. Lehner (2013) has written that although 
venture capitalists are slowly warming to the trending idea of firms being more valuable 
if they can tap into consumers’ desire for more companies trying to create positive 
change, these venture capitalists are still likely to undervalue such companies. This 
reality is something that company founders are conscious of, and so they might believe 
that the public will value their company’s efforts to improve the world more than a 
venture capitalist might. This could be a motivation to seek non-traditional funding.  
 
2.5 Motivation of crowdfunding for SMEs  
Andersen and Mauritzen (2016) have reported that it is sometimes better for 
companies to choose online crowdfunding rather than traditional financing when 
domestic interest rates are high. Interest rates can be quite volatile, differing from bank 
to bank and depending on the country’s economy. In the United States, interest rates 
have been kept low since the economic collapse because those in charge of fiscal 
policy have been operating on the belief that low interest rates will encourage economic 
growth. This has, in turn, led to the greater availability of credit at reasonable rates. For 
this reason, the United States has not seen crowdfunding become quite as popular as 
in Germany. As Andersen and Mauritzen (2016) have explained, the rising interest 
rates in many Germany countries have led company founders to opt not to seek a bank 
loan; that option might drain money out of the company without providing the boost 
that comes from having an investor pushing the firm. This means that motivation differs 
on a case by case basis; firms consider the numbers, the interest rates, and the 
alternatives that could allow them to better position themselves to move forward 
(Lehner 2013).  
 
At least some studies (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 2016) have 
demonstrated that one of the primary reasons companies seek crowdfunding is the 
desire to protect their equity. It bears mentioning at this point that the literature does 
not claim that all forms of crowdfunding are created equally. Some ventures provide 
equity to investors. Others provide incentives or rewards (Mauritzen 2016). For those 
ventures that raise small amounts of money from many different people, it is often not 
ownership in the company that is provided, but a place on an advisory board, a special 
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experience not available to the general public, or even a basic prize (Cholakova and 
Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 2016). Certain companies, for instance, provide naming 
opportunities. Restaurants have offered people a chance to name an item on their 
menu. Other SMEs have offered investors the opportunity to name a room in their 
building. Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) have reported that even though a number of 
crowdfunding campaigns offer equity, the majority are still reward based. Business 
founders rely on this approach to obtain the cash they need while still retaining equity 
(Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 2016).  
 
For many business founders, maintaining equity is sacrosanct (Cholakova and 
Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 2016). They want to keep as much ownership in the 
company as possible because, throughout Germany, the main reason people start 
businesses is their desire to later sell the business and earn a profit from that sale. If 
they begin to give away equity, they will quickly find themselves in a position where 
selling the company would not lead to the desired profit (Lehner 2013).  
 
While debt financing is also a way to obtain business funding without having to give up 
equity, it entails certain conditions, including the fact that in many cases, the bank 
effectively owns the company and can encumber it in myriad ways if things go wrong 
Hervé et al. (2016).  
 
Banks do not provide the boost that investors do, and moreover, they can drain money 
out of a growing company that needs to keep its cash flow high when just starting out. 
Crowdfunding can be a way for company founders to obtain the cash and boost they 
need without the need to face the significant problems associated with traditional 
investing. Namely, they get to keep all the valuable equity that they have built up in the 
company (Hervé et al. 2016).  
 
Hervé et al. (2016) have noted that one of the top motivations of people who invest in 
these campaigns is the desire to feel involved in something larger than themselves. 
With this in mind, the motivation for the business owners is to give these investors what 
they want while keeping that which is most important in their own eyes, namely, the 
stake in the company. A venture capitalist or bank would have other concerns and 
considerations not aligned with the founder’s ultimate interest in keeping firm control 
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of the company’s value in the hopes of profiting later (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; 
Herve et al. 2016; Mauritzen 2016). 
 
The foregoing discussion of the importance of crowdfunding can be considered in light 
of the first research question of the study, which is as follows: What is the percentage 
of crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? Although the importance of 
crowdfunding to SMEs has been discussed from numerous conceptual perspectives, 
there do not appear to be previous studies in which the percentage of crowdfunding 
among SMEs has been quantified for a large (n > 100) sample of companies.   
 
Conceptually, one of the common themes in the literature on the importance of 
crowdfunding to SMEs is that of cooperative game theory. Given that companies have 
a vested interest in maintaining equity (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 
2016), the importance of crowdfunding to SMEs can be described in terms of retaining 
equity. Because crowdfunding depends on numerous, small investments, no single 
investor has the ability to apply competitive game-theory dynamics in order to demand 
equity in return for investment (Andersen & Mauritzen, 2016). Thus, crowdfunding is 
particularly attractive to SMEs, but the importance of crowdfunding has not been 
quantified in terms of how much SME funding actually comes from crowdfunding.  
 
2.6 Crowdfunding success and impact on shift in financing demand 
Many studies (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Herve et al. 2016; Marelli & Ordanini 
2016; Mauritzen 2016) on people seeking funding have examined the various factors 
that help to determine whether a campaign is successful. It should be noted that some 
crowdfunding campaigns are successful while some are not. Simply put, there are 
variables one can consider predicting whether a company will run a successful 
campaign. While these indicators are not perfect predictors, and while there are 
certainly exceptions to every rule, these criteria are generally useful and must be 
understood by companies seeking funding (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015).  
 
Marelli and Ordanini (2016) have named two factors that have made German 
crowdfunding campaigns successful for SMEs. First, the ability to provide people with 
incentives to support a campaign early on has been a primary indicator of a campaign’s 
success. This indicates that there needs to be momentum for a campaign to succeed. 
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Without enough momentum, a campaign has very little chance of getting off the 
ground. In order to generate this momentum, the campaign must attract people at the 
beginning. For those willing to give away equity via their crowdfunding campaign, an 
early incentive is an effective way to start the campaign (Lukkarinen et al. 2016). For 
those only distributing rewards, it is critical to offer the most enticing rewards to early 
supporters. In addition, the authors have suggested that founders who are actually 
active in the marketplace for funding are more likely to be funded themselves. In a 
sense, this finding portrays crowdfunding as community based and cooperative. If 
people are supporting one another, then they are likely to get engagement with their 
own SME on the back end (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Herve et al. 2016; Marelli 
& Ordanini 2016; Mauritzen 2016). This path to success is certainly very different than 
that associated with traditional funding. In traditional funding circles, the company’s 
fundamentals and relationships are what drive its ability to obtain funding. This is 
something quite different: A broader community and a shared purpose help to 
determine outcomes. This might shed light on how companies decide on a funding 
approach. A company that has a reputation on a crowdfunding platform would have 
more success raising money in that way. An entrepreneur who primarily has 
relationships offline and in traditional circles would be more likely to succeed with a 
traditional funding source (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Herve et al. 2016; Marelli & 
Ordanini 2016; Mauritzen 2016). In this case, self-selection, along with the other 
relevant factors that create this critical divide, may place a role in determining a firm’s 
direction (Marelli and Ordanini 2016).  
 
Lukkarinen et al. (2016) wrote about the elements that can set apart a crowdfunding 
campaign. One of the primary findings of their study was that many online 
crowdfunding campaigns simply do not work. While the public tends to hear about the 
ones that are successful, the many that fail receive less attention. The authors wrote 
this to quell the idea that anyone can obtain money through this type of capital raising. 
They also named the factors that tend to influence success; these success factors are 
different from those seen in the offline world. Critically, in offline campaigns, campaigns 
that succeed often do so because of the business fundamentals and the personal 
characteristics of the management team. This is not the case with crowdfunding, as 
many supporters of these ventures, even those interested in gaining equity, do not 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 47 
seem to respond to the same cues as traditional finance institutions (Cholakova and 
Clarysse 2015).  
 
Critically, there is evidence that the platform and the ability of the business owners to 
properly leverage the crowdfunding interface are essential. For instance, a company 
is more likely to obtain funding when it has a video that is compelling. In the context of 
traditional financing, the idea that venture capitalists would consider the presence or 
non-presence of a video as the primary determining factor is preposterous, but it 
illustrates the gap between the two models (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015).  
 
Beyond that, another key success factor for any crowdfunding campaign is the extent 
to which the funding seeker is able to leverage both offline and online networks 
(Balboni et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak et al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 
2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017; Kim & Moor 2017; Previati 2015; Vedantam 2015). 
The ability to connect with new people is critical to garner the mass support needed for 
these sorts of campaigns, but at their core, these campaigns are subject to the same 
constraints as other funding drives (Balboni et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2017; Gierczak et 
al. 2016; Honisch & Ottenbacher 2016; Hossain & Oparaocha 2017; Kim & Moor 2017; 
Previati 2015; Vedantam 2015). Namely, people able to leverage their own private 
networks for crowdfunding are more successful than others (Balboni et al. 2014). For 
instance, one of the best ways to generate momentum early in an equity crowdfunding 
campaign is to distribute links to the campaign page to acquaintances. The goal, then, 
is to leverage a network using the platform, rather than to use the platform to generate 
interest and build a network. This is a critical difference that helps to illustrate why 
certain campaigns are successful and others, especially those lacking an existing 
network but hoping to build one, are not successful.  
 
Balboni et al. (2014) closely investigated the market in Italy to determine what might 
determine whether Italian enterprises succeed or fail. The authors found three 
important elements that set apart those who met success from those who failed. First, 
the choice of a crowdfunding platform was a primary determinant. This is one of the 
most interesting questions, of course, that falls outside of the control of a company’s 
founder. How well known and well respected a platform is can impact whether 
individuals are willing to invest through that platform. This means that the initial choice 
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is crucial because a company owner will not have much ability to change how people 
feel about a given platform. Secondly, the study found that founders who maintained a 
strong presence on social networks like Twitter were better able to leverage their 
networks for crowdfunding (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015). This is a crucial finding 
because it demonstrates just how strange and innovative this funding model is. It is 
much more about visibility and reaching people in a manner similar to a marketing 
campaign, while traditional finance is based on the fundamentals of the business. The 
study revealed that people who succeed at crowdfunding may merely be those able to 
stay in the public eye. In contrast, a more technical and logical approach is required to 
convincing venture capitalists and banks that a venture is worth investing in (Balboni 
et al. 2014). Finally, active campaigns tended to do much better. If a company was 
able to and willing to keep up with its investors over time by offering updates, then it 
could both build trust with those investors and increase engagement to drive more 
traffic to its mission. This important distinction underscores that in certain cases, little 
more than effort is required for SMEs to be successful at crowdfunding. Investors only 
want to know that the company is willing to listen to what they have to say; other factors 
provoke much less interest (Zetzsche and Preiner 2017).  
 
Kunz et al. (2016) have echoed the above sentiments. The authors explored several 
factors that tend to influence the success of these campaigns. They hypothesized that 
these campaigns can be impacted when organisers take steps such as including a 
video and communicating with people who contribute. They found that the inclusion of 
a video was the most important factor in the success of a campaign. In particular, they 
noted that crowdfunding campaigns might be as much about emotional engagement 
as anything else. When people feel emotionally moved, an outcome that videos tend 
to encourage, they are much more likely to contribute to an initiative. These authors 
suggested that crowdfunding campaigns largely mimic non-profits and charities with 
their marketing. Those organisations attempt to encourage people to invest in causes 
larger than themselves, and they offer no equity other than the idea that donors might 
be able to experience a sense of ownership in their cause for a short period of time 
after donating (Zetzsche and Preiner 2017). They often try to stimulate an emotional 
response by posting videos related to their mission. This approach, the authors 
maintained, is similar to how crowdfunding campaigns work. They also suggested that 
campaign organisers who communicate with would-be investors through blog posts 
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and other informal mediums are much more likely to attract actual investment attention. 
Additionally, when there is a commitment on the part of the business owner to giving 
to other causes and investing in other businesses, people are more likely to invest in 
that business owner’s SME. To suggest that all of these factors drive a major wedge 
between crowdfunding and traditional financing would be an understatement (Kunz et 
al. 2016).  
 
Zetzsche and Preiner (2017) have indicated that the ability to engage across country 
lines is a critical factor in the success and failure of campaigns. While the authors were 
primarily writing about the development of an entire crowdfunding campaign and 
platform for all of Germany, they noted that SME fundraising campaigns able to 
leverage the full force of the continent have been able to raise capital more successfully 
than those campaigns focused on a single nation. In many cases, with the EU’s 
economic rules, companies already attempt to reach consumers just across the border. 
It makes sense that they should try to leverage this closeness and economic 
cooperation to obtain the needed capital and funding (Zetzsche and Preiner 2017). 
Hornuff and Schmidt (2016) have claimed that one way business owners can ensure 
their future success is by giving more information to potential investors: “While equity 
crowdfunding expands the funding opportunities of start-up companies, which in turn 
can be an important driver of economic growth, some caution is warranted, as investors 
suffer from severe information asymmetries and the majority of start-up firms fail” 
(Hornuff and Schmidt 2016). What this ultimately suggests is that during a time when 
many SMEs are not disseminating information to the market, they are failing. At the 
same time, there is much more trust in those SMEs that are willing to bridge the gap 
in terms of information.  
 
This conclusion links back to an important point regarding why companies choose to 
select crowdfunding instead of a traditional channel. Some companies have something 
to hide from investors: They have major shortcoming that they do not want an investor 
to uncover, and thus, they rely on a funding mechanism that is not likely to uncover 
those failings (Zetzsche and Preiner 2017). These are SMEs that seek crowdfunding 
neither because it provides benefits in terms of marketing nor because it is less time 
intensive, but because it allows them to take advantage of overly idealistic investors. 
The market is quick to adjust, however, and when it becomes known that these risks 
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exist, there is also a movement towards wanting more information prior to making these 
critical decisions. This means that in the modern age, with consumers and investors 
learning more about the failure rate of start-ups and the tendency of SMEs to withhold 
information during crowdfunding campaigns, companies should provide as much 
information as they can during these processes. If the ultimate goal is to build trust 
among potential contributors, then providing more information is a step start-ups can 
take to impact the success of their campaigns (Zetzsche and Preiner 2017).  
 
Bonzanini et al. (2015) have mentioned that people are much more apt to support an 
initiative if they feel it has a mission and a purpose that serves society. These authors 
considered German start-ups trying to fix the problems brought about by fossil fuels 
and climate change. Namely, there is a movement in Germany to understand the 
effects of fossil fuels on society. That movement seeks to create more renewable 
energy sources to enable development that does not deplete environmental resources. 
While this movement has been slow to catch on in the United States, it has been 
popular in Germany, where the government has pushed for tougher emissions 
standards and other measures. Hence, projects claiming to be fixing a major problem 
in society have enjoyed more support in Germany than one might expect, and what is 
more, when companies demonstrate that they are capable of fixing such a problem, 
people tend to support them. Such projects almost seem more like a social or political 
cause than like mere businesses (Zetzsche and Preiner 2017). Respondents said their 
motivation for donating was the desire to invest in a new and innovative project trying 
to improve the world for their children. This outcome suggests that these people 
themselves had a strong desire to fix global problems but, lacking the ability to 
undertake so large a mission on their own, they decided to simply participate in a 
project being done on a grander stage. One can only speculate regarding how 
crowdfunding and venture capital funding differ in this regard. While there are surely 
traditional lenders who want to improve the world, the Internet and crowdfunding have 
been two of the most important elements behind certain campaigns’ success 
(Bonzanini et al. 2015).  
 
Vergara (2016) has claimed that another factor influencing whether a campaign 
succeeds is the quality of the underlying project and idea. Purists will note certain 
similarities between new financing models and the traditional outlets. While there has 
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been some focus in other stories on the manner of promotion and the quality of the 
presentation, the implication is that a project must possess value and significance to 
enjoy success. It is not all smoke and mirrors when it comes to the crowdfunding game, 
and perhaps it is true that the presentation itself can be a distinguishing factor that sets 
apart good ideas. The good ideas need to be applied, however, and the market itself 
cannot be tricked into supporting subpar ideas just because they are packaged 
attractively. This is a re-stating of the hypothesis regarding an efficient and wise 
market. Researchers have talked about the market having wisdom, and if this is true, 
then the underlying ideas that are supported must be promising (Bonzanini et al. 2015). 
Of course, investors come from the same class as consumers in the world of 
crowdfunding, so it follows that people who like an idea would both potentially invest 
in it and purchase the final product; hence project quality is both a requirement and a 
self-fulfilling element. This author did examine the market in the Philippines, which is 
much different from that of Germany (Bonzanini et al. 2015). Crowdfunding has had 
less success in Asian markets, and this may suggest that Asian markets are treating 
crowdfunding like a less formal version of their own traditional funding markets. With 
other studies in Germany have demonstrated that the most important success factors 
have very little to do with the actual project’s underlying quality, it may just be that the 
factors determining success in the Philippines are much different than those in 
Germany, even if this is something that will bother those purists (Vergara 2016).  
 
The literature discussed above is pertinent to the second (Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing?) and third (What is the potential 
impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from 
financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms?) research questions of the study. 
Specifically, the literature suggests that motivations for crowdfunding and traditional 
investing are different, with crowdfunding appearing to be more of a partnership 
between the funder and the fundee and traditional investing often oriented towards the 
acquisition of equity and thereby having an element of competition in addition to 
cooperation. Game theory suggests that, to the extent that companies are able to 
secure funds through crowdfunding, they will do so in a manner that reduces their 
reliance on traditional funding, with its demands on equity. However, this prediction 
made by game theory has not been empirically tested. The purpose of the second 
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research question of the study is to test this relationship, and the purpose of the third 
research question is to explore the possible implications of a potential trade-off 
between crowdfunding and traditional funding.  
 
2.7 The crowdfunding literature on capital providers 
While much of the literature on crowdfunding and crowdinvesting has focused on those 
who seek capital, providers of capital have also been a topic of intense study. These 
people fascinate those who study investing and capital raising. Crowdfunders are 
people who have been excluded from many investment opportunities (Bonzanini et al. 
2015). They now prefer to own part of private companies with promising ideas for fixing 
major problems. The literature on these individuals has covered topics from why they 
choose to invest, to what they invest in, to what kind of due diligence they conduct, to 
what their goals are. Other studies have explored who they are, what qualities they 
have, and what impact they have on society. As the world of private company 
investment in Germany has been opened to people who are not rich institutional 
investors, a whole new body of research has also emerged to better understand this 
phenomenon (Vergara 2016).  
 
2.8 Motivation and focus of crowdfunding investors  
There is no question that the people who participate in crowdfunding tend to look 
different and have different qualities than those involved in traditional capital raising 
schemes Hervé et al. (2016). Venture capitalists and Internet contributors differ in 
terms of their mission, financial standing, and ability to access information. Moreover, 
they may have different motivations that help to shape the outcome of the investment. 
Hervé et al. (2016) have written that crowdfunding investors have social motivations. 
They do note that at present, crowdfunding is mostly a world for men, with men 
constituting more than 90% of investors. Crowdfunding investors are mostly seeking 
to use their investing experience to build connections with other people who share their 
interests. Hence, people may be using these crowdfunding opportunities to build online 
communities similar to the message boards and forums that football fans might use to 
talk about their team. The hypothesis that crowdfunding is correction-based is backed 
by research that suggests that SME crowdfunding campaigns are more successful 
when they offer constant engagement and an opportunity for two-way communication 
between campaign organisers and investors (Hervé et al. 2016).  
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Pearson et al. (2016) agreed with these findings, but they added points of their own. 
They discussed the social element of investing in terms of “enjoyment”. Namely, they 
noted that people tend to invest because they enjoy investing and the feeling it gives 
them, and because they enjoy connecting online with likeminded people. People tend 
to invest in causes in which they believe and about which they are knowledgeable. A 
sports fan who likes to attend matches, for example, might invest in an app that helps 
bring less expensive tickets to the market. This means that to the extent communities 
are built around these investments, those communities tend to include people who are 
likeminded. It is human nature to want to come together in this way, and if the literature 
is any indication, this factor plays a role in encouraging people to invest in these 
campaigns. In addition, this study found that people tend to give to these causes in 
large part because of their philanthropic leanings. They view crowdfunding campaigns 
as a way to solve a problem. It does not matter to them that the company in question 
is a for-profit rather than a non-profit (Vergara 2016). They would look at Tesla, for 
instance, and see a company trying to stop the world from overreliance on fossil fuels. 
They would view that goal as positive, and to the extent they were offered an 
opportunity to be a part of the solution, they would accept it as a chance to be 
charitable, rather than something else. This means that many of the companies that 
are successfully engaging in crowdfunding campaigns largely owe their success to the 
nature of leverage. They are receiving extra benefits and extracting value from 
investors because they are essentially providing those investors with what a charity 
offers: the opportunity to feel positively about oneself by investing in a project that could 
change the world for the better (Vergara 2016).  
 
Finally, the authors noted that investors are not unintelligent or completely self-
sacrificing. Many are driven on some level by the idea of financial success. While they 
may not need to make money off of an investment, they are driven by the desire to feel 
vindicated and to see their judgments prove accurate. The money itself is more 
important as a reflection of something grander, namely, that the company will change 
the world and that they themselves will look smart for being among the first to recognise 
the potential. This may differ from the motivations of venture capitalists or traditional 
funding institutions because, simply put, those actors have enjoyed enough financial 
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success that they are not necessarily looking to new funding opportunities as ways to 
boost their egos (Bretschneider et al. 2014).  
 
Bretschneider et al. (2014) have suggested that one should not view all crowdfunding 
investors as the same. Rather, it is critical to treat every investor as an individual with 
unique motivations for investing. While many venture capitalists and bank lenders tend 
to be similar in this regard, those involved in crowdfunding tend to be diverse and to 
follow a range of schools of thought. Companies naturally seek to raise money and 
capital from multiple sources, and people are bound to have different reasons for 
investing (Vergara 2016). The authors noted that while some may be hoping to grow 
rich or to be recognised for their foresight, others may contribute because they are a 
part of the online community where the money is being raised. Others may contribute 
because they have a social connection to the entrepreneur and want to demonstrate 
support for his or her venture. Regardless, the key takeaway is that treating these 
investors as falling into a single category of motivation is impossible: They are too 
diverse and have too many individual motivations (Vergara 2016). In some cases, 
people may be drawn to a given campaign because that it checks multiple boxes for 
the person. This is becoming especially true in a world where people can choose from 
so many different missions and initiatives. They can choose from projects that fix any 
number of problems or that that offer a range of rewards. People typically select the 
projects most likely to provide the most fulfilment in multiple domains. In investigating 
the motivations of people who provide capital to SMEs in Germany, these authors 
found that the best approach is to take every individual investor at his own worth and 
to never think that one has a person nailed down until one actually has that person 
nailed down (Vergara 2016).  
 
Belleflamme et al. (2014) broke down crowdfunding motivations in an easy-to-
understand manner. People tend to invest in crowdfunding campaigns for one of two 
reasons: They either want to obtain something or want to be a part of something. Their 
suggestion of taking data from many involved people is the fact that one can usually 
be right about the people involved in this if one is just willing to think in these very 
human terms. People are often greedy and are looking to take advantage of 
opportunities. In the crowdfunding world, this might mean equity, a significant reward 
from the company, or a sizeable profit if the company succeeds. Some people are 
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motivated by the extrinsic factors related to a company, and yet others are driven by 
more intrinsic elements. These are people who are motivated by being a part of a 
movement. They would like to derive some benefit from their investment, but the true 
reward for them is knowing that they contributed. This approach to understanding 
investors’ motivations also considers how people view SMEs engaged in 
crowdfunding. Those that see these as companies as profit driven and capable of 
producing a return are likely to view an investment as a transaction (Muller et al. 2013). 
Those who view SMEs as enterprises trying to solve major problems in the community 
will see them as charities and will consider an investment using the same calculation 
applied to their charitable giving. For them, it is rarely about a return. People who give 
to charities rarely check to see how their money was spent and what return was derived 
from it. Rather, they give because it feels good and because they want to be involved 
in finding to solutions to problems. The community, whether it manifests itself in the 
form of online discourse or something else, is a powerful motivator for people who may 
not see investing and crowdfunding as actions undertaken to turn a profit. Muller et al. 
(2013) have indicated that some investors even see giving to an SME through a 
campaign as allowing them to be part of the team atmosphere that the company has 
built. Namely, these individuals may feel that the company is able to develop new 
technology and to solve problems because of their capital contribution. From this 
perspective, funding is a means of making investors feel involved even when their 
contribution is made online and does not entail meeting anyone at the company or 
helping to determine the SME’s future course of action. As Wilson and Testoni (2014) 
have reported, some may even contribute because they want to be involved on a meta 
level in helping to usher in an era where crowdfunding plays a larger role in the capital 
markets in Germany. They may define their role and their community as participating 
in opening capital markets more fully to people who are not rich and who lack the 
institutional investor status that has typically a requirement to back private companies 
in Germany and the United States (Muller et al. 2013).  
  
Moritz et al. (2015) have also noted the role of feeling important. People who invest in 
the crowdfunding campaigns of SMEs often have an opportunity to feel important, even 
when they are not contributing much. This is an element of such campaigns’ design, 
of course. People are given names that describe the extent to which they have helped 
the company. This is a generally positive development because it provides investors 
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with the desired boost to their self-esteem. As these authors have noted, when SMEs 
are willing to communicate with people who are investing more and more, those 
investors feel big, which leaves them more likely both to give to the SME and to 
promote the company to those they care about. Making investors feel important 
through communication is one of the most effective actions an SME can take if it wants 
to have a successful campaign, and this is due to the fact that participating in such 
campaigns permits people to fulfil major needs that their professional lives have 
perhaps been unable to address (Moritz & Block 2016). Feeling a sense of ownership 
in the company can be especially rewarding for those who feel as if they do not own 
anything at all. Discounting this important element of motivation would be foolish 
because the need to feel recognised is very human, and this is especially true among 
people who would tend to be the smaller investors. In some respects, being able to 
invest in an SME trying to bring about positive change is the only way many of these 
investors can get their foot in the door. An SME that is quite competitive in its hiring 
might never hire a particular investor, but that person can still feel important if he or 
she invests and if the company utilises a communication strategy that makes that 
individual feel valued and recognised (Muller et al. 2013). The level of competition 
associated with SMEs may also contribute to risk and social elements associated with 
crowdfunding. 
 
2.9 Risk and behavioural signalling among peers 
The term crowdfunding includes the word crowd and is used to discuss “peer to peer” 
lending for a reason (Moritz & Block 2016). The social element created is based on the 
market base and how the SME targets this market for investment purposes, similar to 
how social networks seek to recruit individuals for causes. Those SMEs hoping to raise 
capital from these campaigns often want to do so with the support of a community and 
by capturing the tendency of people to do what those around them are also doing. This 
is the nature of the viral society in which we now live; people largely follow leaders and 
base their actions on expectations regarding others’ behaviour. However, social 
pressure is not the right term, according to the literature (Moritz & Block 2016). Rather, 
signalling may be important, and timing may also be a critical element. When others 
around a person pick up on an important trend and invest in a project, he or she is 
much more apt to do the same. Ahlers et al. (2015) have written about the nature of 
signalling in terms of information sharing both by SMEs and early investors. When 
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there is effective communication to potential investors, this often serves as a signal 
that pushes those individuals to invest, even if they otherwise might not have invested 
in anything. Critically, people tend to invest when they feel that it is safe to do so. One 
of the first factors they consider is the presence of other investors. Moreover, many 
perceive the willingness of the SME to provide more information as signalling that it is 
safe to support the project in question (Ahlers et al. 2015).  
 
Vismara (2016) has described this phenomenon as information cascading. When 
information begins, it can be shared quickly, and it can play a powerful role in 
encouraging more people to invest in an initiative. Information cascading is 
commonplace for those doing business on the Internet. In all forms of online exchange, 
people have tended to move in this direction. Political news cascades across the 
Internet, from platform to platform, until the public have received the key message. 
This is why, as Vismara (2016) has suggested, it is so critical for SMEs to choose the 
right platforms for their funding campaigns. When the platform easily facilitates sharing 
on social media and the like, it enables the spread of information from one potential 
investor to another. This review constitutes the core of signalling in the world of 
crowdfunding; information cascades are all about transparency. When early investors 
have public, linked profiles that people can see, they learn more about the first people 
to invest. Those people then become real, with rich backstories and histories that later 
investors can identify with. They see that the people investing in an SME are much like 
themselves, and they are hence more willing to trust the SME and its campaign. The 
first investors and their openness have a signalling effect on others. These individuals 
essentially hear the call all around them and are then willing to trust the SME more 
than they would have without this social signal (Moritz & Block 2016). This 
demonstrates the trepidation with which many investors in Germany have approached 
this kind of investing. On one level, they experience anxiety because they do not know 
what is good and what is not. Information asymmetries within investing platforms might 
result in investors basing their decisions on their best guesses and instincts regarding 
what to target and what to pass over (Moritz & Block 2016). When they see that others 
have invested in a project, and when they can connect with those other people, these 
individuals are more likely participate in what might otherwise be a risky investment 
(Moritz & Block 2016). 
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Klein (2016) has claimed that investors in SME crowdfunding campaigns are largely 
looking for a reason to invest rather than a reason to avoid investing. For all the reasons 
mentioned previously in this review, they are motivated to get involved. At the same 
time, they often need a hook to pull them in and to signal that the investment pool is 
safe. This is why, as Klein has noted, some entrepreneurs use third-party affiliation 
signalling to attract people. Just as many individuals would hardly want to go on a date 
with another person without knowing if they shared mutual friends, many people will 
not invest in a company without knowing whether the founder is associated with any 
organisations that speak well of that founder (Vismara 2016). Klein found that when 
business founders can point to a connection to an investor syndicate, this is an 
effective signal that tells crowdfunding investors that the entrepreneur is legitimate. 
Those crowdfunding investors look for such signs almost anywhere. As soon as these 
investors obtain this assurance that the entrepreneur has a promising future and is 
associated with another syndicate, they are often willing to involve themselves. Those 
SME owners who put together crowdfunding campaigns are quite aware of this, as 
they often like to use these affiliations to encourage more trust and to attract more 
investors. How they introduce these affiliations can make a major difference as well, 
and more subtle introductions are more effective than a “bullhorn” approach. The latter 
may be perceived as “trying too hard” to be legitimate. Investors notice such efforts 
and are often repelled by the desperation they imply (Vismara 2016).  
 
Block et al. (2016) have noted that some of the most impressive SME crowdfunding 
campaigns have been those able to combine effectively communicating with investors 
and knowing how to signal key points. For instance, in studying the communication 
techniques of campaign organisers, the authors found confirmation that more 
communication is better and leads to more trust and engagement. They also found that 
many crowdfunding campaigns’ communication strategies incorporated investor and 
social signalling. For instance, as part of keeping potential investors up to date 
regarding campaign events and company news, an SME owner can casually mention 
that a reputable person or organisation has made an investment or otherwise endorsed 
the company. According to Vismara (2016) this has the important effect of suggesting 
to undecided potential investors that they might be missing out on a promising 
opportunity that others have recognised. The fact that the company communicated and 
integrated signalling into its strategy can ultimately help those individuals to resolve 
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their doubts about investing. This is just one way, according to Block and others, that 
SMEs have been able to use social signalling to their advantage to help people past 
their fears and into a community of trust centred on a product or service .  
 
2.10 The literature on intermediaries in crowdfunding relationships 
As mentioned by Block et al. (2016) while funding seekers and providers are interesting 
because of the complex motivations and dynamics that come into play, an important 
branch of the literature also covers the important role of the intermediary (Block et al. 
2016). Peer to peer lending and other forms of crowdfunding did not emerge for many 
years because the technology simply was not ready. All of the other elements needed 
to make these deals existed: There was desire among those not allowed to invest in 
private companies to participate in such campaigns. At the same time, SMEs 
demanded the funding denied to them by a system that tends to prioritise those people 
and companies that are already wealthy. The only piece missing was the technology 
to make crowdfunding possible—and even more, to make it easy. The literature on the 
innovative sources for platforms has been important in shaping the decision-making 
matrixes of companies seeking to raise money in easy ways that allow them preserve 
ownership of equity (Block et al. 2016).  
 
2.11 Risk and information asymmetry 
The world of crowdfunding is problematic in part because the people asking for money 
have more information than those providing money. The law takes care of this dilemma 
when the company is public (Courtney et al. 2017). When a company is offered for 
public consumption on an exchange, and when it becomes publicly owned, there are 
requirements concerning what must be turned over to investors (de Silveira 2013). 
There are also strong controls governing what must be reported and how often. This 
is critical to the development of open markets, and these rules allow people to invest 
with confidence. When such rules are broken and trust is shattered by people hiding 
facts or manipulating data, the perpetrators are often punished harshly (Kumar and 
Aldous 2015). Few will forget the Enron scandal in the United States. In that case, Ken 
Lay and others within the energy company falsified documents and inflated numbers 
to keep the stock price high so that their own corporate bonuses would be very large 
(Roy 2015). This is something that happens less in those situations because of tight 
controls (Bratton & Levitin 2013), but in the world of SMEs in Germany, where 
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companies are not taken public and do not have to abide by many of the same laws 
as public companies, information asymmetries become possible. Courtney et al. 
(2017) have reported that one way intermediaries have been able to address such 
information problems is by ensuring that people have access to as much third-party 
information as possible. This author suggests that intermediary sites such as 
Kickstarter and Prosper are well aware of the problems affecting this particular practice 
and have hence developed technologies that link their investors to information. Social 
signalling, of course, is a major part of such efforts, as investors are able to see the 
affiliations of those seeking money as well as the affiliations of the other people 
investing. Other tools have been developed with the primary goal of ensuring that 
people on either side of a given transaction have everything they need so that the 
transaction is a satisfying process that is not marred by the threat of fraud (Courtney 
et al. 2017).  
 
Firoozi et al. (2017) have described the important role that intermediaries play in trying 
to prevent fraud. If there is one factor that these intermediaries control, it is the question 
of who can use their platform on either side of the aisle. They can ban companies and 
investors from their platforms, even for life. In Germany, they can do so for almost any 
reason, and they certainly have the ability to do so when either party is engaged in 
fraudulent activity. With this in mind, the website itself, as the third party that helps 
investors find the companies in which they want to invest, can represent a signal to 
those investors. By allowing entrepreneurs to share their campaigns, a platform is 
suggesting to its investor base that those entrepreneurs are on the up and up. While 
mistakes can happen, it is possible for those platforms to exclude people who do the 
wrong thing. As the platforms grow and become more important, SME owners who 
might be tempted to do the wrong thing have to think about whether they want to risk 
both their reputation and their ability to operate on a critical platform that will become 
increasingly important in providing access to investors (Bratton & Levitin 2013). This 
leads to a situation where there are certainly more controls over who can use these 
sites and in what ways. Despite little in the way of formal regulations, the intermediaries 
are taking at least some steps to ensure that the problem of fraud is minimised when 
money is being exchanged between people who do not know one another (Bratton & 
Levitin 2013).  
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Of course, as McKenny et al. (2017) have noted, there is a significant problem, and 
more research must be conducted on that point moving forward. While intermediaries 
have marshalled their tools in order to provide more signalling and more capabilities, 
they have not done enough to ensure that fraud is prevented. Stronger fraud monitoring 
tools and better prevention tools may be necessary if these companies want to enjoy 
legitimacy and to remain an important part of the capital markets in Europe. At present, 
one of the concepts underlying crowdfunding is also one of its main weaknesses. One 
reason crowdfunding emerged was that people simply did not have access to 
investment opportunities (Bratton & Levitin 2013). They were held back because the 
traditional funding sources did not have any respect for them, and government 
regulations did not provide them with the desired access to markets. In order to fix this 
problem, as McKenny has noted, there needed to be more openness to almost anyone. 
The idea behind the intermediaries was that anyone with a promising idea would have 
a forum to present that idea, allowing the market to weigh in on not only the value of 
the idea but also the trustworthiness and an intelligence of the person pitching it. While 
this openness has arguably made the world of crowdfunding more democratic and 
allowed the business world to be more based on merit than on relationships with major 
funding bodies (Catalini et al 2016), it also has a downside. When anyone can obtain 
capital, some people will to use that opportunity to take advantage of others who simply 
want to be a part of a cause. This illustrates the conundrum that many intermediaries 
find themselves facing. In a way, their core purpose is in conflict with what they need 
to do to sharpen their services and help people even more (Catalini et al 2016),  
 
Courtney et al. (2016) have noted that one of the ways in which these intermediaries 
can resolve their internal existential conflict is by using their core strength to mitigate 
their core weakness. Engagement with their constituent communities is a major 
undertaking that can make a considerable difference in determining whether fraud 
takes place. The investment community’s sentiment regarding an intermediary site can 
push a campaign forwards or cause it to lose traction. Certain intermediaries have 
worked hard to provide platforms where investors can share their thoughts and 
concerns (Bratton & Levitin 2013). One of the most important steps they can take is 
making sure that these investor voices are not silenced and that legitimate concerns 
are considered and given due respect. The strength of the community and the 
collective wisdom of the investors belonging to it should offer some ability to push back 
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against fraud. While it may not be able to completely mitigate information asymmetries, 
it can allow a platform where people can share their thoughts and lessons learned 
regarding potential investment opportunities. In this way, the information obtained by 
one individual could play a critical role in informing the entire community about an 
element of a given campaign that might otherwise be damaging to everyone (Courtney 
et al. 2016).  
 
2.12 The impact of intermediary choices on donor behaviour 
Intermediaries play a critical role in influencing how their own investors interact with 
their platforms (Bratton & Levitin 2013). One of the most important questions regarding 
SME crowdfunding in Germany is which model a given platform is going to use. There 
are multiple models available which provide a structure for organising how giving and 
receiving take place. For instance, if a company is trying to raise a certain amount for 
a project but fails to meet its goal, albeit by a close margin, a choice needs to be made: 
Should that company be able to keep the money it has raised through the campaign? 
Should the money be returned to those who contributed because the campaign failed 
to reach its objective? There are many reasons why a given platform may choose one 
of these options over another, but they must consider how the decision ultimately 
impacts the behaviour of customers (Cumming et al. 2014).  
 
Cumming et al. (2014) have reported that when a platform or intermediary uses an “all 
or nothing” approach to crowdfunding, people are much more likely to contribute. With 
this model, people get something back if the campaign does not reach its goal. There 
are two potential reasons why this could be the case. First, this structure creates more 
incentives towards the end for people to give. If an SME raises funds totalling 95% of 
its goal and it only has one day left in its campaign, then there is an easy way to 
communicate that to potential investors to encourage them to help (Mollick 2014). This 
simple step creates a sense of urgency that may potentially drive people to give money 
when they would not have otherwise done so. Cumming et al. (2014) have also 
hypothesized  that people like to give when they know for certain that their money will 
be returned in the case of failure (Belleflamme et al 2016). At present, there is a school 
of thought in the literature that strongly suggests that people only tend to give money 
when they believe they are making a considerable impact. If they trust the SME that it 
needs a certain amount of money to begin operating, they may also logically believe 
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that if the SME fails to reach its goal, it will struggle in this regard. These two schools 
of thought are in conflict, and perhaps both motivations play a role in determining 
whether people give more when an “all or nothing” approach is in use (Cumming et al. 
2014).  
 
Solomon et al. (2015) have noted that companies that facilitate crowdfunding have a 
strong incentive to see those campaigns work. Sites that provide this service are, of 
course, trying to earn a profit. They are companies with payrolls, monthly projections, 
and other financial concerns. When they run a campaign and it is successful, they get 
to keep the percentage of the funds raised representing their fees. They are able to 
take a share of the profits and to advertise that a particular company managed to raise 
enough money to perhaps release the next trendy card game or cure world hunger 
through a new type of corn. When campaigns are not funded, however, these sites do 
not get to keep a percentage. They have to refund all funds, including their own fee. 
This outcome represents a complete loss for everyone involved. All participants have 
lost their time, the SME has not obtained the capital it needed, and the investor is left 
scrambling to find a new opportunity for his or her money (Bratton & Levitin 2013).  
 
This reality means that the platforms have two important questions to ponder (Solomon 
et al. 2015). First, they have the choice of whether they want to use a “keep what you 
get” model in which SMEs get to retain the money they raise even if they do not reach 
their goal. This benefits the platform or intermediary because from its perspective, all 
campaigns are a success; this model also allows it to keep a share of the funds raised. 
At the same time, this choice has the potential to harm the intermediary because, as 
the research suggests, people do not give as much money under this format. 
Intermediaries have a financial obligation to promote the strategy that creates the most 
engagement because that will yield the most in fees. At the same time, they have to 
weigh the risk of losing everything in a given campaign versus the certainty of knowing 
that a given campaign will provide at least some money (Solomon et al. 2015). As 
these authors have noted, there are other ways that companies can increase 
engagement. While some decisions and elements are in the hands of the SME running 
the campaign, other methods of increasing engagement are under the control of the 
intermediary. That third-party platform can effectively push for additional investor 
engagement by putting into place elements that push for more early returns. Just like 
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fundraising for a charity often depends on early momentum to confer legitimacy and 
bring in momentum on the back end, for an SME, crowdfunding requires a company to 
attract investors early in the process (Vachelard et al. 2016). When a company 
succeeds in doing so, it will draw more late investors, but if the SME cannot attract that 
critical early mass, a sense of failure will linger over the campaign and make it difficult 
to gain momentum. It is a difficult catch-22 and something intermediaries must 
consider.  
 
Vachelard et al. (2016) pointed to another critical way in which intermediaries can alter 
the behaviour of site visitors. While it is certainly true that the decisions of those 
intermediaries can help determine what individual investors do, these intermediaries 
also play a critical role in setting expectations and behavioural norms for investment 
seekers. First, they are able to establish norms regarding how much money a 
campaign organiser can initially ask for. As Vachelard et al. (2016) has reported, when 
people use crowdfunding to try to attract capital for a campaign dedicated to science, 
they have a serious chance of raising high amounts because people want to contribute 
to projects that are apt to change the world. At the same time, if an intermediary site is 
operating via the “all or nothing” system, it is incentivising an SME to choose a lower 
amount than it might have otherwise chosen. If the alternative is to receive nothing, 
SMEs may choose a lower amount and then come back on the back end and seek 
much more later on (Bratton & Levitin 2013). This critical strategy enables them to ask 
for more funds later but impacts how aggressive they are willing to be during an initial 
campaign. Intermediary sites have to choose how they want to manage these 
situations because their impact on the behaviour of funding seekers may not always 
be positive. To the extent that the setup and design of a site’s offerings keep SMEs 
from getting what they need out of fear, the intermediary has done a poor job of 
facilitating its core purpose (Bratton & Levitin 2013)..  
 
There is, of course, an argument that sites can be designed so that SMEs can receive 
more funding than requested, and this is even possible with the “all or nothing” format 
(Bratton & Levitin 2013). For instance, an SME can set a low funding target in order to 
ensure that it meets its goal, and then it can receive additional funding from interested 
parties. This, however, undermines the entire concept of “all or nothing” funding; 
people simply will not give money once a company has visually reached its goal, even 
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if that goal was somewhat nominal. The sense of urgency evaporates when this 
happens, and the company can no longer pressure potential funders to help it reach 
its goal. This particular fix is not advantageous, as it does not resolve the operating 
problems that can sometimes occur when such systems are put into place (Vachelard 
et al. 2016).  
 
Importantly, intermediary sites also have the ability to influence behaviour by requiring 
more disclosure from both campaign organisers and funders. There is little reason to 
require investors to provide more information about themselves on the site in places 
that are public and visible (Solomon et al. 2015). Funders are entitled to anonymity just 
as rich investors and venture capitalists are entitled to remain behind the scenes if they 
so choose. This means that the decision to compel these individuals to provide more 
information is typically based on the needs of the intermediary site. The site may need 
to engage in more social signalling to attract people to a given investment, so it may 
ask for additional information from certain users. Or, intermediaries can give investors 
control over whether to reveal information—which is the route many sites have chosen 
as a compromise between their obligations and their desire to turn a profit (Solomon 
et al. 2015). At the same time, these sites can positively influence behaviour whenever 
they require entrepreneurs to disclose more information. The goal of such initiatives is 
to ensure that entrepreneurs are open and honest with investors about who they are 
and what they want. The more information that is required of them, the more likely it is 
that the process will be transparent. In this case, the interests of the site and the 
entrepreneur or SME are aligned. Because social signalling plays such a critical role 
in the success of these campaigns in the first place, requiring more information from 
funding seekers has the effect of protecting investors while also increasing their 
likelihood of investing in the campaign being marketed to them. It is a true win-win for 
the intermediary site, while in other situations, it must make value judgments regarding 
priorities in a given situation (Vachelard et al. 2016).  
 
2.13 The literature on the particulars of SME crowdfunding in Germany 
While there are many similarities between crowdfunding in the United States and in 
Germany, there are also a number of particularities specific to German crowdfunding. 
Perhaps most important is the fact that crowdfunding has been a more successful 
venture for businesses in Germany than has been the case in the United States (Braig 
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2016). It has, of course, become quite popular for actual charities and private, 
individual charity in the United States, but that has not translated into the widespread 
use for raising business capital that one might have expected. The literature has 
focused extensively on both Germany and on individual country case studies to reveal 
important facts about the nature of crowdfunding in the EU and Germany (Braig 2016).  
 
Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2016) have reported that in Germany, traditional funding 
sources are much less willing to help SMEs by providing necessary funding. Perhaps, 
the authors have suggested, crowdfunding in Germany has become popular because 
of need, as these enterprises have been essentially left behind by the institutions that 
could have helped them to succeed. In the United States, SMEs, especially in the tech 
industry, have had success in obtaining rounds of funding from various traditional 
sources. Even firms with projects as whimsical as daily fantasy sports have been able 
to raise funding from traditional venture capitalists and huge, well-known entities 
(Wallach & Dunbar, 2015), including the major sports leagues and sports networks 
such as ESPN (Braig 2016). The tendency of institutional investors and lenders to 
support SMEs in the United States has resulted in far less need for crowdfunding to fill 
in the gaps. The situation is quite different in the EU, including in Germany, as there is 
currently much less focus on these particular things, and there is much more focus on 
allowing companies to obtain funding through intermediary platforms with limited rules 
and oversight (Braig 2016).  
 
One of the unique aspects of crowdfunding in Germany is the tendency for it to go on 
without limits (Joenssen & Müllerleile 2016). Until now, crowdfunding in the EU has 
been governed by few rules and regulations, and it operates differently depending on 
the country. While this has had a positive effect in some ways, with more people 
accessing the capital they need to make business improvements and push their ideas, 
in certain cases, this limitless expansion has tested the efficacy of the system. As 
Guerzoni et al. (2016) wrote regarding the Italian context, questions have arisen about 
the relationships between investors and entrepreneurs. Accusations have claimed that 
in some cases, social signalling by both sites and entrepreneurs has been fake or 
contrived. These reports have called into question the legitimacy of the venture while 
also striking fear into the minds of investors (Braig 2016).  
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Nasrabadi (2016) has indicated that in Germany, crowdfunding has gone beyond 
simple financial innovation. As he has noted, in Germany, financial systems had 
become so archaic that they were primed for disruption. The rules were rigid, people 
were often not treated well, and there was no real end in sight. There was a need for 
a private solution able to challenge the traditional business finance world in Germany, 
especially with the conditions ripe for competition in many industries (Joenssen & 
Müllerleile 2016). Crowdfunding emerged from this need. Just as many other industries 
need innovation when their primary players have grown stagnant and have forgotten 
about meeting societal need, in Germany, many banks and venture capitalists had lost 
the ability to adjust to changes in the market. One of the primary differences between 
the German and American SME landscapes is that large companies have begun to 
dominate many of industries in the United States where there might have been 
competition from a smaller company bringing a new product, process, or idea. When 
industries are dominated by such large, powerful players, those sizable companies 
tend to constantly scoop up smaller companies in sales and acquisitions (Joenssen & 
Müllerleile 2016). This is far from a beneficial outcome for consumers and the 
competitive market at large, and it also creates a situation where there is less 
innovation in funding. The American market being what it is, many SMEs never 
progressed to the funding rounds needed to expand because they were purchased 
well before that point. The literature has suggested that the business climate in 
Germany may be more conducive in some countries for SMEs to challenge larger 
players. An environment more likely to facilitate such results tends to produce 
innovation in the funding world (Joenssen & Müllerleile 2016).  
 
Gossell et al. (2016) have touched on one of the most important characteristics of 
Germany that may make crowdfunding for SMEs a more likely venture than in the 
United States. As the authors have stated, Germans are more likely to embrace the 
idea of working together, while in the United States, there tends to be a belief that tasks 
can be handled individually. There is less of a belief in the power of the collective, and 
there are even political buzzwords used to keep people from trying to push for 
collectivism. Many of the countries of Germany have large, supportive governments 
that provide a litany of services to their citizens, including medical care and free 
education (Nasrabadi 2016). There is a cultural understanding that these services 
provided through the collective conscience of the country are necessary for the survival 
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of the human race and for solving the important questions facing society at large. As 
some authors have pointed out, it is entirely possible that this cultural leaning may 
provide a partial basis for understanding why crowdfunding has become so popular 
(Dennis 2015). The willingness to acknowledge major societal issues is only a starting 
point, however, as in such a culture, the need for companies with strong social 
convictions is recognised. The acceptance of an obligation, which then manifests itself 
through the more benevolent elements of crowdfunding, is an incredibly powerful 
aspect that tends to push these crowdfunding efforts forward.  
 
Hooghiemstra and de Buysere (2016) have written about the significant cooperation of 
banks and Germany regulators in terms of establishing limits for crowdfunding 
campaigns. This outcome may foreshadow the future for the United States, and it 
signals many critical points about the effort to provide SMEs with funding in Germany. 
This authors have noted that financial institutions in Germany had been negligent in 
keeping pace with the needs of businesses. Many SMEs did not enjoy the right to 
obtain funding from these larger sources, even when their ideas and underlying 
fundamentals were strong (Nasrabadi 2016). At the same time, SMEs often could not 
afford both the time lag and financial costs involved in this kind of investment. 
Ultimately, the high costs of working with these financial institutions excluded these 
SMEs, which meant that German consumers could not take advantage of the often-
superior services and products developed by these innovative companies (Nasrabadi 
2016). Of course, when crowdfunding sites emerged to meet this need, they presented 
a direct risk to the banks that had depended on overpriced services up until that point. 
These banks had colluded with regulators to make it more difficult for average people 
to get involved in investing. As the authors have noted, the regulators and banks 
attempted to justify their actions in many ways, but their main argument has centred 
on the need to protect investors from fraud and other things. While these sorts of 
regulator moves are always explained as attempts to protect small investors from their 
own lack of knowledge, the actual goal is to protect banks from being overtaken by a 
more innovative movement. This threatens innovation within the German funding 
universe, since major financial institutions have found it easy to collude with regulators 
to restrict organisations seeking to fill a critical need in the Germany business world 
(Funk 2016). This has also happened in China, where a number of major financial 
institutions have successfully used their clout to pass laws limiting the ability of certain 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 69 
crowdfunding applications to subvert banks (Funk 2016). While some have argued that 
Asian consumers are simply not attracted to crowdfunding, others have claimed that 
potential users have not been able to determine whether they would like to use these 
platforms to reduce costs because collusion between financial institutions and the 
government has resulted in the entire industry being shut down at a very early stage 
(Afterman 2016). 
 
Ramos and Gonzalez (2016) have written about the effects of crowdfunding in Spain 
and how it has helped to change the employment market there. As they have noted, 
when companies are able to simultaneously obtain funding and save money, they are 
in a much better position to hire people and power the community at large. The authors 
studied the impact of the rise of the Spanish crowdfunding movement. While they did 
not find that the increase in the availability of capital solved all problems, they did report 
that more people were being hired and more savings were being passed on to those 
workers (Afterman 2016). The ultimate outcome was that many Spanish companies 
were operating more efficiently, as they were no longer forced to pay high bank fees. 
They were able to expand to meet the rising demands of their customers and to hire 
more workers to make that possible. The net benefit for society was impressive, 
according to the authors, and constitutes a compelling case for why crowdfunding is 
beneficial for society. Diaz and Cacheda (2016) have described how crowdfunding and 
the movement towards social entrepreneurship have led Spain through a challenging 
era. The authors have pointed out that these two things have been linked in Spain and 
across Germany. More people are taking it upon themselves to start businesses not 
only to earn money but also to fix the many problems facing the world today. Because 
they are doing so, they have been able to fill in the gaps where some governments 
have failed (Afterman 2016). This has been critical in Spain, as in Italy, Greece, and 
other parts of Europe. In the wake of the economic downturn, governments 
experimented with austerity policies, which meant that there were often not enough 
government resources available to fix the problems facing these countries. Rather than 
waiting for a miracle, many decided they would use their own abilities and networks to 
start companies addressing the gaps in social policy. This gave rise to the need for a 
quick funding source that could be responsive. Following the crisis, traditional banks 
were both weak and slow to respond to rapid demands (Cacheda 2016). 
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Shneor et al. (2016) have reported that in certain parts of Germany, there is a lack of 
available jobs, and just as immigrants in some countries choose to work for themselves 
because they cannot get hired elsewhere, many people in the Baltic states are turning 
to entrepreneurship. This movement is positive, as people are seeking to meet their 
own needs. The problem, however, is that in places, an established and effective 
business funding system is not in place. While in parts of Germany, the crowdfunding 
movement has arisen to displace traditional funding sources, in other parts of 
Germany, the movement is primarily filling a gap because few options exist in the first 
place. The authors have noted that movements in business ownership in these regions 
have been largely fuelled by cross-national crowdfunding movements. This 
demonstrates the unique power of globalisation to provide solutions to local problems, 
especially when there is an appropriate infrastructure to allow such exchanges to take 
place (Cacheda 2016).  
 
The regulatory framework governing crowdfunding in Germany remains open to the 
concept, which is one of the elements that has enabled crowdfunding to grow at such 
a rapid rate. Donation-based crowdfunding is allowed in all Germany nations. In 
Finland, however, the powerful Act on Fundraising has resulted in administrative 
hurdles and higher costs for crowdfunding (Wilson & Testoni 2014). As Aschenbeck-
Florange et al. (2013) have suggested, reward-based crowdfunding presents more 
difficulties across Germany. While reward-based crowdfunding is typically accepted in 
all nations, some regulate it under e-commerce laws. Under those laws, companies 
are sometimes required to provide refunds if something is amiss or if an investor 
changes his or her mind. Taxation on these transactions is another issue at place. The 
uncertainty surrounding reward-based crowdfunding can make it a less-than-ideal 
option for some entrepreneurs, especially those seeking more stability (Wilson & 
Testoni 2014).  
 
Equity crowdfunding is allowed in most German regions, and it is regulated under 
existing securities structures. However, there are restrictions, and as Wardrop and 
Ziegler (2016) have written, regulations are growing stronger in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere. Denmark is the least open to this sort of capital funding, as it does not 
allow companies to offer equity crowdfunding opportunities to investors. Some Danish 
companies have manoeuvred around this by registering pro forma companies in 
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countries where crowdfunding sites and platforms exist. For instance, British 
companies have risen to meet the need, allowing Danish capital seekers to obtain the 
cash they need (Wilson & Testoni 2014).  
 
While there is substantial discussion of crowdfunding in the German SME context, it is 
not adequately known how crowdfunders in Germany face potential regulatory risks, 
thus providing a motivation for the fourth research question of the study (In the context 
of crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk?). 
Game theory, while applicable to the first three research questions of the study, is less 
applicable to the fourth, because regulatory agencies appear to have equal duties to 
small investors, SMEs themselves, and institutional investors; thus, game theory does 
not predict the existence of either overt regulatory blocks or encouragements to 
crowdfunding in the SME context. 
 
2.14 Conclusion 
The literature on German SMEs’ use of crowdfunding to overcome the problems 
associated with traditional funding demonstrates the dire situation facing many 
companies in that country. American venture capitalists and banks have proven more 
willing to support promising SMEs than has been the case in Germany: German banks 
have been slow to lend following the financial collapse, and venture capitalists, who 
are only interested in investing in a few companies, offer little refuge (Wilson & Testoni 
2014). As the research has demonstrated, crowdfunding did not emerge for no reason. 
Rather, it arose to meet needs in countries where the government was not doing 
enough to support the people. Business founders started companies, often based on 
the aim of fixing social ills facing their countries and the world (Aschenbeck-Florange 
et al. 2013). This led to the crowdfunding movement, which allowed those founders to 
solicit money from not only investors at home, but also investors abroad. In many parts 
of the EU, crowdfunding opened the eyes of the business world to a new way of helping 
these businesses to expand, to hire more people, to produce more, and to market 
themselves more effectively. On the whole, it has been a positive movement, but there 
has been some pushback, as the literature has suggested (Ziegler 2016).  
 
The literature has demonstrated that funding seekers have many motivations for not 
seeking traditional funding. In short, many of these SME owners and founders had no 
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choice but to rely on crowdfunding because they either lacked the necessary 
connections to banks or venture capitalists or had ideas that would not appeal to major 
funding parties (Aschenbeck-Florange et al. 2013). In some cases, their motivations 
were more complicated. The funding seeker might have wanted to save money or to 
move quickly; both goals can be accomplished with crowdfunding but may not be 
possible in the traditional finance world. Moreover, stories have abounded of 
businesses using their crowdfunding campaigns as more than just a round of funding. 
Rather, they have leveraged these campaigns to market themselves and to build 
excitement among investors; this approach incentivises those investors to then 
promote what the company is doing. Finally, some firms chose crowdfunding to 
demonstrate that they are committed to be an insurgent company that operates in its 
own way. These different motivations highlight the diverse kinds of companies that 
seek funding through this unique movement, and it illustrates why one should never 
try to put an SME founder in a particular category (Cacheda 2016). 
 
The motivations for those on the other side are rather simple. As the literature has 
pointed out, these people are seeking equity, a financial reward, or the opportunity to 
be a part of something that is larger than themselves (Ziegler 2016). It breaks down 
depending on whether the goal is an extrinsic reward or an intrinsic reward. Those 
SMEs that rely on crowdfunding offer people a chance to be a part of a movement, 
especially when the product or service will help solve a major social problem. For 
some, however, crowdfunding is primarily about money, and they are essentially 
buying lottery tickets in the hopes that their equity in a company could one day lead to 
high profits (Aschenbeck-Florange et al. 2013).  
 
Germany is unique in this regard, and crowdfunding has found the most success in 
those countries where the government has largely failed and banks have been slow to 
respond (Afterman 2016). The future is unclear for SMEs and crowdfunding sites, 
however, as there are changes on the horizon. The power of crowdfunding has 
reduced the influence of large banks that would otherwise have the ability to encourage 
governments to treat them favourably. This leads to doubt regarding whether 
crowdfunding will continue to be a force for SME founders or whether those founders 
will have to return to an era of struggling to convince large banks and other sources of 
corporate capital that they are worthy of their time and investment (Afterman 2016). 
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Based on a synthesis of the literature reviewed in this chapter, there appears to be a 
tension between traditional funding and crowdfunding as utilized by German SMEs. 
Traditional funding might be harder to obtain and tied closely to investors’ need for 
equity whereas crowdfunding might be simpler to obtain and less tied to investors’ 
need for equity.  
 
Game theory provides a conceptual framework that can link the concepts of investors’ 
desire (for example, in equity or in the maturity of an investment target) and investees’ 
desires (for example, in terms of retaining equity, testing the waters, building 
communities, and remaining independent. One of the major elements in game theory 
is the assumption that the units (which could be companies or investors) are the 
primary decision makers. 
 
The Literature differentiated following (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 2016) 
between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Cooperative has been 
primarily normative in its approach, whereas non-cooperative game theory, despite its 
stress on individualistic norms, has been more closely associated with experimental 
gaming and ad hoc applications. For studying the evolution of societies, we believe 
models of games within games, interacting on different time scales, are most 
appropriate. In this case, the long-term bargaining and discussion of cooperative 
games can be used to develop, maintain, and enforce the laws or rules for many largely 
individualistic and anonymously made decisions. 
 
Therefore, under cooperative game theory, coalitions (which may be characterised as 
banks and German SMEs) are in competition to obtain financing but must make the 
decision whether or not to obtain financing from a traditional bank or through 
crowdfunding. 
 
Conceptually, one of the common themes in the literature on the importance of 
crowdfunding to SMEs is that of cooperative game theory. Given that companies have 
a vested interest in maintaining equity (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mauritzen 
2016), the importance of crowdfunding to SMEs can be described in terms of retaining 
equity. Because crowdfunding depends on numerous, small investments, no single 
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investor has the ability to apply competitive game-theory dynamics in order to demand 
equity in return for investment (Andersen & Mauritzen, 2016). Thus, crowdfunding is 
particularly attractive to SMEs, but the importance of crowdfunding has not been 
quantified in terms of how much SME funding actually comes from crowdfunding. 
 
Game theory suggests that, to the extent that companies are able to secure funds 
through crowdfunding, they will do so in a manner that reduces their reliance on 
traditional funding, with its demands on equity. However, this prediction made by game 
theory has not been empirically tested. The purpose of the second research question 
of the study is to test this relationship, and the purpose of the third research question 
is to explore the possible implications of a potential trade-off between crowdfunding 
and traditional funding. 
   
The conceptual tension between traditional funding and crowdfunding can be 
empirically tested by means of (a) hypotheses that measure the trade-off between the 
two types of financing or (b) qualitative explorations identifying characteristics of the 
divide between the two types of financing. Based on the conceptual model of the 
investors and investees, the following empirical assumptions can be made. First, it is 
likely that, because traditional funding is more well-established, it will predominate over 
crowdfunding. Second, it is likely that, because of the tension between (a) the goals 
and characteristics of traditional funding and (b) the goals and characteristics of 
crowdfunding, there will be a negative correlation between the percentage of 
crowdfunding and the percentage of traditional funding for SMEs. Third, it is likely that, 
because of both the incumbent advantages of traditional funding and the specific 
aspects of German market conditions, discussed earlier in this chapter, that favour 
traditional funding, crowdfunding will be found to a niche with a limited future and 
limited impact on the overall funding market. Fourth, it is likely that the maturity of 
regulation will reduce the risks of crowdfunding and decrease systemic risk while the 
costs and benefits of crowdfunding can be understood through the tension between 
the goals of (a) encouraging investment and (b) protecting investors.  
 
Each of these implicit hypotheses derivable from the conceptual model can be 
grounded in the literature. The well-established nature of traditional funding in 
Germany (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2016; Nasrabadi, 2016); the tension between 
crowdfunding and traditional funding in terms of goals and characteristics (Block et al. 
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2016; Bratton & Levitin 2013; Vachelard et al. 2016); the likely-to-be-limited impact of 
crowdfunding (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Herve et al. 2016; Marelli & Ordanini 
2016; Mauritzen 2016); and the roles of regulation, investor inclusion, and investor 
protection (Aschenbeck-Florange et al.2013; Hooghiemstra & de Buysere 2016; 
Wilson & Testoni 2014) have all been noted in the literature. However, these implicit 
hypotheses have not been empirically tested on a sample of German SMEs, 
requiring the application of a research methodology and design of the kind proposed 
in Chapter 3. 
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3 CHAPTER RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, PARADIGM, AND DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe and defend all relevant aspects of the 
methodology and design of the study. Chapter 3 has been structured as follows. First, 
the problem, goal, and questions of the study have been noted, with the questions of 
the study containing both the quantitative and qualitative research questions and, for 
the appropriate quantitative research questions, accompanying null and alternative 
hypotheses. Second, the research paradigms of the study have been discussed, with 
particular emphases on post-positivism and interpretivism. Third, the research 
approach of the study has been discussed, with particular emphasis on the qualitative 
and quantitative aspects of the study and their blending into a mixed-methods 
approach. Fourth, the research design of the study has been provided. Fifth, the 
research ethics of the study have been discussed. Sixth, a conclusion to the chapter 
has been provided. The findings presented in Chapter 4 are in alignment with the 
research methodology, approaches, and designs described and defended in Chapter 
3. 
 
Searches of several databases were conducted. First, a search using the Bolton 
gateway was conducted; this yielded several relevant articles. Several different 
keywords were used, including “SME crowdfunding in Germany”, “innovation in 
business crowdfunding”, and “SME capital crowdfunding”. These keywords were 
designed to target articles that specifically outline current innovations in SME funding. 
They were designed to examine Germany while also allowing for comparisons of SME 
funding mechanisms within Germany. The search also made use of other databases 
to identify relevant articles.  
 
Studies were chosen for inclusion primarily on the basis of their relevance. This was 
the top criterion, and it was deemed more important than even the legitimacy of the 
source and the credibility of the author. Of course, those aspects were also deemed 
critical. The analysis included many peer-reviewed studies published in reputable 
journals, along with dissertation-level studies providing the appropriate level of insight 
into the topic. Because crowdfunding is a relatively new topic, especially in the SME 
world, there were fewer studies available in peer-reviewed journals than there will be 
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in a few years. This consideration necessitated including some sources that would not 
have otherwise been considered, primarily because they were needed to fill out the 
review. That said, these sources were studied to ensure that they provided value.  
 
3.2 Research Problem, Goal, and Questions 
Both the methodology and the design can be understood in terms of the objectives of 
the study. The three objectives of the study identified in Chapter 1 were as follows: (1) 
To evaluate and determine the importance of crowdfunding and crowdfunding 
platforms as financing alternatives for SMEs. (2) To evaluate and determine the 
potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand 
from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms. (3) To identify and assess 
potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk. These objectives provided 
the basis for the research questions of the study. The research questions and 
hypotheses of the study are as follows, provided separately for the study’s qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. 
 
3.2.1 Determination of Quantitative Research Questions 
The quantitative research questions of the study have been provided below. Each 
quantitative research question is accompanied by further discussion. Where 
appropriate, each quantitative research question is accompanied by hypotheses and 
a brief discussion of grouping methods. More extensive statistical detail about each 
quantitative research question has been provided subsequently in this chapter, 
including the actual statistical syntax utilized to generate the results of the study in the 
Stata / SE 14.2 software format. 
 
RQ1: What is the percentage of crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? 
No hypotheses have been associated with RQ1, as it is descriptive in nature and 
therefore not accompanied by inferentially testable hypotheses (Moore & McCabe, 
2009). RQ1 addresses the first objective of the study, as introduced in Chapter 1, which 
was to evaluate and determine the importance of crowdfunding and crowdfunding 
platforms as financing alternatives for SMEs. Crowdfunding as a percentage of all 
funding was calculated for the following groups: 
 
 All SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
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 All SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All technology-based SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-
2017) 
 All technology-based SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample 
(2008-2017) 
 All non-technology-based SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-
2017) 
 All non-technology-based SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the 
sample (2008-2017) 
 
The reason for treating technology and non-technology companies was the detection 
of an industry effect on crowdfunding, to be discussed further under the data analysis 
provided for RQ1. Specifically, using first an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
Tukey’s post hoc test (Tukey, 1949) and subsequently an independent samples t-test 
for confirmation. 
 
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on other—that is, traditional—forms of 
financing? 
In order to validate the statistical analysis, RQ2 has been subdivided into six distinct 
sub-research questions. Each of these sub-research questions is based on a 
comparison of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding with one of five traditional funding 
approaches. 
 
RQ 2.1: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding (equity crowdfunding)? 
H 2.10: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding (equity crowdfunding). 
H 2.1A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding (equity crowdfunding). 
 
RQ 2.2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding? 
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H 2.20: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding. 
H 2.2A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding. 
 
RQ 2.3: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding? 
H 2.30: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. 
H 2.3A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. 
 
RQ 2.4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding? 
H 2.40: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding. 
H 2.4A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding. 
 
RQ 2.5: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding? 
H 2.50: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. 
H 2.5A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. 
 
RQ 2.6: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding combined? 
H 2.60: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding combined. 
H 2.6A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding combined. 
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The second research question partially addresses the second research objective of 
the study, which was to evaluate and determine the potential impact on the traditional 
financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial institutions to 
crowdfunding platforms. The second research question consists of a quantification of 
the trade-off between crowdfunding and five kinds of traditional funding. This 
quantitative analysis was triangulated through qualitative analyses generated by the 
qualitative research questions noted below. 
 
3.2.2 Determination of Qualitative Research Questions 
The qualitative research questions of the study have been provided below, as is 
customary in qualitative research according Berger, 2013; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; 
Cassell & Symon, 2004; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Duffy, 1987; Given, 2008; Thanh & 
Thanh, 2015; Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013, no hypotheses have been associated 
with the qualitative research questions. Particular attention has been directed to 
explaining how, if at all, the qualitative research questions of the study interact with the 
quantitative research questions as enumerated in chapter 3.2.1.  
  
RQ3: What is the potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift 
in SME financing demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms? 
RQ3 was quantitatively addressed in the second research question, which allowed a 
trade-off comparisons between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on each of five kinds of traditional funding. The results of RQ2 and RQ3 will be blended 
by means of a concurrent transformative design, whose purpose is to allow a general 
research question to be explored distinctly through quantitative and qualitative means, 
with the results subsequently interpreted by the researcher (Chadwick, Knapp, Sinclair, 
& Arshoff, 2014; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Ivankova, Creswell, 
& Stick, 2006; Kerrick, Cumberland, Church-Nally, & Kemelgor, 2014; Klassen & 
Durksen, 2014; Koon, Frick, & Igo, 2009; Molina-Azorín, Tarí, Pereira-Moliner, López-
Gamero, & Pertusa-Ortega, 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013). This is important because 
it allows for triangulation and verification of results. In this respect, RQ2 is an attempt 
to quantify the impact of crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on traditional funding, 
segmented by funding type, whereas the qualitative answer to RQ3 will be broader and 
more general. RQ2 provides a narrower, statistical perspective and example of how 
crowdfunding might influence traditional funding, whereas RQ3 provides a more 
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explanatorily power assessment of the impact of crowdfunding.  While this could be 
assessed in a quantitative way, the use of the qualitative method provides information 
regarding the impact of crowdfunding. 
 
RQ4: In the context of crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that 
could lead to systematic risk? 
RQ 4.1: In the context of crowdfunding, what is the relative importance of potential 
regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? 
RQ 4.2: In the context of crowdfunding, what are the costs and benefits of closing 
potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? 
The fourth research question has been further subdivided. As stated, RQ4 is designed 
simply to identify the domain of potential regulatory gaps. The first sub-research 
question associated with RQ4 is designed to elicit expert opinions about the 
importance of these gaps. The first sub-research question associated with RQ4 is 
designed to elicit expert opinions about the costs and benefits of closing these gaps. 
These questions are related to RQ4 because the qualitative approach will allow for the 
identification of the gaps, per the experts, prior to their expression of importance and 
because information will be provided regarding regulatory gaps because regulations 
for crowdfunding are largely the same as they are for traditional banking. Information 
from experts would enable the development of crowdfunding regulations. 
 
3.2.3 Blending of Research Question Results 
As noted in chapter 3.2.1 and chapter 3.2.2 RQ1 and RQ4 are single-methods 
questions (Berger, 2013; Bernard & Bernard, 2012). RQ1 is designed to be answered 
solely by quantitative means, and RQ4 is designed to be answered solely by qualitative 
means. However, RQ2 (a quantitative research question) and RQ3 (a qualitative 
research question) are designed to be blended using the concurrent transformational 
approach (Chadwick et al., 2014; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber, 2012; 
Ivankova et al., 2006; Kerrick et al., 2014; Klassen & Durksen, 2014; Koon et al., 2009; 
Molina-Azorín et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013). A more detailed discussion of the 
application of the concurrent transformational approach to RQs 2 and 3 has been 
provided subsequently in this chapter. 
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3.3 Determination of the Research Paradigms 
Several possible research paradigms and philosophies are available to empirical 
researchers. Some of the available choices include positivism, post-positivism, critical 
theory, and constructivism. Each of these paradigms or philosophies has its own 
ontologies, epistemologies, and applications to the selection of research questions and 
the framing of empirical research. 
 
Historically, the paradigm of positivism is associated with the work of the Vienna Circle 
of philosophers and scientists in the early 20th century (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; 
Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & 
Johnson, 2011). Positivism was somewhat related to, and inspired by, empiricism in 
terms of its emphasis on the importance of measurement; however, to classical 
empiricism, positivism added an emphasis on formal logic as the means through which 
reality could be known (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 
2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Indeed, to 
positivists, there is no reality outside the domains of measurement and logic (Altman, 
1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; 
Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). 
 
Post-positivism is a research paradigm that acquired prominence after the 1950s, by 
which time the formal research program of positivism had already collapsed (Altman, 
1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; 
Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Post-positivism does not assume that reality 
does not exist outside measurement and logic; however, post-positivism includes a 
methodological commitment to both measurement and logic as useful tools for 
acquiring knowledge that can be incomplete (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 
2016; Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 
2011). Thus, the post-positivistic researcher utilizes the tools of measurement and 
logic without claiming that the results of empirical, logical, and mathematical analysis 
are infallible or even represent an accurate picture of reality (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 
2014; Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & 
Johnson, 2011). The post-positivistic researcher is keenly aware of the limits of 
analysis, but the post-positivistic researcher is also aware that certain kinds of analysis 
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are indispensable (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 2010; 
Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). 
 
Mathematically testable hypotheses tend to be associated with either positivism or 
post-positivism; therefore, the quantitative component of the study must be situated in 
one of these two traditions (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 
2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). In terms of 
epistemology, one of the main distinctions between positivism and post-positivism is 
that positivism purports to establish facts and laws, whereas post-positivism treats the 
results of hypothesis testing with more circumspection. In terms of analysis, post-
positivism allows researchers to apply inference and other interpretative methods in 
an empirical format without committing researchers to the belief that reality only 
consists of, or can only be accessed by, what they measure (Kuhn, 1976).  In terms of 
ontology, both positivism and post-positivism draw upon what is measurable, 
mathematically representable, and analysable (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; 
Howell, 2016; Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & 
Johnson, 2011). Because of the contingent and relatively unexplored nature of (a) the 
predominance of crowdfunding and (b) the relationship between crowdfunding and 
traditional funding, the quantitative research questions of the study are more amenable 
to post-positivism. The results of the study might apply solely to Germany or to the 
SMEs from which data were obtained, and the results might also be determined by 
unmeasured third variables; therefore, it would be premature to approach the 
quantitative portion of the study from the philosophical basis of positivism rather than 
post-positivism.  
 
The qualitative component of the study could be approached from the philosophical 
bases of critical theory or constructivism, which are the major traditions associated with 
qualitative inquiry. Critical theory is more historically and structurally oriented in nature, 
whereas constructivism is more amenable to synthesizing the results of individual 
contributions into a limited understanding of a phenomenon (Englander, 2012). 
Because of the absence of a historical dimension in the research questions and 
approach, and the absence of an overtly political lens of inquiry, constructivism 
appears more suited than critical theory to the qualitative components of the study.  
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The specific type of constructivism applied within the study is descriptive 
phenomenology. In descriptive phenomenology, according to Englander (2012, p. 25), 
“the researcher aims at the discovery of the meaning of a particular phenomenon. … 
The phenomenon is the object of investigation, not the person, although obviously, a 
person is required to describe the phenomenon.” A general approach to 
phenomenology, which focuses on the primacy of human experiences, would examine 
not crowdfunding per se, but, rather, the opinions that Delphi experts held about 
crowdfunding. Delphi experts were important in this context because they could 
provide descriptions. However, in keeping with the post-positivistic paradigm applied 
elsewhere in the study, the objective was to understand a phenomenon—that of 
crowdfunding—more so than to centre the experiences of experts with knowledge 
about that phenomenon. For this reason, the type of phenomenological paradigm 
applied in the study was that of descriptive phenomenology, not general 
phenomenology (Englander, 2012).  
 
Kuhn (1976) described a paradigm as a means of viewing the world. As such, a 
paradigm is more general than any specific research approach, methodology, or 
design. A paradigm, according to Kuhn, establishes the first principles of an inquiry, 
among which are the articulation of expectations about (a) what exists and (b) how 
what exists can be measured. Clearly, the phenomenon of crowdfunding can be 
approached through any number of paradigms. In the context of this study, the 
selection of a post-positivistic paradigm means the epistemological and ontological 
assumption that crowdfunding is an objectively measurable type of funding that can be 
mathematically understood in terms of its relations with other kinds of funding (Kuhn, 
1976). Thus, to frame crowdfunding as part of a post-positivistic, quantitative research 
paradigm is to make a research commitment to mathematical analysis, particularly 
statistical analysis, as a means of understanding crowdfunding.  
 
As a research paradigm, post-positivism allows the analysis of crowdfunding from a 
statistical perspective (Kuhn, 1976). The advantages of this paradigm have been 
discussed subsequently in this chapter. However post-positivism alone does not 
address certain important questions about crowdfunding that are necessarily based in 
opinion, conjecture, and speculation (Kuhn, 1976). In this context, a paradigm other 
than post-positivism is necessary to more fully explore the phenomenon of 
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crowdfunding (Englander, 2012). The selection of descriptive phenomenology allows 
such an exploration through the application of the Delphi Methodology, whose details 
have been discussed subsequently in this chapter. 
 
3.4 Determination of Research Approach and Methodology 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to provide an overview of the research 
approach of the study. The overview has been divided into four sections. The first and 
longest section is a discussion of quantitative and qualitative research approaches. 
The second section is an overview of mixed methods. The third section consists of a 
justification of why both quantitative and qualitative research approaches were 
necessary for the current study. The fourth section consists of a justification of why the 
concurrent transformation mixed-methods approach was appropriate for the study in 
instance (RQs 2 and 3), whereas the quantitative and qualitative findings of the study 
were not blended in the instances of RQs 1 and 4. 
 
3.4.1 Determination of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Approaches 
Methodologies can be distinguished between each other in numerous ways. 
According to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (2010), one common approach to 
differentiation involves finding hard boundaries between the phenomena under 
investigation, whereas another approach involves soft boundaries. In a well-known 
metaphor, Wittgenstein suggested that a photograph of a large family would reveal 
that there would be overlapping features shared by certain members of the family, 
but that no specific feature would be unique to all family members. Wittgenstein used 
the same general approach to describe the problem of defining games: “We see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisis-crossing. What still counts 
as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw 
one…” (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 66). The differences between quantitative and 
qualitative research, as specified by McNabb (2010, p, 225) in Table 1 below, can be 
considered in light of Wittgenstein’s comments about boundaries. 
 
Table 1: Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research (Source: McNaab, 2010) 
Philosophical 
Foundations 
Qualitative Research Designs Quantitative Research 
Designs 
 
Ontology 
(perceptions of 
reality) 
 
 
Researchers assume that 
multiple, subjectively derived 
realities can coexist. 
 
 
Researchers assume 
that a single, objective 
world exists. 
Epistemology (roles 
for the researcher) 
Researchers commonly 
assume that they must interact 
with their studied phenomena. 
Researchers assume 
that they are 
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 independent from the 
variables under study. 
 
Axiology 
(researchers’ 
values) 
Researchers overtly act in a 
value-laden and biased 
fashion. 
 
Researchers overtly act 
in a value-free and 
unbiased manner. 
 
Rhetoric (language 
styles) 
Researchers often use 
personalized, informal, and 
context-laden language. 
 
Researchers most often 
use impersonal, formal, 
and rule-based text. 
 
Procedures (as 
employed in 
research) 
Researchers tend to apply 
induction, multivariate, and 
multi-process interactions, 
following context-laden 
methods. 
 
Researchers tend to 
apply deduction, limited 
cause-and-effect 
relationships, with 
context-free methods. 
 
Note: As specified by McNabb (2010, p. 225) 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research can, in Wittgenstein’s metaphor, be considered 
two somewhat overlapping families in which some features of qualitative research can 
be found in the quantitative family and vice-versa. While there are indeed distinctions 
between these two approaches to research, they are not necessarily hard distinctions. 
Even the use of mathematics, often considered the main hallmark of quantitative 
research (Balnaves & Caputi, 2012; Creswell, 2015; McNabb, 2010), does not serve 
as an absolute distinction between quantitative and qualitative research: “numbers are 
often used in qualitative research, and quantitative inquiry includes elements of quality” 
(Holloway & Wheeler, 2013, p. 28). Thus, explaining the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative research requires acknowledging the possibility that the 
boundaries between these two approaches to research are not hard; no one set of 
explanations can apply to all examples of quantitative methods to the exclusion of 
qualitative methods, and vice-versa. 
 
Nonetheless, as Wittgenstein (2010) argued, even overlapping phenomena are distinct 
enough to allow an examination of their differences. McNabb (2010, p. 225) attempted 
to draw a distinction between qualitative and quantitative designs on the basis of five 
philosophical foundations, those of (a) ontology, (b) epistemology, (c) axiology, (d) 
rhetoric, and (e) procedures. McNabb proposed specific differences between 
quantitative and qualitative methodology in each of these five foundations. These 
foundations, presented in Table 1 above, offer a systematic means of examining both 
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the differences and similarities between quantitative and qualitative research. Of the 
foundations, ontology comes first. In philosophy, ontology refers to understanding 
existence or being (Castilho & Lopes, 2010; Grossman, 1992; Yan, Zanni-Merk, 
Cavallucci, & Collet, 2014); according to McNabb (2010), one of the main differences 
between quantitative and qualitative research is that quantitative researchers assume 
the existence of a single and objective world whereas qualitative researchers are 
committed to a more subjective understanding of what is and what can be. However, 
on closer inspection, this distinction seems more of a methodological than an 
ontological distinction. For example, a quantitative researcher working with a measure 
of the importance of crowdfunding s not committed to believing that such importance 
exists only in terms of the items measured in the scale. Rather, the quantitative 
researcher working with an importance of crowdfunding scale has no empirical or 
epistemological basis for exploring importance outside the constraints of the scale. 
Among scientists, methodological naturalism is the term used to indicate that the 
domain of science is nature (Hartner, 2013). There might well be supernatural 
phenomena, but these phenomena cannot be admitted into the domain of science, 
even if they exist; methodological naturalism is thus not a theory of what is, but rather 
a theory of how to study nature (Lacey, 2013). In some ways, methodological 
naturalism applies to the point that McNabb (2010) was trying to make about ontology. 
By the nature of their tools and methodology, quantitative researchers are locked in to 
the examination of specific aspects of phenomena (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard 
& Bernard, 2012; Brink, Van der Walt, & Van Rensburg, 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; 
Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & 
Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; 
McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Trochim, Donnelly, & 
Arora, 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). If, for example, there 
are dimensions of the importance of crowdfunding not measured by a scale, then the 
quantitative researcher cannot, except in passing, refer to these dimensions.  
 
Quantitative researchers are, perhaps more than qualitative researchers, 
methodologically constrained in their examination of phenomena (Balnaves & Caputi, 
2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 
2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; 
Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 
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2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; 
Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). If so, then the difference that McNabb (2010 attempts to 
locate in the realm of ontology can be reduced to a procedural and epistemological 
difference. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers might well believe or not 
believe in a given kind of reality; what matters is not researchers’ beliefs about what 
exists, but about the way in which researchers can examine what exists (Balnaves & 
Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; 
Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & 
Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; 
McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Trochim et al., 2015; 
Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003), which is where the more 
substantive differences between quantitative and qualitative research become 
apparent.  
 
In philosophy, epistemology concerns the questions of how humans learn and how 
humans develop confidence in what they know (Bateson, 1972; Campbell, 1988; 
Dillard, 2000). In the qualitative tradition, there are research designs that are 
epistemologically broad, in that they provider researchers considerable leeway in 
building knowledge (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 
2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker 
& Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 
2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; 
Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). For example, 
in descriptive phenomenology, “the researcher aims at the discovery of the meaning 
of a particular phenomenon” (Englander, 2012, pp. 16-17) by speaking to individuals 
about their experiences or perceptions of that phenomenon. While there have been 
numerous attempts (Cassell & Symon, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Hesse-Biber, 
2012; Klenke, 2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Moustakas, 2014) to create a 
standardized, scientific coding structure for phenomenology, it is still possible for 
conscientious qualitative researchers to disagree with each other about what 
Englander called the meaning of a phenomenon. Phenomenologists, like most 
qualitative researchers, work with human narratives that can be complex and 
contradictory (Cilesiz, 2011; Husserl, 1970; Jamjoom, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Paul, 
2015; Pettigrew, 2015; Sharif Nia, Ebadi, Lehto, & Peyrovi, 2015; Spiegelberg, 1982), 
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especially when it comes to complex concepts like the importance of a funding type. 
Going from the narrative (or, more broadly speaking, the data of qualitative 
methodology) to the meaning (or the interpretation of the data) is a process that 
appears at least somewhat more equivocal and challenging (Cilesiz, 2011; Husserl, 
1970; Jamjoom, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Paul, 2015; Pettigrew, 2015; Sharif Nia et al., 
2015; Spiegelberg, 1982) than the equivalent process in quantitative research. 
Consider the case of the quantitative researcher working with a scale designed to 
measure the importance of crowdfunding to SMEs. Such a researcher might, for 
example, want to know whether there is a difference between the importance of 
crowdfunding as assessed by different groups of SMEs. The researcher will draw a 
sample, note its limitations, administer the scale, and then apply procedures such as 
an independent samples t test (Student, 1908) or the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (Mann 
& Whitney, 1947) test to determine whether there is a significant difference. For the 
quantitative researcher, the process of going from the data to the interpretation might 
be more structured and less equivocal than the same process for the qualitative 
researcher (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; 
Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & 
Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 
2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; 
Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). In the case 
of the importance of crowdfunding scale, the researcher might report the t value and p 
value for the difference in means, and the results might indicate whether there was a 
statistically significant difference or not.  
 
On the other hand, a qualitative research trying to phenomenologically explore why 
some groups of SMEs might find crowdfunding to be more important has numerous 
choices about how to frame, interpret, and present the resulting answer, and also how 
to explore the underlying data sources. With respect to qualitative methods, 
researchers have more leeway in selecting narrative snippets, identifying themes in 
the data, and mapping out an interpretation (Berger, 2013; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; 
Cassell & Symon, 2004; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Duffy, 1987; Given, 2008). Given the 
same set of data, research questions, and design details, two quantitative researchers 
are perhaps more likely to generate the same results than are qualitative researchers 
handed the same materials (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink 
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et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; 
Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; 
Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 
2014; Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). To 
make this claim is not to argue that the results of quantitative research are somehow 
better results; rather, the argument is that the output of quantitative research is more 
constrained, which, at least in some ways, makes it less procedurally ambiguous. 
There is only one way of conducting an independent samples t test, for example 
(technically, two, if one counts the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test as an 
alternative), but there could be numerous ways of arriving at conclusions about the 
meaning of the phenomenon of crowdfunding as used by SMEs. This distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative research is therefore primarily about epistemology 
and procedures (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; 
Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & 
Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 
2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; 
Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). Both the 
quantitative and qualitative researcher are making specific epistemological 
assumptions. A researcher working with an importance of crowdfunding scale is 
assuming that the scale has construct validity, that is, that the scale actually measures 
the phenomenon that it is supposed to study (which might or might not be the case).  
 
However, the mere use of a statistical procedure as opposed to a qualitative analysis 
does not mean that the quantitative researcher is any more or less equipped to 
understand or interpret reality (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; 
Brink et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 
2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; 
Moustakas, 2014; Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 
2003). In the social sciences, both the quantitative and qualitative researcher are 
equally constrained by their assumptions (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & 
Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; 
Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 
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2010; Moustakas, 2014; Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; 
Zikmund, 2003). The epistemological assumptions of the quantitative researcher can 
be described as front-loaded (Altman, 1991; Gerstman, 2014; Howell, 2016; 
Kremelberg, 2010; Moore & McCabe, 2009; Urdan, 2016; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). In 
administering and interpreting the importance of crowdfunding scale, for example, the 
quantitative researcher is reposing trust in the scale developer’s assumptions about 
how to measure the importance of crowdfunding. In using narrative data to understand 
why different groups of SMEs might ascribe different kinds or levels of importance to 
crowdfunding, the qualitative researcher’s epistemological work is back-loaded 
(Berger, 2013; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Davies & Hughes, 
2014; Duffy, 1987; Given, 2008); it is after the process of research, in the process of 
interpretation, that the qualitative researcher constructs meaning. In other words, 
meaning construction is common to both quantitative and qualitative researcher, but 
the specific times at which and ways in which meaning is constructed differ across 
these two approaches (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et 
al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; 
Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; 
Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 
2014; Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003).   
 
Ultimately, only the categories of epistemology and procedures (as they appear in 
McNabb, 2010’s effort to differentiate between quantitative and qualitative research) 
differ substantially between quantitative and qualitative designs, and these differences 
could be relatively minimal depending on any two studies that are selected for 
comparison. Quantitative researchers have less methodological room to examine 
reality; the choice of a scale and statistical procedure tend to lock quantitative 
researchers into a specific means of approaching and interpreting data (Balnaves & 
Caputi, 2001; Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; 
Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & 
Hughes, 2014; Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; 
McBurney & White, 2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Trochim et al., 2015; 
Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). On the other hand, because of the 
epistemological and procedural differences discussed earlier, qualitative researchers 
have greater leeway in how they handle and interpret data (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; 
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Bernard & Bernard, 2012; Brink et al., 2005; Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell, 2015; 
Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Dantzker & Hunter, 2006; Davies & Hughes, 2014; 
Given, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Jackson, 2015; Leary, 2011; McBurney & White, 
2011; McNabb, 2010; Moustakas, 2014; Trochim et al., 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013; 
Yin, 2009; Zikmund, 2003). 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research can both be considered in light of their 
relationship to theory. According to Henderikus (2010), a theory “is normally aimed at 
providing explanatory leverage on a problem, describing innovative features of a 
phenomenon or providing predictive utility” (Henderikus, 2010, p. 1498). Both 
quantitative and qualitative designs bear similar relations to theory, and both are 
indispensable in forming, testing, and expanding theories in psychology in particular 
and the social sciences in general. What matters more than trying to arrive at a generic 
evaluation of the merits of these two kinds of designs is to determine how, when, why, 
and where to apply them, based on the identified problem of the study. 
 
3.4.2 Determination of Mixed Methods Approach 
In mixed methods, researchers work with both quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Holden, Eriksson, Andreasson, 
Williamsson, & Dellve, 2015; Ivankova et al., 2006; Tazghini & Siedlecki, 2013; 
Venkatesh et al., 2013; Zhang, De Pablos, & Xu, 2014). The main reason for taking 
such an approach is that, given some of the differences between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches discussed in the previous section of this chapter, quantitative 
and qualitative approaches are likely to illuminate phenomena in different ways, 
which, in theory, means that the combination of these approaches is likely to be more 
powerful than either approach implemented in isolation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Holden et al., 2015; Ivankova et al., 2006; Tazghini & 
Siedlecki, 2013; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). Table 2 below contains 
an overview (CIRT, 2018, p. 1) of the different types of mixed-methods designs. 
Table 2: Mixed Methods Designs (Source: CIRT, 2018) 
Mixed-
Methods 
Design 
Description 
 
Sequential 
Explanatory 
 
This method is a two phase design where the quantitative data is 
collected first followed by qualitative data collection. The purpose is to 
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use the qualitative results to further explain and interpret the findings 
from the quantitative phase. For example, a survey may be used to 
collect quantitative data from a larger group. Members of that group may 
then later be selected for interviews where they can explain and offer 
insights into their survey answers. 
 
Sequential 
Exploratory 
This method is also a two phase design. The qualitative data is collected 
first, followed by collection and analysis of quantitative data. The purpose 
of this design is to develop an instrument (such as a survey), to develop 
a classification for testing, or to identify variables. Using the information 
from journals or diaries to develop an appropriate survey to administer to 
a larger sample would be an example of this design. 
 
Sequential 
Transformative 
This type of design also has two phases but allows the theoretical 
perspective of the researcher to guide the study and determine the order 
of data collection. The results from both methods are integrated together 
at the end of the study during the interpretation phase. 
 
Concurrent 
Triangulation 
In this design, qualitative and quantitative data are collected concurrently 
in one phase. The data is analysed separately and then compared and/or 
combined. An example would be if a researcher collected survey data 
and interview data at the same time and compared the results. This 
method is used to confirm, cross-validate or corroborate findings. It is 
often used to overcome a weakness in one method with the strengths of 
another. It can also be useful in expanding quantitative data through 
collection of open-ended qualitative data. 
 
Concurrent 
Nested / 
Embedded 
This design includes one phase of data collection in which priority is 
given to one approach that guides the project, while the other approach 
is embedded or nested into the project and provides a supporting role. 
The embedded approach is often addressing a different question then 
the primary research question. 
 
Concurrent 
Transformative 
Design 
This method involves concurrent data collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data. It is guided by a theoretical perspective in the purpose or 
research question of the study. This perspective guides all 
methodological choices and the purpose is to evaluate that perspective 
at different levels of analysis. 
 
Note: As specified by CIRT (2018, p. 1) 
 
As noted earlier, the study is necessarily divided into quantitative and qualitative 
components, necessitating a mixed-methods approach.  
 
With respect to the first research objective, that of evaluating and determining the 
importance of crowdfunding and crowdfunding platforms as financing alternatives for 
SMEs, one straightforward but explanatorily powerful measure of the importance of 
crowdfunding is the relative contribution of crowdfunding to the overall funding of a 
company, which is best measured through quantitative means. SMEs can certainly be 
asked qualitative questions about how and why crowdfunding is important to them, but 
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the answers to such questions would be unlikely to align as closely with the first 
research objective, in which the phenomenon of importance appears to be most 
accurately measurable through quantitative-only means (Creswell & Plano Clark, 201).  
 
The second research objective was as follows: To evaluate and determine the potential 
impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from 
financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms. This research objective appears to be 
amenable to both quantitative and qualitative approaches. From a quantitative 
perspective, the concept of a shift in financing appears to be best determining by 
quantifying the existence of a trade-off between  
(a) the relative contribution of crowdfunding to the overall funding of an SME 
and  
(b) the relative contribution of other kinds of traditional funding methods. While 
useful, such a quantitative approach would not furnish a complete answer to the 
second research question, because the conceptual variable of impact can be 
analysed in qualitative ways as well. In particular, experts might reach several 
different conclusions about what kinds of impacts crowdfunding might exert, 
how traditional financing agents might react, and other phenomena that are not 
susceptible to simple measurement and that have a strongly subjective 
dimension. For this reason, the second research objective of the study appears 
to require both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Tazghini & Siedlecki, 
2013; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014).  
 
The third research objective of the study was as follows: To identify and assess 
potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk. In this research objective, 
words such as potential and could, and the overall future orientation of the research 
objective (that is, its objective of assessing a future, possible state of affairs) imply the 
usefulness of a qualitative approach. Because of the high degree of speculation and 
subjectivity in the third research question, it appears particularly well-suited to being 
answered by qualitative approaches (Ivankova et al., 2006). 
 
3.4.3 Justification and Validation of Specific Mixed Methods 
Table 2 above contains an overview of six commonly recognized types of mixed-
methods designs. In this study, concurrent triangulation applied to the results of RQs 
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1 and 4. For reasons explained more thoroughly above, RQ1 was explored through 
quantitative means, whereas RQ4 was explored through qualitative means. These 
explorations were carried out concurrently, that is, at the same time, with the 
researcher’s statistical analysis for RQ1 taking place at the same time, albeit 
methodologically separated from, the Delphi method as applied to RQ4. RQs 1 and 4 
were therefore answered concurrently and without any interlinkage; therefore, this 
aspect of the study can best be described as conforming to the concurrent triangulation 
design.  
 
A concurrent transformational design was applied to the blending of the quantitative 
findings from RQ2 and the qualitative findings from RQ3. The justification of the 
concurrent transformational design for blending the findings from RQs 2 and 3 can be 
provided in the context of CIRT’s (2018, p. 1) definition of this particular mixed-methods 
design: “This method involves concurrent data collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data. It is guided by a theoretical perspective in the purpose or research 
question of the study. This perspective guides all methodological choices and the 
purpose is to evaluate that perspective at different levels of analysis” (CIRT, 2018, p. 
1). The theoretical presumption with respect to RQs 2 and 3 is that (a) there is in fact 
some kind of relationship between SME reliance on crowdfunding and SME reliance 
on other kinds of funding and (b) there are likely to be many possible impacts of shifts 
in SME reliance on crowdfunding. The best way of honouring both of these theoretical 
assumptions was to apply concurrent transformational design (Holden, Eriksson, 
Andreasson, Williamsson, & Dellve, 2015; Ivankova et al.). 
 
3.5 Sampling Processes 
While the sampling for the individual research questions is shown in the next section, 
this section contains information regarding the overall sampling process.  In general, 
sampling was conducted by Survey Sampling International (SSI). Thus, sampling 
processes were conducted by survey sampling for quantitative data. As the qualitative 
data were gathered by the Delphi method, both quantitative data and qualitative data 
were obtained by the non-probability sampling method. This type of sampling allows 
for a representation of the population. This sampling is beneficial because it enables 
the researcher to select certain criteria (as done in the individual research questions), 
enabling a specific sample to be drawn. While the results of the study cannot 
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necessarily be generalized to the population, they may be used to provide contributions 
to existing literature regarding how the population of interest may react. 
 
3.6 Quantitative and Qualitative Processes 
To gater and evaluate the necessary quantitative data the assistance of SSI was used. 
SSI was contracted to contact German SMEs, defined as 
  
(a) companies incorporated and mainly located in Germany and  
(b) companies with annual 2018 revenues between €500,000 and €10,000,000 
(turnover to max.50 Million), 
  
as this is the official European Union definition for German SMEs published by the Lfm 
Bonn (Institute of medium sized Enterprises research) 
 
Because SMEs are likely to be in different stages of funding at different times, 
participants were asked to provide compressed annual information. Thus, each 
participant in the study sampled was asked to complete a financing instrument 
resembling Table for the different kinds of funding and funding stages. The data 
provided by SSI was double-checked by an individual sample test through comparison 
with the official balance sheet statements collected via Bloomberg. These funding 
amounts were transformed into ratios to ensure comparability of the data. During the 
data collection process, the author identified an unexpected deviation of the standard 
normal distribution of fund raising. The author was able to identify that the common 
feature of the SMEs with a difference is, that they are technology companies. 
Technology company in this context is to understand as a company which is mainly 
active on the online market and not a consumer good producer. These companies 
have a higher demand to innovative funding mechanisms as classical non-technology 
companies. Thus, the study separated the analysis of technology and non-technology 
companies as further described in the following chapter. The quantitavie analyses 
occurred using the independent sample t-test, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test, and the 
ordinary least squares. 
 
The Qualitative Process was based on the Delphi Method. On the basis of the Delphi 
Method, two stages of questions were posed to subject-matter experts assembled to 
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answer the qualitative questions of the study. The following figure outlines the applied 
process. 
 
 
Figure 4: Delphie Process (Source: Author) 
 
The following classes of individuals were considered appropriate informants: 
 
 Venture capitalists and other stakeholders in investment processes targeting 
SMEs in particular 
 Technology vendors from crowdfunding platforms  
 Professors and other academic experts on funding and, in particular, 
crowdfunding 
Individuals fitting any of the profiles above were solicited with the assistance of SSI. 
Once identified and qualified, willing participants established email contact with the 
researcher and were sent a list of questions to answer (Provided in the Appendix). The 
research collated these answers into a single document, sent a second wave of 
questions to the participants, and allowed the participants to see all of the responses 
from the first wave of the Delphi Method. 
 
3.7 Determination of the Research Design 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to present and defend the research design 
of the study. The research design has been presented separately for each of the 
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research questions of the study. Each discussion contains a restatement of the 
research question and any accompanying hypotheses, notes on sampling and 
procedures, and notes on analytical and interpretive strategies. 
 
3.7.1 RQ1 Research Design 
The first research question of the study was as follows: What is the percentage of 
crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? No hypotheses have been associated 
with RQ1, as it is descriptive in nature. RQ1 addresses the first objective of the study, 
which was to evaluate and determine the importance of crowdfunding and 
crowdfunding platforms as financing alternatives for SMEs.  
 
For RQ1, data were gathered with the assistance of SSI. SSI was contracted to contact 
German SMEs, defined as (a) companies incorporated in Germany and (b) companies 
with annual 2018 revenues between €500,000 and €10,000,000 EUR SMEs are likely 
to be in different stages of funding at different times, participants were asked to provide 
annual information. Thus, each participant in the study sampled for RQ1 was asked to 
complete an instrument resembling Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: RQ1 Data Structure (Source: Author) 
Year Your 
Industry 
Crowd-
funding 
Amount € 
Seed 
Funding € 
Start-up 
Funding € 
Round 1 
Funding € 
Round 2 
Funding € 
Round 3 
Funding € 
2008 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2009 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2010 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2011 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2012 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2013 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2014 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2015 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2016 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
2017 IND CF€ SF€ SU€ R1€ R2€ R3€ 
 
Some study participants provided data for one year; others provided data for multiple 
years. Clearly, German SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding cannot be measured in terms 
of raw € amounts, because larger SMEs would be more likely to obtain more €. 
Therefore, once collected, the data in Table 3 were transformed into ratios. For each 
year, and for all years in aggregate, the total funding amounts for each type 
(crowdfunding, seed funding, start-up funding, Round 1 funding, Round 2 funding, and 
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Round 3 funding) were added together. Then, for each year and for all years as an 
aggregate, the € amounts represented in Table 3 were transformed into percentages 
instead. Assume, for example, that company A received €100,000 in crowdfunding in 
2008 and reported an additional €500,000 in traditional seed funding. Thus, in that 
year, 16.67% of Company A’s total funding would have come from crowdfunding. The 
transformation of all data into percentages allowed more a more valid comparison 
across SMEs of different sizes.  
As noted earlier, crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding was calculated for the 
following groups: 
 All SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All technology SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All technology SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample (2008-
2017) 
 All non-technology SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All non-technology SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample 
(2008-2017) 
The reason for these groupings was as follows. Using an ANOVA with Tukey’s post 
hoc test and subsequently an independent samples t-test for confirmation, it was found 
that technology companies were significantly different from non-technology in their 
reliance on crowdfunding. These results have been reported and discussed in Chapter 
4. 
 
Table 4 below contains the statistical syntax that was utilized to analyse data for 
RQ1. These syntax were applied in Stata, a commercial software program designed 
for statistical analysis and represents the scientific standard (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011; Hesse-Biber, 2012; Holden, Eriksson, Andreasson, Williamsson, & Dellve, 
2015; Ivankova et al., 2006; Tazghini & Siedlecki, 2013; Venkatesh et al., 2013; 
Zhang, De Pablos, & Xu, 2014). The syntax in the first column created the data 
structure into which data were pasted (from the Microsoft Excel format in which SSI 
delivered the data), the middle column contains the statistical commands, the right 
column contains the syntax used to create graphics. 
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Table 4: Stata Syntax, RQ1 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 
"Manufacturing" 3 "Financial 
Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
label value ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund 
"Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed 
Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup 
Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype 
"Technology Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech 
Company" 0 "Non-Tech Company" 
label value techtype 
 
 
summarize cfund, 
detail 
by ind, sort: 
summarize cfund, 
detail 
by techtype, sort: 
summarize cfund, 
detail 
ttest cfund, 
by(techtype) 
ranksum cfund, 
by(techtype) 
by ind, sort: ci 
mean cfund 
anova cfund ind 
pwmean cfund, 
over(ind) 
mcompare(tukey) 
effects 
 
graph box cfund, 
over(techtype) 
mark(1,mlabel(company)) 
scheme(s1color) name(g1) 
ciplot cfund, by(techtype) 
scheme(s1color) name(g2) 
hist cfund, freq 
scheme(s1color) name(g3) 
hist cfund, by(techtype) 
freq scheme(s1color) 
name(g4) 
graph box cfund, over(ind) 
mark(1,mlabel(company)) 
scheme(s1color) name(g5) 
 
The first step in the statistical data analysis for RQ1 was to generate detailed 
descriptive statistics for the variable of cfund, which, as noted in Table 4, was defined 
as the percentage of all funding coming from crowdfunding. The second step in the 
statistical data analysis for RQ1 was to generate detailed descriptive statistics for the 
variable of cfund as sorted by ind, which, as noted in Table 4, was defined as 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 101 
membership ind of six distinct industry groupings. The third step in the statistical data 
analysis for RQ1 was to generate detailed descriptive statistics for the variable of 
cfund as sorted by techtype, which, as noted in Table 4, was defined as being a 
technology company or not being a technology company. These steps in the data 
analysis were designed solely to obtain descriptive statistics; the next steps pertained 
to inferential statistics. The fourth step in the statistical data analysis for RQ1 was to 
determine whether there was a statistically significant effect of industry on as the 
percentage of all funding coming from crowdfunding (McNabb 2010, p, 225). The 
determination of whether there was a statistically significant effect of industry on as the 
percentage of all funding coming from crowdfunding came through an ANOVA followed 
by Tukey’s post hoc test, with the critical p value in both tests set to .05. In the fifth step 
in the statistical data analysis, there was a determination of whether there was a 
statistically significant effect of being a technology company on as the percentage of 
all funding coming from crowdfunding, which came through an independent samples 
t-test followed by a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test, with the critical p value in both tests 
set to .05. The sixth step in the statistical data analysis for RQ1 was to calculate the 
95% confidence interval of the mean of the percentage of all funding coming from 
crowdfunding on the basis of industry differences (McNabb 2010, p, 225). 
 
3.7.2 RQ2 Research Design 
The second research question of the study was as follows: Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing?  
 
RQ2 has been subdivided into six distinct sub-research questions in order to simplify 
the statistical analysis. Each of these sub-research questions is based on a 
comparison of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding with one of five traditional funding 
approaches; the sub-research questions were developed by isolating each one of 
these funding approaches in a distinct sub-research question and also be measuring 
overall funding in a separate sub-research question. The restatement of RQ2’s sub-
research questions and their associated hypotheses follows below. 
RQ 2.1: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding? 
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H 2.10: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding. 
H 2.1A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding. 
 
RQ 2.2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding? 
H 2.20: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding. 
H 2.2A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding. 
 
RQ 2.3: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding? 
H 2.30: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. 
H 2.3A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. 
 
RQ 2.4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding? 
H 2.40: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding. 
H 2.4A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding. 
 
RQ 2.5: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding? 
H 2.50: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. 
H 2.5A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. 
RQ 2.6: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding combined? 
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H 2.60: There is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding combined. 
H 2.6A: There is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding combined. 
 
The data for RQ2 were assembled in the same way, and with the same data structure, 
as the data for RQ1, as presented in Table 3 above. The same statistical syntax was 
applied to create the data structure for RQ2, but the code for statistical syntax and 
graphics was different. Table 5 contains the relevant statistical code for RQ2; attention 
is called to the middle and the last columns as there the differences applied. 
 
Table 5: Stata Syntax, RQ2 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 
"Manufacturing" 3 "Financial 
Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
label value ind ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund "Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology 
Company?" 
 
forval i=2008/2017 { 
regress cfund seed 
if year==`i' 
} 
forval i=2008/2017 { 
regress cfund su if 
year==`i' 
} 
forval i=2008/2017 { 
regress cfund ri if 
year==`i' 
} 
forval i=2008/2017 { 
regress cfund rii if 
year==`i' 
} 
forval i=2008/2017 { 
regress cfund riii 
if year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund seed 
hettest 
regress cfund su 
hettest 
regress cfund ri 
hettest 
regress cfund rii 
hettest 
regress cfund riii 
hettest 
regress cfund seed, 
vce(robust) 
hettest 
regress cfund su, 
vce(robust) 
hettest 
regress cfund ri, 
vce(robust) 
hettest 
regress cfund rii, 
vce(robust) 
hettest 
regress cfund riii, 
vce(robust) 
hettest 
 
graph twoway (lfitci cfund 
seed) (scatter cfund seed), 
scheme(s1color) name(g6) 
graph twoway (lfitci cfund 
su) (scatter cfund su), 
scheme(s1color) name(g7) 
graph twoway (lfitci cfund 
ri) (scatter cfund ri), 
scheme(s1color) name(g8) 
graph twoway (lfitci cfund 
rii) (scatter cfund rii), 
scheme(s1color) name(g9) 
graph twoway (lfitci cfund 
riii) (scatter cfund riii), 
scheme(s1color) name(g10) 
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label define techtype 1 "Tech 
Company" 0 "Non-Tech Company" 
label value techtype techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-
Crowdfunding” 
 
 
 
3.7.2.1 RQ 2.1 design 
The first sub-research question associated with RQ2 was as follows: Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and 
SMEs’ reliance on seed funding? The null hypothesis for the first sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 is that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding. The 
alternative hypothesis for the first sub-research question associated with RQ2 is that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding 
and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding. 
 
The first sub-research question associated with RQ2 was first analysed by means of 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on 
SMEs’ reliance on seed funding (McNabb 2010). The OLS regression of SMEs’ 
reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on seed funding was a base model; this 
base model was expanded by adding the company’s status as a technology company 
to the syntax provided in Table 5. Table 6 below contains the syntax utilized to add the 
predictor of technology company to the first sub-research question associated with 
RQ2. The addition of the predictor of technology company made it possible to 
determine the predictive power of an SME’s reliance on seed funding on an SME’s 
reliance on crowdfunding after the company’s industry was taken into account; as 
being a technology company was associated with higher levels of reliance on 
crowdfunding, the covariate of being a technology company was necessary to add to 
the first sub-research question associated with RQ2. 
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Table 6: Stata Syntax, RQ2.1 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 
"Manufacturing" 3 "Financial 
Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
label value ind ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund "Crowdfunding 
%" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding 
%" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology 
Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech 
Company" 0 "Non-Tech Company" 
label value techtype techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-
Crowdfunding” 
 
 
 
forval i=2008/2017 
{ 
regress cfund seed 
i.techtype if 
year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund seed 
hettest 
regress cfund 
seed, vce(robust) 
 
graph twoway (lfitci 
cfund seed) (scatter 
cfund seed), 
scheme(s1color) 
name(g6) 
 
The null hypothesis for the first sub-research question associated with RQ2 will only 
be rejected if the p values of the seed predictor are < .05 in both the OLS and RSE 
regression models (McNabb 2010). If there is disagreement in the results of the OLS 
and RSE regression models for the first sub-research question associated with RQ2, 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 106 
it will be noted as a limitation of the study in Chapter 5. In addition, the first sub-
research question associated with RQ2 will be graphically illustrated by means of a 
scatterplot of the relationship between the variables of SME reliance on crowdfunding 
and SME reliance on seed funding. 
 
3.7.2.2 RQ 2.2 design 
The second sub-research question associated with RQ2 was as follows: Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and 
SMEs’ reliance on startup funding?  
 
The null hypothesis for the second sub-research question associated with RQ2 is that 
there is not a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on startup funding. The alternative hypothesis for 
the second sub-research question associated with RQ2 is that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on startup funding. The second sub-research question associated with RQ2 was 
analysed by means of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of SMEs’ reliance 
on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on startup funding. The OLS regression of SMEs’ 
reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on startup funding was a base model; this 
base model was expanded by adding the company’s status as a technology company 
to the syntax provided in Table 5. Table 7 below contains the syntax utilized to add the 
predictor of technology company to the second sub-research question associated with 
RQ2. The addition of the predictor of technology company made it possible to 
determine the predictive power of an SME’s reliance on startup funding on an SME’s 
reliance on crowdfunding after the company’s industry was considered; as being a 
technology company was associated with higher levels of reliance on crowdfunding, 
the covariate of being a technology company was necessary to add to the second sub-
research question associated with RQ2. 
 
Table 7: Stata Syntax, RQ2.2 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for 
Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
 
forval i=2008/2017 
{ 
 
graph twoway 
(lfitci cfund 
su) (scatter 
cfund su), 
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replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 "Manufacturing" 3 
"Financial Services" 4 "Retail" 5 "Entertainment" 6 
"Education" 
label value ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund "Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech Company" 0 "Non-Tech 
Company" 
label value techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-Crowdfunding” 
 
 
regress cfund su 
i.techtype if 
year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund su 
hettest 
regress cfund su, 
vce(robust) 
scheme(s1color) 
name(g7) 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the second sub-research question associated with RQ2 will 
only be rejected if the p values of the startup predictor are < .05 in both the OLS and 
RSE regression models. If there is disagreement in the results of the OLS and RSE 
regression models for the second sub-research question associated with RQ2, it will 
be noted as a limitation of the study in Chapter 5. In addition, the second sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 will be graphically illustrated by means of a scatterplot 
of the relationship between the variables of SME reliance on crowdfunding and SME 
reliance on start-up funding. 
 
3.7.2.3 RQ 2.3 design 
The third sub-research question associated with RQ2 was as follows: Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and 
SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding? The null hypothesis for the third sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 is that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
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between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. 
The alternative hypothesis for the third sub-research question associated with RQ2 is 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. The third sub-research question 
associated with RQ2 was analysed by means of an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding. 
The OLS regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on Round 
1 funding was a base model; this base model was expanded by adding the company’s 
status as a technology company to the syntax provided in Table 5. Table 8 below 
contains the syntax utilized to add the predictor of technology company to the third 
sub-research question associated with RQ2. The addition of the predictor of 
technology company made it possible to determine the predictive power of an SME’s 
reliance on Round 1 funding on an SME’s reliance on crowdfunding after the 
company’s industry was considered; as being a technology company was associated 
with higher levels of reliance on crowdfunding, the covariate of being a technology 
company was necessary to add to the third sub-research question associated with 
RQ2. 
 
Table 8: Stata Syntax, RQ2.3 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for 
Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 "Manufacturing" 3 
"Financial Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
label value ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
 
forval i=2008/2017 
{ 
regress cfund ri 
i.techtype if 
year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund ri 
hettest 
regress cfund ri, 
vce(robust) 
 
graph twoway 
(lfitci cfund ri) 
(scatter cfund ri), 
scheme(s1color) 
name(g8) 
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label variable cfund "Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech Company" 0 "Non-
Tech Company" 
label value techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-Crowdfunding” 
 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the third sub-research question associated with RQ2 will only 
be rejected if the p values of the Round 1 predictor are < .05 in both the OLS and RSE 
regression models. If there is disagreement in the results of the OLS and RSE 
regression models for the third sub-research question associated with RQ2, it will be 
noted as a limitation of the study in Chapter 6. In addition, the third sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 will be graphically illustrated by means of a scatterplot 
of the relationship between the variables of SME reliance on crowdfunding and SME 
reliance on Round 1 funding. 
 
3.7.2.4 RQ 2.4 design 
The fourth sub-research question associated with RQ2 was as follows: Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and 
SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding? The null hypothesis for the fourth sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 is that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding. 
The alternative hypothesis for the fourth sub-research question associated with RQ2 
is that there is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding. The fourth sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 was analysed by means of an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 
funding. The OLS regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on 
Round 2 funding was a base model; this base model was expanded by adding the 
company’s status as a technology company to the syntax provided in Table 5. Table 9 
below contains the syntax utilized to add the predictor of technology company to the 
fourth sub-research question associated with RQ2. The addition of the predictor of 
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technology company made it possible to determine the predictive power of an SME’s 
reliance on Round 2 funding on an SME’s reliance on crowdfunding after the 
company’s industry was considered; as being a technology company was associated 
with higher levels of reliance on crowdfunding, the covariate of being a technology 
company was necessary to add to the fourth sub-research question associated with 
RQ2. 
 
Table 9: Stata Syntax, RQ2.4 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for 
Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 "Manufacturing" 3 
"Financial Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
label value ind ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund "Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech Company" 0 "Non-
Tech Company" 
label value techtype techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-Crowdfunding” 
 
 
forval i=2008/2017 
{ 
regress cfund rii 
i.techtype if 
year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund rii 
hettest 
regress cfund rii, 
vce(robust) 
 
graph twoway 
(lfitci cfund rii) 
(scatter cfund 
rii), 
scheme(s1color) 
name(g9) 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the fourth sub-research question associated with RQ2 will only 
be rejected if the p values of the Round 2 predictor are < .05 in both the OLS and RSE 
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regression models. If there is disagreement in the results of the OLS and RSE 
regression models for the fourth sub-research question associated with RQ2, it will be 
noted as a limitation of the study in Chapter 5. In addition, the fourth sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 will be graphically illustrated by means of a scatterplot 
of the relationship between the variables of SME reliance on crowdfunding and SME 
reliance on Round 2 funding. 
 
3.7.2.5 RQ 2.5 design 
The fifth sub-research question associated with RQ2 was as follows: Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and 
SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding? The null hypothesis for the fifth sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 is that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. 
The alternative hypothesis for the fifth sub-research question associated with RQ2 is 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. The fifth sub-research question 
associated with RQ2 was analysed by means of an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding. 
The OLS regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on Round 
3 funding was a base model; this base model was expanded by adding the company’s 
status as a technology company to the syntax provided in Table 5. Table 10 below 
contains the syntax utilized to add the predictor of technology company to the fifth sub-
research question associated with RQ2. The addition of the predictor of technology 
company made it possible to determine the predictive power of an SME’s reliance on 
Round 3 funding on an SME’s reliance on crowdfunding after the company’s industry 
was taken into account; as being a technology company was associated with higher 
levels of reliance on crowdfunding, the covariate of being a technology company was 
necessary to add to the fifth sub-research question associated with RQ2. 
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Table 10: Stata Syntax, RQ2.5 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for 
Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 "Manufacturing" 3 
"Financial Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
label value ind ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund "Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech Company" 0 "Non-
Tech Company" 
label value techtype techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-Crowdfunding” 
 
 
 
forval i=2008/2017 
{ 
regress cfund riii 
i.techtype if 
year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund riii 
hettest 
regress cfund rii, 
vce(robust) 
 
graph twoway 
(lfitci cfund riii) 
(scatter cfund 
riii), 
scheme(s1color) 
name(g10) 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the fifth sub-research question associated with RQ2 will only 
be rejected if the p values of the Round 3 predictor are < .05 in both the OLS and RSE 
regression models. If there is disagreement in the results of the OLS and RSE 
regression models for the fifth sub-research question associated with RQ2, it will be 
noted as a limitation of the study in Chapter 5. In addition, the fifth sub-research 
question associated with RQ2 will be graphically illustrated by means of a scatterplot 
of the relationship between the variables of SME reliance on crowdfunding and SME 
reliance on Round 3 funding. 
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3.7.2.6 RQ 2.6 design 
The sixth sub-research question associated with RQ2 was as follows: Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and 
SMEs’ reliance on total non-crowdfunding? The null hypothesis for the sixth sub-
research question associated with RQ2 is that there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on total non-
crowdfunding. The alternative hypothesis for the sixth sub-research question 
associated with RQ2 is that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on total non-crowdfunding. The 
sixth sub-research question associated with RQ2 was analysed by means of an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding on SMEs’ 
reliance on total non-crowdfunding. The OLS regression of SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding on SMEs’ reliance on total non-crowdfunding was a base model; this 
base model was expanded by adding the company’s status as a technology company 
to the syntax provided in Table 5. Table 11 below contains the syntax utilized to add 
the predictor of technology company to the sixth sub-research question associated with 
RQ2. The addition of the predictor of technology company made it possible to 
determine the predictive power of an SME’s reliance on total non-crowdfunding on an 
SME’s reliance on crowdfunding after the company’s industry was considered; as 
being a technology company was associated with higher levels of reliance on 
crowdfunding, the covariate of being a technology company was necessary to add to 
the sixth sub-research question. 
 
Table 11: Stata Syntax, RQ2.6 (Source: Author) 
Code for Data Structure Code for 
Statistical 
Procedures 
Code for 
Graphics 
 
set obs 1000 
gen year = 0 
replace year = 2008 in 1/100 
replace year = 2009 in 101/200 
replace year = 2010 in 201/300 
replace year = 2011 in 301/400 
replace year = 2012 in 401/500 
replace year = 2013 in 501/600 
replace year = 2014 in 601/700 
replace year = 2015 in 701/800 
replace year = 2016 in 801/900 
replace year = 2017 in 901/1000 
gen ind = 0 
label define ind 1 "Tech" 2 "Manufacturing" 3 
"Financial Services" 4 "Retail" 5 
"Entertainment" 6 "Education" 
 
forval i=2008/2017 
{ 
regress cfund tnonc 
i.techtype if 
year==`i' 
} 
regress cfund tnonc 
hettest 
regress cfund 
tnonc, vce(robust) 
 
graph twoway 
(lfitci cfund 
tnonc) (scatter 
cfund tnonc), 
scheme(s1color) 
name(g11) 
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label value ind ind  
label variable ind "Industry" 
replace ind = 1 in 1/12 
replace ind = 1 in 101/112 
replace ind = 1 in 201/212 
replace ind = 1 in 301/312 
replace ind = 1 in 401/412 
replace ind = 1 in 501/512 
replace ind = 1 in 601/612 
replace ind = 1 in 701/712 
replace ind = 1 in 801/812 
replace ind = 1 in 901/912 
gen cfund = 0 
label variable cfund "Crowdfunding %" 
gen seed = 0 
label variable seed "Seed Funding %" 
gen su = 0 
label variable su "Startup Funding %" 
ren ri = 0 
label variable ri "Round 1 %" 
gen rii = 0 
label variable rii "Round 2 %" 
gen riii = 0 
label variable riii "Round 2 %" 
gen techtype = 0 
label variable techtype "Technology Company?" 
label define techtype 1 "Tech Company" 0 "Non-
Tech Company" 
label value techtype techtype 
gen tnonc = seed+su+ri+rii+riii 
label variable tnonc “Total Non-Crowdfunding” 
 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the sixth sub-research question associated with RQ2 will only 
be rejected if the p values of the total non-crowdfunding predictor are < .05 in both the 
OLS and RSE regression models. If there is disagreement in the results of the OLS 
and RSE regression models for the sixth sub-research question associated with RQ2, 
it will be noted as a limitation of the study in Chapter 5. In addition, the sixth sub-
research question associated with RQ2 will be graphically illustrated by means of a 
scatterplot of the relationship between the variables of SME reliance on crowdfunding 
and SME reliance on total non-crowdfunding. 
 
3.7.3 RQ3 Research Design 
The third research question of the study was as follows: What is the potential impact 
on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial 
institutions to crowdfunding platforms? RQ3 was answered through the use of the 
Delphi Method, which has been summarized in Table 12 below, which contains 
Linstone and Turoff’s (2002, p. 4) description of when the Delphi Method is justified 
and what the Delphi Method consists of. This information complements Linstone and 
Turoff’s discussion of the rationales for, and applications of, the Delphi Method. 
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Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication 
process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, 
to deal with a complex problem. To accomplish this "structured communication" there 
is provided: some feedback of individual contributions of information and knowledge; 
some assessment of the group judgment or' view; some opportunity for individuals to 
revise views; and some degree of anonymity for the individual responses. (Linstone & 
Turoff, 2002, p. 3). The following table created according Linstone & Turoff (2002) 
shows an Overview of the applied Delphi Method. 
 
Table 12: Overview of the Delphi Method (Source: adapted from Linstone and Turoff, 2002) 
Rationales for Use of the Delphi Method Specific Applications of the Delphi 
Method  
 
 The problem does not lend itself 
to precise analytical techniques 
but cart benefit from subjective 
judgments on a collective basis  
 The individuals needed to 
contribute to the examination of a 
broad or complex problem have 
no history of adequate 
communication and may 
represent diverse backgrounds 
with respect to experience or 
expertise 
 More individuals are needed than 
can effectively interact in a face-
to-face exchange 
 Time and cost make frequent 
group meetings infeasible · The 
efficiency of face-to-face 
meetings can be increased by a 
supplemental group 
communication process  
 Disagreements among individuals 
are so severe or politically 
unpalatable that the 
communication process must be 
refereed and/or anonymity 
assured 
 The heterogeneity of the 
participants must be preserved to 
assure validity of the results, i.e., 
avoidance of domination by 
quantity or by strength of 
personality ("bandwagon effect") 
 
 Gathering current and historical 
data not accurately known or 
available 
 Examining the significance of 
historical events 
 Evaluating possible budget 
allocations Exploring urban and 
regional planning options 
 Planning university campus and 
curriculum development 
 Putting together the structure of a 
model 
 Delineating the pros and cons 
associated with potential policy 
options 
 Developing causal relationships 
in complex economic or social 
phenomena 
 Distinguishing and clarifying real 
and perceived human motivations 
 Exposing priorities of personal 
values, social goals 
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Note: As specified by Linstone and Turoff (2002, p. 4) 
On the basis of the Delphi Method, two stages of questions were posed to subject-
matter experts assembled to answer RQ3. Before presenting these questions, it would 
be appropriate to identify the sampling means through which individual experts were 
identified to answer RQ3. The following classes of individuals were considered 
appropriate informants: 
 
 Venture capitalists and other stakeholders in investment processes targeting 
SMEs in particular 
 Technology vendors from crowdfunding platforms  
 Professors and other academic experts on funding and, in particular, 
crowdfunding 
 
Individuals fitting any of the profiles above were solicited with the assistance of SSI. 
Once identified and qualified, willing participants established email contact with the 
researcher and were sent a list of questions to answer. The research collated these 
answers into a single document, sent a second wave of questions to the participants, 
and allowed the participants to see all of the responses from the first wave of the Delphi 
Method. 
 
The questions in the first wave of the Delphi Method as applied to RQ3 were as follows: 
 
1. What do you feel about the importance of crowdfunding in the overall funding 
strategy of SMEs? Is crowdfunding likely to be important or unimportant? If so, 
why? 
2. If crowdfunding should become more important as a funding strategy, what 
kinds of effects might this increasing importance have on traditional funding and 
the traditional funding marketplace? Please explain your reasoning. 
3. Please discuss what you consider to be plausible future scenarios about the 
possible changes to traditional funding that might be wrought by increased 
crowdfunding. What are some plausible scenarios? Which scenario do you 
consider to be the most likely? 
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4. Please discuss how you see crowdfunding as changing over time. Is it becoming 
more or less prevalent? Why? 
 
The first three Delphi Method questions were oriented to RQ3 but kept somewhat 
open-ended in order to allow the Delphi experts to express a wide range of views and 
contribute a broader spectrum of data. The second wave of Delphi questions consisted 
of the following: 
 
1. Having seen what some of your colleagues think about the impact of 
crowdfunding on traditional funding, have you changed your own opinions? Why 
or why not?  
2. Please respond to any of your colleagues’ claims or answers that you find 
interesting—whether because you agree or disagree with them. 
 
The second wave of questions, particularly question #2, was designed to elicit 
conversations between participants with different points of view and encourage 
interaction with the data collected in the first wave of the Delphi Method. Data analysis 
for RQ3 will be performed through a three-step approach coding that will proceed from 
(a) a review of all data collected from RQ3 to (b) an identification of themes in the data 
for RQ3, and (c) a synthesis of themes collected for RQ3 into an overall explanatory 
structure for RQ3. 
 
The data analysis for RQ3 benefited from the use of NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. All data for RQ3 were stored in NVivo, and classification analysis within 
NVivo was utilised in order to discover recurring keyworks and themes for RQ3. By 
highlighting narratives that were on similar topics or themes, NVivo reduced the manual 
work necessary to sort RQ3 narratives and derive findings accordingly. 
 
3.7.4 RQ4 Research Design 
The fourth research question of the study was as follows: 
  
In the context of crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to 
systematic risk? The fourth research question of the study was associated with two 
sub-research questions.  
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The first sub-research question associated with RQ4 was as follows: In the context of 
crowdfunding, what is the relative importance of potential regulatory gaps that could 
lead to systematic risk? The second research question associated with RQ4 was as 
follows: In the context of crowdfunding, what are the costs and benefits of closing 
potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? 
 
On the basis of the Delphi Method, two stages of questions were posed to subject-
matter experts assembled to answer RQ4. Before presenting these questions, it would 
be appropriate to identify the sampling means through which individual experts were 
identified to answer RQ4. The following classes of individuals were, as in the method 
applied to RQ3, considered appropriate informants for RQ4 as well, with the addition 
of stakeholders from investment banking and financial services: 
 
 Venture capitalists and other stakeholders in investment processes targeting 
SMEs in particular 
 Technology vendors from crowdfunding platforms  
 Professors and other academic experts on funding and, in particular, 
crowdfunding 
 Investment bankers and other stakeholders in financial services 
 
Individuals fitting any of the profiles above were solicited with the assistance of SSI. 
Once identified and qualified, willing participants established email contact with the 
researcher and were sent a list of questions to answer. The research collated these 
answers into a single document, sent a second wave of questions to the participants, 
and allowed the participants to see all of the responses from the first wave of the Delphi 
Method. 
 
The questions in the first wave of the Delphi Method as applied to RQ4 were as follows: 
 
1. Please discuss regulatory gaps that you believe to exist in the current 
environment of crowdfunding, both in a German and a global context.  
2. Do you believe that regulatory gaps that might exist in the current environment 
of crowdfunding, both in a German and a global context, will lead to some form 
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of systematic risk? If so, please identify each risk and discuss the possible 
reasons for its existence.  
3. How important is it to reduce regulatory gaps in the current environment of 
crowdfunding, both in Germany and globally? Why? 
4. Which regulatory gaps are the most important? Why? 
5. What are the costs of allowing current regulatory gaps to continue, both in 
Germany and globally? 
6. What are the benefits of allowing current regulatory gaps to continue, both in 
Germany and globally? 
 
RQ4 gathered knowledge that was not elicited in the other research questions, none 
of which touched specifically on themes of regulatory risk. While RQ3 was a means of 
exploring reasons for a trade-off between crowdfunding and traditional funding as 
identified in RQ2, RQ4 was a standalone research question designed solely to explore 
expert conceptions of regulatory risk related to crowdfunding among SMEs.  
 
The first six Delphi Method questions were oriented to RQ4 but kept somewhat open-
ended in order to allow the Delphi experts to express a wide range of views and 
contribute a broader spectrum of data. The second wave of Delphi questions consisted 
of the following: 
 
1. Having seen what some of your colleagues think about crowdfunding, regulatory 
gaps, and systemic risk, have you changed your opinion(s)? Why or why not?  
2. Please respond to any of your colleagues’ claims or answers that you find 
interesting—whether because you agree or disagree with them. 
 
The second wave of questions, particularly question #2, was designed to elicit 
conversations between participants with different points of view and encourage 
interaction with the data collected in the first wave of the Delphi Method. Data analysis 
for RQ4 will be performed through a three-step approach coding that will proceed from 
(a) a review of all data collected from RQ4 to  
(b) an identification of themes in the data for RQ4, and  
(c) a synthesis of themes collected for RQ4 into an overall explanatory structure 
for RQ4. 
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The data analysis for RQ4 benefited from the use of NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. All data for RQ4 were stored in NVivo, and classification analysis within 
NVivo was utilised in order to discover recurring keyworks and themes for RQ4. By 
highlighting narratives that were on similar topics or themes, NVivo reduced the manual 
work necessary to sort RQ4 narratives and derive findings accordingly. 
 
 
3.8 Determination of Research Ethics 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to describe issues of research ethics 
related to the study. 
Perhaps the leading ethical concern recognized by experts in research methodology 
is that of informed consent (Kadam, 2017; Wolff, 2011). The main purposes of informed 
consent are to  
(a) ensure that participants are aware of what they are being asked to do in the 
context of a research process,  
(b) ensure that participants are aware of their rights, and  
(c) give the researcher an opportunity to consider and protect against research 
risks and harms.  
In this study, sampling was carried out by SSI, but on the basis of informed consent 
forms that were designed by the researcher. There were two sets of informed consent 
forms: One for SMEs that were asked to participate in the data collection for RQs 1 
and 2, and one for subject-matter experts asked to participate in the data collection for 
RQs 3 and 4. 
 
3.8.1 Informed Consent for SMEs 
The following table determines and outlines the details of the informed consent used 
for SMEs and is setup according Kadam, (2017). 
 
Table 13: Informed Consent for Delphi Experts within SMEs (Source: adapted from Kadam, 2017) 
Component Details 
 
Introduction 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the 
research study is to examine the prevalence and importance of crowdfunding 
among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Germany. This study will 
contribute to the researcher’s completion of a doctoral study.  
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Research 
Procedures 
Should you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign 
this consent form once all your questions have been answered to your 
satisfaction. This study consists of an online data-gathering instrument that asks 
you to estimate the amount of funding your SME received from different sources. 
You may choose to complete the data collection form for any year, or any 
collection of years, between 2008 and 2017.  
 
Time Required Participation in this study might require 10-45 minutes of your time, depending on 
how readily you can access data related to your SME’s funding.  
 
Risks The investigator does not perceive more than minimal risks from your involvement 
in this study (that is, no risks beyond the risks associated with everyday life). 
 
Benefits There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this study. However, the 
results of the study might indirectly assist SMEs in learning more about, and 
better exploiting, crowdfunding.  
 
Payment for 
Participation 
There is no payment for participation in this study.  
 
Confidentiality  
 
The results of this research will be published as a dissertation. Your SME will be 
identified in the research records by a code number. The researcher retains the 
right to use and publish non-identifiable data. When the results of this research 
are published, no information will be included that would reveal your identity or 
your SME’s identity. All data will be stored in a secure location accessible only to 
the researcher. Upon completion of the study, all information that matches up 
individual respondents with their answers will be destroyed. 
 
Participation & 
Withdrawal 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to choose not to participate. 
Should you choose to participate, you can withdraw at any time without 
consequences of any kind. 
 
Questions 
about the 
Study 
If you have questions or concerns during the time of your participation in this 
study, or after its completion or you would like to receive a copy of the final 
aggregate results of this study, please contact SSI. 
 
Giving of 
Consent  
I have read this consent form and I understand what is being requested of me as 
a participant in this study. I freely consent to participate. I have been given 
satisfactory answers to my questions. The investigator provided me with a copy of 
this form. I certify that I am at least 18 years of age.  
 
 
3.8.2 Informed Consent for Delphi Experts 
The following table determines and outlines the details of the informed consent used 
for SMEs and is setup according Wolff, (2011). 
 
Table 14: Informed Consent for Delphi Experts (Source: adapted from Wolff, 2011) 
Component Details 
 
Introduction 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the 
research study is to examine the potential, barriers, and risks related to 
crowdfunding among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Germany 
and globally. This study will contribute to the researcher’s completion of a doctoral 
study.  
 
Research 
Procedures 
Should you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign 
this consent form once all your questions have been answered to your 
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satisfaction. This study consists of an online data-gathering instrument that asks 
you to answer several questions related to the potential, barriers, and risks 
related to crowdfunding among SMEs in Germany and globally.  
 
Time Required Participation in this study might require 60-120 minutes of your time, depending 
on how much time you can allocate to the thoroughness of your responses.  
 
Risks  The investigator does not perceive more than minimal risks from your 
involvement in this study (that is, no risks beyond the risks associated with 
everyday life). 
 
Benefits There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this study. However, the 
results of the study might indirectly assist SMEs in learning more about, and 
better exploiting, crowdfunding.  
 
Payment for 
Participation 
There is no payment for participation in this study.  
 
Confidentiality  
 
The results of this research will be published as a dissertation. You will be 
identified in the research records by a code number. The researcher retains the 
right to use and publish non-identifiable data. When the results of this research 
are published, no information will be included that would reveal your identity. All 
data will be stored in a secure location accessible only to the researcher. Upon 
completion of the study, all information that matches up individual respondents 
with their answers will be destroyed. 
 
Participation & 
Withdrawal 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to choose not to participate. 
Should you choose to participate, you can withdraw at any time without 
consequences of any kind. 
 
Questions 
about the 
Study 
If you have questions or concerns during the time of your participation in this 
study, or after its completion or you would like to receive a copy of the final 
aggregate results of this study, please contact SSI. 
 
Giving of 
Consent  
I have read this consent form and I understand what is being requested of me as 
a participant in this study. I freely consent to participate. I have been given 
satisfactory answers to my questions. The investigator provided me with a copy of 
this form. I certify that I am at least 18 years of age.  
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 was structured as follows. First, the problem, goal, and questions of the 
study were noted, with the questions of the study containing both the quantitative and 
qualitative research questions and, for the appropriate quantitative research questions, 
accompanying null and alternative hypotheses. Second, the research paradigms of the 
study were discussed, with particular emphases on post-positivism and interpretivism. 
Third, the research approach of the study was discussed, with particular emphasis on 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the study and their blending into a mixed-
methods approach. Fourth, the research design of the study was provided. Fifth, the 
research ethics of the study was discussed. The findings presented in Chapter 4 are 
in alignment with the research approach, design, and methodology described and 
defended in Chapter 3.  Table 15 below contains the alignment between the research 
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objectives, research questions, and research approaches in the study. Table 15, the 
ultimate result of the discussion of methodology provided in Chapter 3, ensures that 
the research problems identified in the study were transformed into tangible research 
objectives that, in turn, were associated with appropriate research questions and 
means of analysis. 
 
Table 15: Research, Objective, Approach and Design Alignment Table (Source: Author) 
Research 
Objective 
Research 
Question 
Research 
Approach 
Research 
Philosophy 
Literature 
Support 
 
 
To evaluate and 
determine the 
importance of 
crowdfunding 
and 
crowdfunding 
platforms as 
financing 
alternatives for 
SMEs.  
 
 
RQ1: What is 
the percentage 
of crowdfunding 
in the overall 
funding of 
SMEs? 
 
 
Quantitative: 
ANOVA, 
independent-
samples t-test, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney U test, 
confidence 
interval of 
means, 
descriptive 
statistics. 
 
Post-positivism 
 
Hagedorn & 
Pinkwart, 
2016; 
Nasrabadi, 
2016) 
 
To evaluate and 
determine the 
potential impact 
on the 
traditional 
financing market 
of a shift in SME 
financing 
demand from 
financial 
institutions to 
crowdfunding 
platforms. 
RQ2: Is there a 
statistically 
significant 
relationship 
between SMEs’ 
reliance on 
crowdfunding 
and SMEs’ 
reliance on 
other—that is, 
traditional—
forms of 
financing? 
 
Quantitative: 
OLS and RSE 
regressions, 
heterogeneity of 
error variances 
testing. 
Post-positivism Block et al. 
2016; Bratton 
& Levitin 
2013; 
Vachelard et 
al. 2016 
 
To evaluate and 
determine the 
potential impact 
on the 
traditional 
financing market 
of a shift in SME 
financing 
demand from 
financial 
institutions to 
crowdfunding 
platforms. 
 
RQ3: What is 
the potential 
impact on the 
traditional 
financing market 
of a shift in SME 
financing 
demand from 
financial 
institutions to 
crowdfunding 
platforms 
 
Qualitative 
(Delphi Method): 
Two waves of 
questions and 
answers from 
targeted 
experts.  
Constructivism Cholakova 
and Clarysse 
2015; Herve 
et al. 2016; 
Marelli & 
Ordanini 
2016; 
Mauritzen 
2016 
 
To identify and 
assess potential 
regulatory gaps 
that could lead 
to systematic 
risk. 
 
RQ4: In the 
context of 
crowdfunding, 
what are 
potential 
regulatory gaps 
that could lead 
Qualitative 
(Delphi Method): 
Two waves of 
questions and 
answers from 
targeted 
experts. 
Constructivism Aschenbeck-
Florange et 
al.2013; 
Hooghiemstra 
& de Buysere 
2016; Wilson 
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to systematic 
risk? 
 
& Testoni 
2014 
 
 
Table 15 is a synthesis and alignment of the objectives, research questions, research 
methods, research philosophies, concepts, and literature support for the study. In each 
category, the literature establishes certain predictions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
well-established nature of traditional funding in Germany (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2016; 
Nasrabadi, 2016); the tension between crowdfunding and traditional funding in terms 
of goals and characteristics (Block et al. 2016; Bratton & Levitin 2013; Vachelard et al. 
2016); the likely-to-be-limited impact of crowdfunding (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; 
Herve et al. 2016; Marelli & Ordanini 2016; Mauritzen 2016); and the roles of 
regulation, investor inclusion, and investor protection (Aschenbeck-Florange et 
al.2013; Hooghiemstra & de Buysere 2016; Wilson & Testoni 2014) have all been 
noted in the literature, but not empirically tested in the context of German SMEs. Table 
15 is also important for demonstrating that the objectives, research questions, 
methods, philosophies, and concepts of the study are aligned. 
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4 CHAPTER FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to present the results of the study. The results have been 
presented in order of the research questions of the study. The chapter presents the 
analytical findings in a sequenced core categories and constituent factors which are 
derived from data analysis using the statistical approaches and techniques described 
in chapter 3 of the presented study. Each core category and its constituent factors 
originated out of empirical data are discussed and analysed in accordance of extant 
literature ensure the rigour and reliability of the findings. The conclusion of Chapter 4 
contains a brief summary of the results, which have been finally analysed and 
addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2 RQ1 Results 
RQ1 was as follows: What is the percentage of crowdfunding in the overall funding of 
SMEs? RQ1 has been analysed with respect to the following groups: 
 
 All SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All technology SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All technology SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample (2008-
2017) 
 All non-technology SMEs in the sample for all years in the sample (2008-2017) 
 All non-technology SMEs in the sample for each separate year in the sample 
(2008-2017) 
 
Each of these groups has been analysed separately in the remainder of the RQ1 
results. 
 
4.2.1 All SMEs, All Years 
The first group for which RQ1 results were collected for the group of all SMEs for all 
years. It was found that the mean dependence of crowdfunding among the entire 
sample for all years (2008-2017) in the sample was 3.94% (SD = 2.77). The range of 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding was from a low of 0.65% to a high of 
56.69%. The skewness of the distribution of crowdfunding as a percentage of all 
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funding was 10.32, indicating that most of the companies had a reliance on 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding that was below the observed mean of 
3.94%. The kurtosis of the distribution of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding 
was 167.25, reflecting the influence of outliers as presented in Figure 4 below: 
 
Figure 5: Box plot, distribution of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for all SMEs and all years in the 
sample (Source: Author) 
 
4.2.2 All SMEs, Each Year 
The scientific adequate manner in which to present RQ1 statistics for each year (2008-
2017) in the sample is through a table. Accordingly, Table 16 below contains the 
following statistics related to crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding: 
 
 Mean 
 Standard deviation 
 Skewness 
 Kurtosis 
 95% confidence interval of the mean 
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Table 16: Reliance on Crowdfunding as a % of All Funding, Year by Year, Entire Sample (Source: Author) 
Year Mean 95% CI of 
the Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
2008 3.89 3.57, 4.21 1.61 2.61 3.16 
2009 4.26 3.73, 4.78 2.67 3.74 20.49 
2010 3.56 3.28, 3.84 1.41 1.47 4.82 
2011 4.28 3.19, 5.36 5.50 8.84 84.91 
2012 3.92 3.55, 4.29 1.85 1.02 3.81 
2013 3.64 3.38, 3.91 1.32 0.96 3.48 
2014 4.03 3.26, 4.79 3.85 7.92 73.09 
2015 4.03 3.60, 4.48 2.13 3.11 15.98 
2016 4.05 3.48, 4.61 2.83 6.87 60.09 
2017 3.76 3.43, 4.08 1.65 1.36 4.18 
 
4.2.3 All Technology SMEs, All Years 
It was found that the mean dependence of crowdfunding for all technology companies 
for all years (2008-2017) in the sample was 6.41% (SD = 4.30). The range of 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for technology companies was from a low 
of 2.55% to a high of 56.69%. The skewness of the distribution of crowdfunding as a 
percentage of all funding for technology companies was 9.05, indicating that most of 
the companies had a reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding that was 
below the observed mean of 6.41%. The kurtosis of the distribution of crowdfunding as 
a percentage of all funding was 97.78, reflecting the influence of outliers as presented 
in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Box plot, distribution of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for technology SMEs and all years in 
the sample (Source: Author) 
 
4.2.4 All Technology SMEs, Each Year 
The scientific adequate manner in which to present RQ1 statistics for each year (2008-
2017) in the sample is through a table. Accordingly, Table 17 below contains the 
following statistics related to crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for 
technology companies only: 
 Mean 
 Standard deviation 
 Skewness 
 Kurtosis 
 95% confidence interval of the mean 
 
Table 17: Reliance on Crowdfunding as a % of All Funding, Year by Year, Technology Companies (Source: Author) 
Year Mean 95% CI of 
the Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
2008 6.12 5.62, 6.62 1.23 1.23 1.73 
2009 5.91 5.22, 6.59 1.59 0.40 2.54 
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2010 5.91 5.27, 6.56 1.33 0.07 2.21 
2011 8.58 3.54, 13.61 11.06 4.20 18.80 
2012 6.29 5.78, 7.00 1.53 0.18 3.40 
2013 5.39 4.85, 5.92 1.24 -0.07 1.80 
2014 7.32 4.09, 10.56 7.29 4.11 18.70 
2015 6.46 5.32, 7.61 2.83 2.24 7.46 
2016 5.64 5.07, 6.21 1.32 0.05 3.05 
2017 6,52 5.88, 7.16 1.36 -0.15 2.49 
 
4.2.5 All Non-Technology SMEs, All Years 
It was found that the mean dependence of crowdfunding for all non-technology 
companies for all years (2008-2017) in the sample was 3.20% (SD = 1.46). The range 
of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for non-technology companies was from 
a low of 0.65% to a high of 28.81%. The skewness of the distribution of crowdfunding 
as a percentage of all funding for non-technology companies was 10.47, indicating that 
most of the companies had a reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding 
that was below the observed mean of 3.20%. The kurtosis of the distribution of 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for non-technology companies was 
161.00, reflecting the influence of outliers as presented in Figure 6 as followed. 
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Figure 7: Box plot, distribution of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for non-technology SMEs and all 
years in the sample (Source: Author) 
 
4.2.6 All Non-Technology SMEs, Each Year 
The scientific adequate manner in which to present RQ1 statistics for each year (2008-
2017) for non-technology companies in the sample is through a table. Accordingly, 
Table 18 below contains the following statistics related to crowdfunding as a 
percentage of all funding: 
 Mean 
 Standard deviation 
 Skewness 
 Kurtosis 
 95% confidence interval of the mean 
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Table 18: Reliance on Crowdfunding as a % of All Funding, Year by Year, Non-Technology Companies (Source: 
Author) 
Year Mean 95% CI of 
the Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
2008 3.11 2.92, 3.29 0.79 0.03 2.60 
2009 3.76 3.14, 4.38 2.73 4.83 27.27 
2010 3.01 2.86, 3.16 0.67 0.27 2.77 
2011 3.13 2.97, 3.30 0.74 0.07 3.36 
2012 3.01 2.81, 3.21 0.87 -0.67 3.06 
2013 3.12 2.94, 3.30 0.80 0.26 2.67 
2014 3.10 2.93, 3.27 0.73 -0.32 3.06 
2015 3.17 3.00, 3.34 0.73 0.10 4.28 
2016 3.57 2.89, 4.25 3.00 8.00 67.90 
2017 3.06 2.90, 3.23 0.74 0.36 2.92 
 
4.2.7 RQ1: Comparisons between Technology and Non-Technology Companies 
There was a statistically significant difference between technology SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (6.41%. SD = 4.30) and nontechnology 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (3.20%. SD = 1.46), 
t(998) = 17.575, p < .001. Technology companies had a higher reliance on 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding than did non-technology companies. 
However, because the variable of reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all 
funding was distributed abnormally (Shapiro-Wilk W = 0.460, p < .001), it was 
necessary to triangulate the parametric independent samples t-test with the non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test 
confirmed that mean reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding was 
higher for technology companies than for non-technology companies, z = 21.488, p < 
.001. A visual comparison of this difference between technology companies and non-
technology companies has been provided in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 8: Box plot, comparison of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for non-technology SMEs and 
technology SMEs for all years in the sample (Source: Author) 
 
4.3 RQ2 Results 
RQ2 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ 
reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on other—that is, traditional—forms of 
financing? RQ2 has been subdivided into six distinct sub-research questions. Each of 
these sub-research questions is based on a comparison of SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding with one of five traditional funding approaches. 
 
4.3.1 Seed funding Sub-RQ2.1 Results 
Sub-RQ 2.1 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on seed funding? 
 
4.3.1.1 Seed funding, all years 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding was statistically significant, F(1, 998) 
= 33.440, p < .001. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding had an effect size 
of 0.032, indicating that roughly 3.2% of the variation in crowdfunding could be 
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explained by variation in seed funding. The regression equation for the relationship 
between crowdfunding and seed funding was as follows: 
Crowdfunding % = (Seed funding %)(-0.092) + 5.581 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding reduced 
crowdfunding by roughly a tenth of a percent. The results of adding technology 
company status to the regression of crowdfunding on seed funding are presented in 
Table 19 below, which also includes the results of the original regression. 
 
Table 19: Regression of Crowdfunding in Seed Funding, No Covariate & Tech Covariate Models (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.230% more of their funding as crowdfunding, 
and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong enough to 
displace seed funding as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding. The adjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of 
crowdfunding on seed funding was 0.032, but this regression did not meet the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity of errors through the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test, χ2 = 15.380, p < .001. However, the same results were obtained through 
a RSE regression, so the findings reported above are statistically reliable. 
 
4.3.1.2 Seed funding, 2008 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2008 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 8.41, p = .0046. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2008 
had an effect size of 0.079, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2008 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2008. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2008 was as 
follows: 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                    1000            1000   
                                            
                  (18.82)         (10.17)   
_cons               5.582***        3.096***
                                  (16.32)   
1.techtype                          3.230***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-5.78)          (0.37)   
seed              -0.0922***      0.00573   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Crowdfunding %, 2008 = (Seed funding %, 2008)(-0.087) + 5.383 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2008 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2008 by roughly a tenth of a percent. The results of 
adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2008 on seed 
funding in 2008 are presented in Table 20, which also includes the results of the 
original regression. 
 
Table 20: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2008 on Seed Funding in 2008, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.065% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2008, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace seed funding in 2008 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2008. 
 
4.3.1.3 Seed funding, 2009 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2009 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 2.310, p = .1322. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2009 
had an effect size of 0.023, indicating that roughly 2.3% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2009 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2009. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2009 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2009 = (Seed funding %, 2009)(-0.065) + 5.409 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2009 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2009 by roughly half a percent. The results of adding 
technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2009 on seed funding 
in 2009 are presented in Table 21, which also includes the results of the original 
regression. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.04)          (7.82)   
_cons               5.384***        2.890***
                                  (13.40)   
1.techtype                          3.065***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.90)          (0.63)   
seed              -0.0865**        0.0121   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 21: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2009 on Seed Funding in 2009, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.101% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2009, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
seed funding in 2009 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2009. 
 
4.3.1.4 Seed funding, 2010 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2010 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 8.46, p = .0045. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2010 
had an effect size of 0.080, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2010 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2010. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2010 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2010 = (Seed funding %, 2010)(-0.077) + 4.904 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2010 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2010 by roughly a tenth of a percent. The results of 
adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2010 on seed 
funding in 2010 are presented in Table 22, which also includes the results of the 
original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (6.72)          (4.32)   
_cons               5.410***        3.904***
                                   (3.20)   
1.techtype                          2.101** 
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.52)         (-0.17)   
seed              -0.0652        -0.00744   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 22: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2010 on Seed Funding in 2010, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.866% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2010, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace seed funding in 2010 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2010. 
 
4.3.1.5 Seed funding, 2011 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2011 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 1.860, p = .1783. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2011 
had an effect size of 0.008, indicating that roughly 0.8% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2011 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2011. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2011 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2011 = (Seed funding %, 2011)(-0.127) + 5.509 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2011 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2011 by roughly a tenth of a percent. The results of 
adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2011 on seed 
funding in 2011 are presented in Table 23, which also includes the results of the 
original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.19)          (9.80)   
_cons               4.905***        3.182***
                                  (12.77)   
1.techtype                          2.866***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.91)         (-0.55)   
seed              -0.0773**      -0.00943   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 23: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2011 on Seed Funding in 2011, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 5.529% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2011, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was did not 
change seed funding in 2011 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding 
as a % of total funding in 2011. 
 
4.3.1.6 Seed funding, 2012 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2012 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 25.830, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2012 
had an effect size of 0.208, indicating that roughly 21% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2012 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2012. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2012 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2012 = (Seed funding %, 2012)(-0.157) + 6.610 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 
2012 reduced crowdfunding received in 2012 by roughly a tenth of a percent. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2012 on seed funding in 2012 are presented in Table 24, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (3.77)          (1.55)   
_cons               6.510***        2.845   
                                   (4.13)   
1.techtype                          5.529***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.36)          (0.17)   
seed               -0.128          0.0155   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 24: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2012 on Seed Funding in 2012, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.218% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2012, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace seed funding in 2012 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2012. 
 
4.3.1.7 Seed funding, 2013 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2013 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 17.400, p = .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2013 
had an effect size of 0.150, indicating that roughly 15% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2013 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2013. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2013 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2013 = (Seed funding %, 2013)(-0.102) + 5.482 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2013 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2013 by roughly a tenth of a percent. The results of 
adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2013 on seed 
funding in 2013 are presented in Table 25, which also includes the results of the 
original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (11.92)          (7.82)   
_cons               6.610***        3.519***
                                  (11.55)   
1.techtype                          3.218***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-5.08)         (-1.18)   
seed               -0.157***      -0.0273   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 25: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2013 on Seed Funding in 2013, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.207% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2013, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace seed funding in 2013 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2013. 
 
4.3.1.8 Seed funding, 2014 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2014 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.930, p = .3369. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2014 
had an effect size of 0.009, indicating that roughly a tenth of a percent of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2014. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 
2014 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2014 = (Seed funding %, 2014)(-0.061) + 5.146 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2014 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2014 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2014 
on seed funding in 2014 are presented in Table 26, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (11.98)          (7.79)   
_cons               5.483***        3.312***
                                   (8.72)   
1.techtype                          2.207***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-4.17)         (-0.46)   
seed               -0.103***     -0.00985   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 26: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2014 on Seed Funding in 2014, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 4.397% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2014, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
seed funding in 2014 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2014. 
 
4.3.1.9 Seed funding, 2015 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2015 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 10.420, p = .0017. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2015 
had an effect size of 0.0961, indicating that roughly 9.6% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2015. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 
2015 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2015 = (Seed funding %, 2015)(-0.135) + 6.456 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2015 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2015 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2015 
on seed funding in 2015 are presented in Table 27, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (4.22)          (1.97)   
_cons               5.147***        2.409   
                                   (5.00)   
1.techtype                          4.397***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.97)          (0.59)   
seed              -0.0619          0.0361   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 27: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2015 on Seed Funding in 2015, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.142% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2015, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace seed funding in 2015 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2015. 
 
4.3.1.10 Seed funding, 2016 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2016 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.260, p = .6119. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2016 
had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2016 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2016. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2016 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2016 = (Seed funding %, 2016)(-0.030) + 4.609 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2016 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2016 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2016 on seed funding in 2016 are presented in Table 28, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (8.28)          (5.95)   
_cons               6.456***        3.972***
                                   (8.36)   
1.techtype                          3.142***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.23)         (-1.25)   
seed               -0.135**       -0.0425   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 28: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2016 on Seed Funding in 2016, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.339% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2016, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
seed funding in 2016 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2016. 
 
4.3.1.11 Seed funding, 2017 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2017 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 9.910, p = .0022. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2017 
had an effect size of 0.0918, indicating that roughly 9% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2017 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2017. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and seed funding in 2017 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2017 = (Seed funding %, 2017)(-0.092) + 5.464 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from seed funding in 2017 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2017 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2017 
on seed funding in 2017 are presented in Table 29, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (4.03)          (1.94)   
_cons               4.609***        2.463   
                                   (3.30)   
1.techtype                          2.339** 
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.51)          (0.90)   
seed              -0.0303          0.0560   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 29: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2017 on Seed Funding in 2017, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.534% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2017, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace seed funding in 2017 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2017. 
 
4.3.2 Start-up funding Sub-RQ2.2 Results 
Sub-RQ 2.2 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on start-up funding? 
 
4.3.2.1 Start-up funding, all years  
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding was statistically insignificant, F(1, 
998) = 2.560, p = .1099. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding had an 
effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding could 
be explained by variation in start-up funding. The regression equation for the 
relationship between crowdfunding and start-up funding was as follows: 
Crowdfunding % = (Start-up funding %)(-0.018) + 4.229 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding 
reduced crowdfunding by roughly a tenth of a percent. The results of adding technology 
company status to the regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding are presented 
in Table 30 below, which also includes the results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (9.66)          (7.52)   
_cons               5.465***        2.787***
                                  (14.42)   
1.techtype                          3.534***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.15)          (0.78)   
seed              -0.0923**        0.0142   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 30: Regression of Crowdfunding in Startup Funding, No Covariate & Tech Covariate Models (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.261% more of their funding as crowdfunding, 
but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change start-up 
funding as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of total funding. 
The adjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding was 0.1099, but this regression did not meet the assumption of 
heteroskedasticity of errors through the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test, χ2 = 
21310, p < .001. However, the same results were obtained through a RSE regression, 
so the findings reported above are statistically reliable. 
 
4.3.2.2 Start-up funding, 2008 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2008 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 2.330, p = .1302. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.0232, indicating that roughly 2.3% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2008. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2008 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2008 = (Start-up funding %, 2008)(-0.030) + 4.360 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2008 reduced crowdfunding received in 2008 by roughly the amount indicated above. 
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2008 on start-up funding in 2008 are presented in Table 31, which also includes the 
results of the original regression.. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                    1000            1000   
                                            
                  (21.06)         (15.36)   
_cons               4.230***        2.927***
                                  (17.57)   
1.techtype                          3.261***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.60)          (1.64)   
su                -0.0184          0.0168   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 31: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2008 on Startup Funding in 2008, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.036% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2008, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2008 as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2008. 
 
4.3.2.3 Start-up funding, 2009. 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.080, p = .7779. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2009 had an effect size of 0.0008, indicating that very little of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2009. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2009 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2009 = (Start-up funding %, 2009)(0.010) + 4.086 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2009-increased crowdfunding received in 2009 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2009 on start-up funding in 2009 are presented in Table 32, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (12.64)         (13.57)   
_cons               4.361***        3.009***
                                  (14.00)   
1.techtype                          3.036***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.53)          (0.53)   
su                -0.0309         0.00641   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 32: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2009 on Start-up Funding in 2009, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.065% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2009, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2009 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2009. 
 
4.3.2.4 Start-up funding, 2010 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2010 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 4.190, p = .0433. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2010 
had an effect size of 0.0410, indicating that roughly 4% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2010 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2010. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up funding in 2010 was 
as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2010 = (Start-up funding %, 2010)(-0.037) + 4.181 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2010 reduced crowdfunding received in 2010 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2010 on start-up funding in 2010 are presented in Table 33, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (6.24)          (5.39)   
_cons               4.086***        3.460***
                                   (3.60)   
1.techtype                          2.165***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                   (0.28)          (0.53)   
su                 0.0109          0.0192   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 33: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2010 on Start-up Funding in 2010, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.902% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2010, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2010 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2010. 
 
4.3.2.5 Start-up funding, 2011 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2011 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.290, p = .5893. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.003, indicating that roughly 0.3% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2011. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2011 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2011 = (Start-up funding %, 2011)(-0.038) + 4.897 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2011 reduced crowdfunding received in 2011 by roughly the amount indicated above. 
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2011 on start-up funding in 2011 are presented in Table 34, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (12.56)         (13.78)   
_cons               4.182***        3.021***
                                  (13.16)   
1.techtype                          2.902***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.05)         (-0.05)   
su                -0.0376*      -0.000579   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 34: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2011 on Startup Funding in 2011, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 5.638% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2011, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2011 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2011. 
 
4.3.2.6 Start-up funding, 2012 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2012 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 4.450, p = .0374. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2012 
had an effect size of 0.0434, indicating that roughly 4.3% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2012. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up funding in 
2012 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2012 = (Startup funding %, 2012)(-0.051) + 4.664 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2012 reduced crowdfunding received in 2012 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2012 on start-up funding in 2012 are presented in Table 35, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (3.85)          (1.91)   
_cons               4.898***        2.470   
                                   (4.38)   
1.techtype                          5.638***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.54)          (0.57)   
su                -0.0387          0.0388   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 35: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2012 on Start-up Funding in 2012, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.326% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2012, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace start-up funding in 2012 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2012. 
 
4.3.2.7 Start-up funding, 2013 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2013 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.310, p = .2552. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.0132, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2013. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2013 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2013 = (Start-up funding %, 2013)(-0.019) + 3.972 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2013 reduced crowdfunding received in 2013 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2013 on start-up funding in 2013 are presented in Table 36, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (11.77)         (12.94)   
_cons               4.664***        3.304***
                                  (13.51)   
1.techtype                          3.326***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.11)         (-1.33)   
su                -0.0514*        -0.0194   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 36: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2013 on Start-up Funding in 2013, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.348% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2013, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2013 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2013. 
 
4.3.2.8 Start-up funding, 2014 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.100, p = .7569. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2014. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2014 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2014 = (Start-up funding %, 2014)(0.015) + 3.786 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2014-increased crowdfunding received in 2014 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2014 on start-up funding in 2014 are presented in Table 37, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (12.55)         (11.54)   
_cons               3.972***        2.831***
                                  (10.35)   
1.techtype                          2.348***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.14)          (1.31)   
su                -0.0191          0.0158   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 37: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2014 on Start-up Funding in 2014, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 4.235% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2014, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2014 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2014. 
 
4.3.2.9 Start-up funding, 2015 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2015 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.120, p = .2935. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.011, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2015. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2015 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2015 = (Start-up funding %, 2015)(-0.030) + 4.512 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2015 reduced crowdfunding received in 2015 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2015 on start-up funding in 2015 are presented in Table 38, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (4.36)          (3.48)   
_cons               3.787***        2.787***
                                   (5.08)   
1.techtype                          4.235***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                   (0.31)          (0.44)   
su                 0.0157          0.0202   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 38: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2015 on Start-up Funding in 2015, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.344% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2015, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2015 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2015. 
 
4.3.2.10 Start-up funding, 2016 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2016 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.130, p = .7146. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2016 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2016. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2016 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2016 = (Startup funding %, 2016)(0.013) + 3.822 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2016-increased crowdfunding received in 2016 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2016 on start-up funding in 2016 are presented in Table 39, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (8.88)          (7.15)   
_cons               4.513***        2.946***
                                   (9.13)   
1.techtype                          3.344***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.06)          (0.60)   
su                -0.0306          0.0132   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 39: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2016 on Start-up Funding in 2016, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.558% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2016, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2016 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2016. 
 
4.3.2.11 Start-up funding, 2017 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2017 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.110, p = .7442. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2017. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and start-up 
funding in 2017 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2017 = (Start-up funding %, 2017)(-0.007) + 3.861 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from start-up funding in 
2017 reduced crowdfunding received in 2017 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2017 on start-up funding in 2017 are presented in Table 40, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (5.70)          (3.13)   
_cons               3.822***        2.337** 
                                   (3.71)   
1.techtype                          2.558***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                   (0.37)          (1.80)   
su                 0.0135          0.0679   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 40: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2017 on Start-up Funding in 2017, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.462% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2017, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
start-up funding in 2017 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2017. 
 
4.3.3 Round 1 funding Sub-RQ2.3 Results 
Sub-RQ 2.3 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 1 funding? 
 
4.3.3.1 Round 1 funding, all years 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding was statistically significant, F(1, 
998) = 9.630, p = .0020. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding had an 
effect size of 0.010, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation in crowdfunding could 
be explained by variation in Round 1 funding. The regression equation for the 
relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 funding was as follows: 
Crowdfunding % = (Round 1 funding %)(-0.050) + 4.467 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding 
reduced crowdfunding by roughly the amount indicated above. The results of adding 
technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding are 
presented in Table 41 below, which also includes the results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.64)         (14.64)   
_cons               3.861***        2.995***
                                  (15.39)   
1.techtype                          3.462***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.33)          (0.39)   
su               -0.00707         0.00461   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 41: Regression of Crowdfunding in Round 1 Funding, No Covariate & Tech Covariate Models (Source: 
Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.198% more of their funding as crowdfunding, 
and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong enough to 
displace Round 1 funding as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding. The adjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of 
crowdfunding on Round 1 funding was 0.010, but this regression did not meet the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity of errors through the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test, χ2 = 16.430, p < .001. However, the same results were obtained through 
a RSE regression, so the findings reported above are statistically reliable. 
 
4.3.3.2 Round 1 funding, 2008 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2008 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 7.750, p = .0064. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.073, indicating that roughly 7.3% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2008. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2008 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2008 = (Round 1 funding %, 2008)(-0.074) + 4.700 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2008 reduced crowdfunding received in 2008 by roughly the amount indicated above. 
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2008 on Round 1 funding in 2008 are presented in Table 42, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                    1000            1000   
                                            
                  (23.41)         (17.62)   
_cons               4.467***        3.219***
                                  (17.21)   
1.techtype                          3.198***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.10)         (-0.09)   
ri                -0.0501**      -0.00132   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 42: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2008 on Round 1 Funding in 2008, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.071% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2008, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 1 funding in 2008 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2008. 
 
4.3.3.3 Round 1 funding, 2009 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.200, p = .6518. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2009 had an effect size of 0.002, indicating that roughly a fifth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding 
in 2009. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 1 funding in 2009 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2009 = (Round 1 funding %, 2009)(-0.021) + 4.494 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2009 reduced crowdfunding received in 2009 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2009 on Round 1 funding in 2009 are presented in Table 43, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (14.29)         (12.68)   
_cons               4.701***        2.965***
                                  (13.47)   
1.techtype                          3.071***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.78)          (0.71)   
ri                -0.0745**        0.0121   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 43: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2009 on Round 1 Funding in 2009, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.185% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2009, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 1 funding in 2009 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2009. 
 
4.3.3.4 Round 1 funding, 2010 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2010 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 9.390, p = .0028. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2010 had an effect size of 0.087, indicating that roughly 8.7% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2010. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2010 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2010 = (Round 1 funding %, 2010)(-0.079) + 4.396 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2010 reduced crowdfunding received in 2010 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2010 on Round 1 funding in 2010 are presented in Table 44, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (7.59)          (5.86)   
_cons               4.494***        3.599***
                                   (3.55)   
1.techtype                          2.185***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.45)          (0.30)   
ri                -0.0215          0.0138   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 44: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2010 on Round 1 Funding in 2010, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.822% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2010, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 1 funding in 2010 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2010. 
 
4.3.3.5 Round 1 funding, 2011 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2011 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.010, p = .9185. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.0001, indicating that very little the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2011. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 funding 
in 2011 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2011 = (Round 1 funding %, 2011)(0.010) + 4.172 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2011 increased crowdfunding received in 2011 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2011 on Round 1 funding in 2011 are presented in Table 45, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (14.45)         (15.93)   
_cons               4.397***        3.272***
                                  (12.86)   
1.techtype                          2.822***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.06)         (-1.42)   
ri                -0.0798**       -0.0235   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 45: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2011 on Round 1 Funding in 2011, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 5.447% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2011, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 1 funding in 2011 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2011.  
 
4.3.3.6 Round 1 funding, 2012 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2012 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.450, p = .2312. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2012 had an effect size of 0.014, indicating that roughly 1.4% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2012. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2012 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2012 = (Round 1 funding %, 2012)(-0.044) + 4.437 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2012 reduced crowdfunding received in 2012 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2012 on Round 1 funding in 2012 are presented in Table 46, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (3.63)          (2.80)   
_cons               4.172***        3.046** 
                                   (4.38)   
1.techtype                          5.447***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                   (0.10)          (0.09)   
ri                 0.0106         0.00881   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 46: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2012 on Round 1 Funding in 2012, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.378% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2012, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 1 funding in 2012 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2012. 
 
4.3.3.7 Round 1 funding, 2013 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2013 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 4.030, p = .0476. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.039, indicating that roughly 3.9% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2013. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2013 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2013 = (Round 1 funding %, 2013)(-0.046) + 4.129 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2013 reduced crowdfunding received in 2013 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2013 on Round 1 funding in 2013 are presented in Table 47, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (9.52)         (10.25)   
_cons               4.437***        3.012***
                                  (13.63)   
1.techtype                          3.378***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.20)         (-0.01)   
ri                -0.0450       -0.000211   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 47: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2013 on Round 1 Funding in 2013, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.274% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2013, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 1 funding in 2013 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2013. 
 
4.3.3.8 Round 1 funding, 2014 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 3.920, p = .0504. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.038, indicating that roughly 3.8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2014. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2014 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2014 = (Round 1 funding %, 2014)(-0.140) + 5.405 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2014 reduced crowdfunding received in 2014 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2014 on Round 1 funding in 2014 are presented in Table 48, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (15.01)         (14.01)   
_cons               4.129***        3.096***
                                   (9.92)   
1.techtype                          2.274***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.01)          (0.14)   
ri                -0.0469*        0.00234   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 48: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2014 on Round 1 Funding in 2014, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 4.028% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2014, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 1 funding in 2014 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2014. 
 
4.3.3.9 Round 1 funding, 2015 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2015 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.230, p = .2695. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.012, indicating that roughly 1.2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2015. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2015 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2015 = (Round 1 funding %, 2015)(-0.045) + 4.470 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2015 reduced crowdfunding received in 2015 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2015 on Round 1 funding in 2015 are presented in Table 49, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (6.83)          (4.64)   
_cons               5.406***        3.729***
                                   (4.68)   
1.techtype                          4.028***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.98)         (-0.90)   
ri                 -0.140         -0.0597   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 49: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2015 on Round 1 Funding in 2015, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.275% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2015, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 1 funding in 2015 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2015. 
 
4.3.3.10 Round 1 funding, 2016 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2016 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.150, p = .7002. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2016 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding 
in 2016. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 1 funding in 2016 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2016 = (Round 1 funding %, 2016)(0.020) + 3.814 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2016 increased crowdfunding received in 2016 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2016 on Round 1 funding in 2016 are presented in Table 50, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (9.86)          (9.38)   
_cons               4.470***        3.345***
                                   (9.12)   
1.techtype                          3.275***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.11)         (-0.58)   
ri                -0.0453         -0.0174   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 50: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2016 on Round 1 Funding in 2016, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.098% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2016, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 1 funding in 2016 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2016. 
 
4.3.3.11 Round 1 funding, 2017 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2017 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 6.800, p = .0106. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.064, indicating that roughly 6.4% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2017. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 1 
funding in 2017 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2017 = (Round 1 funding %, 2017)(-0.077) + 4.569 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 1 funding in 
2017 reduced crowdfunding received in 2017 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2017 on Round 1 funding in 2017 are presented in Table 51, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (5.77)          (4.89)   
_cons               3.815***        3.214***
                                   (3.25)   
1.techtype                          2.098** 
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                   (0.39)          (0.61)   
ri                 0.0208          0.0315   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 51: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2017 on Round 1 Funding in 2017, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.416% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2017, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 1 funding in 2017 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2017. 
 
4.3.4 Round 2 funding Sub-RQ2.4 Results 
Sub-RQ 2.4 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 2 funding? 
 
4.3.4.1 Round 2 funding, all years 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding was statistically significant, F(1, 
998) = 4.040, p = .0446. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding had an 
effect size of 0.004, indicating that roughly a half of 1% of the variation in crowdfunding 
could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding. The regression equation for the 
relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 funding was as follows: 
Crowdfunding % = (Round 2 funding %)(-0.041) + 4.275 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding 
reduced crowdfunding by roughly the amount indicated above. The results of adding 
technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding are 
presented in Table 52 below, which also includes the results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (13.02)         (14.66)   
_cons               4.570***        3.190***
                                  (14.71)   
1.techtype                          3.416***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.61)         (-0.65)   
ri                -0.0775*        -0.0112   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 52: Regression of Crowdfunding in Round 2 Funding, No Covariate & Tech Covariate Models (Source: 
Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.193% more of their funding as crowdfunding, 
and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong enough to 
displace Round 2 funding as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding. The adjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of 
crowdfunding on Round 2 funding was 0.004, but this regression did not meet the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity of errors through the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test, χ2 = 24.480, p < .001. However, the same results were obtained through 
a RSE regression, so the findings reported above are statistically reliable. 
  
4.3.4.2 Round 2 funding, 2008 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2008 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.990, p = .1612. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.020, indicating that roughly 2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2008. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 
funding in 2008 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2008 = (Round 2 funding %, 2008)(-0.050) + 4.331 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2008 reduced crowdfunding received in 2008 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2008 on Round 2 funding in 2008 are presented in Table 53, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                    1000            1000   
                                            
                  (22.74)         (18.79)   
_cons               4.275***        3.276***
                                  (17.42)   
1.techtype                          3.193***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.01)         (-0.47)   
rii               -0.0414*       -0.00859   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 53: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2008 on Round 2 Funding in 2008, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.988% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2008, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2008 as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2008. 
 
4.3.4.3 Round 2 funding, 2009 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) < 0.001, p = .9675. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2009 had an effect size < .0001, indicating that very little of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2009. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 funding 
in 2009 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2009 = (Round 2 funding %, 2009)(-0.002) + 4.276 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2009 reduced crowdfunding received in 2009 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2009 on Round 2 funding in 2009 are presented in Table 54, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (12.42)         (15.51)   
_cons               4.332***        3.308***
                                  (14.12)   
1.techtype                          2.988***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.41)         (-1.06)   
rii               -0.0503         -0.0219   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 54: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2009 on Round 2 Funding in 2009, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
Thus, technology companies received 2.250% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2009, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2009 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2009. 
 
4.3.4.4 Round 2 funding, 2010. 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2010 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.190, p = .6653. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2010 had an effect size of 0.002, indicating that roughly a fifth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2010. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 2 funding in 2010 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2010 = (Round 2 funding %, 2010)(-0.014) + 3.689 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2010 reduced crowdfunding received in 2010 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2010 on Round 2 funding in 2010 are presented in Table 55, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (7.30)          (5.52)   
_cons               4.276***        3.350***
                                   (3.66)   
1.techtype                          2.250***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.04)          (0.77)   
rii              -0.00278          0.0506   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 55: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2010 on Round 2 Funding in 2010, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.918% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2010, as the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2010 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2010. 
 
4.3.4.5 Round 2 funding, 2011 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2011 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.340, p = .5631. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.003, indicating that roughly a third of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2011. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 2 funding in 2011 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2011 = (Round 2 funding %, 2011)(-0.074) + 4.835 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2011 reduced crowdfunding received in 2011 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2011 on Round 2 funding in 2011 are presented in Table 56, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (11.34)         (14.46)   
_cons               3.690***        2.897***
                                  (13.61)   
1.techtype                          2.918***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.43)          (0.64)   
rii               -0.0150          0.0131   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 56: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2011 on Round 2 Funding in 2011, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 5.449% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2011, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2011 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2011. 
 
4.3.4.6 Round 2 funding, 2012 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2012 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 1.570, p = .2131. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2012 had an effect size of 0.016, indicating that roughly 1.6% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2012. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 
funding in 2012 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2012 = (Round 2 funding %, 2012)(0.058) + 3.475 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2012 increased crowdfunding received in 2012 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2012 on Round 2 funding in 2012 are presented in Table 57, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (4.35)          (2.85)   
_cons               4.836***        3.123** 
                                   (4.33)   
1.techtype                          5.449***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.58)          (0.01)   
rii               -0.0742         0.00109   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 57: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2012 on Round 2 Funding in 2012, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.358% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2012, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2012 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2012. 
 
4.3.4.7 Round 2 funding, 2013 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2013 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 7.370, p = .0078. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.070, indicating that roughly 7% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2013. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 
funding in 2013 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2013 = (Round 2 funding %, 2013)(-0.083) + 4.400 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2013 reduced crowdfunding received in 2013 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2013 on Round 2 funding in 2013 are presented in Table 58, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (8.66)         (11.64)   
_cons               3.475***        2.795***
                                  (13.74)   
1.techtype                          3.358***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                   (1.25)          (1.05)   
rii                0.0586          0.0289   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 58: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2013 on Round 2 Funding in 2013, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.190% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2013, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 2 funding in 2013 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2013. 
 
4.3.4.8 Round 2 funding, 2014 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.400, p = .5285. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.004, indicating that roughly a half of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2014. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 2 funding in 2014 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2014 = (Round 2 funding %, 2014)(-0.057) + 4.446 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2014 reduced crowdfunding received in 2014 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2014 on Round 2 funding in 2014 are presented in Table 59, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (14.33)         (14.33)   
_cons               4.401***        3.437***
                                   (9.81)   
1.techtype                          2.190***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.71)         (-1.46)   
rii               -0.0834**       -0.0327   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 59: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2014 on Round 2 Funding in 2014, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 4.296% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2014, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2014 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2014. 
 
4.3.4.9 Round 2 funding, 2015 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2015 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 3.280, p = .0734. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.032, indicating that roughly 3.2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2015. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 
funding in 2015 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2015 = (Round 2 funding %, 2015)(-0.085) + 4.720 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2015 reduced crowdfunding received in 2015 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2015 on Round 2 funding in 2015 are presented in Table 60, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (5.82)          (5.37)   
_cons               4.446***        3.728***
                                   (5.17)   
1.techtype                          4.296***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.63)         (-1.09)   
rii               -0.0577         -0.0891   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 60: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2015 on Round 2 Funding in 2015, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.252% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2015, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2015 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2015. 
 
4.3.4.10 Round 2 funding, 2016 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2016 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.010, p = .9296. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2016 had an effect size < 0.001, indicating that very little of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2016. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 2 funding 
in 2016 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2016 = (Round 2 funding %, 2016)(-0.006) + 4.094 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2016 reduced crowdfunding received in 2016 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2016 on Round 2 funding in 2016 are presented in Table 61, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.78)          (9.31)   
_cons               4.721***        3.355***
                                   (8.92)   
1.techtype                          3.252***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.81)         (-0.60)   
rii               -0.0854         -0.0215   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 61: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2016 on Round 2 Funding in 2016, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.083% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2016, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2016 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2016. 
 
4.3.4.11 Round 2 funding, 2017 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2017 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.380, p = .5377. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.004, indicating that roughly a half of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2017. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 2 funding in 2017 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2017 = (Round 2 funding %, 2017)(-0.023) + 3.952 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 2 funding in 
2017 reduced crowdfunding received in 2017 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2017 on Round 2 funding in 2017 are presented in Table 62, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (6.51)          (5.49)   
_cons               4.095***        3.471***
                                   (3.21)   
1.techtype                          2.083** 
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.09)          (0.18)   
rii              -0.00637          0.0122   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 62: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2017 on Round 2 Funding in 2017, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.472% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2017, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 2 funding in 2017 as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding in 2017. 
 
4.3.5 Round 3 funding Sub-RQ2.5 Results 
Sub-RQ 2.5 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on Round 3 funding? 
 
4.3.5.1 Round 3 funding, all years 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding was statistically significant, F(1, 
998) = 46.140, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding had an 
effect size of 0.044, indicating that roughly 4.4% of the variation in crowdfunding could 
be explained by variation in Round 3 funding. The regression equation for the 
relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 funding was as follows: 
Crowdfunding % = (Round 3 funding %)(-0.159) + 4.829 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding 
reduced crowdfunding by roughly the amount indicated above. The results of adding 
technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding are 
presented in Table 63 below, which also includes the results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (11.03)         (14.43)   
_cons               3.952***        2.954***
                                  (15.38)   
1.techtype                          3.472***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.62)          (0.62)   
rii               -0.0230          0.0126   
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                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 63: Regression of Crowdfunding in Round 3 Funding, No Covariate & Tech Covariate Models (Source: 
Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.162% more of their funding as crowdfunding, 
and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong enough to 
displace Round 3 funding as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % 
of total funding. The adjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of 
crowdfunding on Round 3 funding was 0.044, but this regression did not meet the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity of errors through the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test, χ2 = 271.300, p < .001. However, the same results were obtained 
through a RSE regression, so the findings reported above are statistically reliable. 
  
4.3.5.2 Round 3 funding, 2008 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2008 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 7.520, p = .0073. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.071, indicating that roughly 7.1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2008. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2008 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2008 = (Round 3 funding %, 2008)(-0.111) + 4.464 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2008 reduced crowdfunding received in 2008 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2008 on Round 3 funding in 2008 are presented in Table 64, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                    1000            1000   
                                            
                  (30.87)         (19.17)   
_cons               4.830***        3.276***
                                  (15.85)   
1.techtype                          3.162***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-6.79)         (-0.49)   
riii               -0.160***      -0.0112   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 64: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2008 on Round 3 Funding in 2008, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.107% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2008, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2008 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2008. 
 
4.3.5.3 Round 3 funding, 2009 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.040, p = .3093. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2009 had an effect size of 0.010, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2009. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2009 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2009 = (Round 3 funding %, 2009)(-0.079) + 4.690 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2009 reduced crowdfunding received in 2009 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2009 on Round 3 funding in 2009 are presented in Table 65, which also includes the 
results of the original regression.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (17.17)         (15.49)   
_cons               4.464***        2.944***
                                  (13.56)   
1.techtype                          3.107***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.74)          (1.07)   
riii               -0.112**        0.0279   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 65: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2009 on Round 3 Funding in 2009, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
Thus, technology companies received 2.227% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2009, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 3 funding in 2009 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2009. 
 
4.3.5.4 Round 3 funding, 2010 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2010 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 8.850, p = .0037. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2010 had an effect size of 0.082, indicating that roughly 8%.2 of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2010. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2010 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2010 = (Round 3 funding %, 2010)(-0.101) + 4.182 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2010 reduced crowdfunding received in 2010 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2010 on Round 3 funding in 2010 are presented in Table 66, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (9.33)          (6.27)   
_cons               4.690***        3.600***
                                   (3.42)   
1.techtype                          2.227***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.02)          (0.33)   
riii              -0.0793          0.0260   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 66: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2010 on Round 3 Funding in 2010, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.000% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2010, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2010 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2010. 
 
4.3.5.5 Round 3 funding, 2011 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2011 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 6.100, p = .015. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.058, indicating that roughly 5.8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2011. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2011 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2011 = (Round 3 funding %, 2011)(-0.378) + 6.421 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2011 reduced crowdfunding received in 2011 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2011 on Round 3 funding in 2011 are presented in Table 67, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (16.80)         (15.49)   
_cons               4.183***        2.857***
                                  (12.80)   
1.techtype                          3.000***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.97)          (0.97)   
riii               -0.101**        0.0222   
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                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 67: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2011 on Round 3 Funding in 2011, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 5.034% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2011, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2011 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2011. 
 
4.3.5.6 Round 3 funding, 2012 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2012 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 9.960, p = .0021. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2012 had an effect size of 0.092, indicating that roughly 9.2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2012. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2012 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2012 = (Round 3 funding %, 2012)(-0.157) + 4.722 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2012 reduced crowdfunding received in 2012 by roughly the amount indicated above. 
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2012 on Round 3 funding in 2012 are presented in Table 68, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (6.29)          (3.14)   
_cons               6.421***        3.801** 
                                   (3.58)   
1.techtype                          5.034***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.47)         (-0.63)   
riii               -0.379*         -0.103   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 68: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2012 on Round 3 Funding in 2012, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.471% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2012, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2012 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2012. 
 
4.3.5.7 Round 3 funding, 2013 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2013 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 14.410, p = .0003. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.128, indicating that roughly 13% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2013. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2013 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2013 = (Round 3 funding %, 2013)(-0.133) + 4.407 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2013 reduced crowdfunding received in 2013 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2013 on Round 3 funding in 2013 are presented in Table 69, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (15.26)         (11.91)   
_cons               4.722***        2.846***
                                  (12.86)   
1.techtype                          3.471***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.16)          (0.81)   
riii               -0.157**        0.0271   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 69: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2013 on Round 3 Funding in 2013, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.174% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2013, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2013 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2013. 
 
4.3.5.8 Round 3 funding, 2014 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.800, p = .1832. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.079, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2014. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2014 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2014 = (Round 3 funding %, 2014)(-0.134) + 4.806 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2014 reduced crowdfunding received in 2014 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2014 on Round 3 funding in 2014 are presented in Table 70, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (18.62)         (15.36)   
_cons               4.408***        3.292***
                                   (9.04)   
1.techtype                          2.174***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.80)         (-0.91)   
riii               -0.134***      -0.0261   
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                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 70: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2014 on Round 3 Funding in 2014, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 4.274% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2014, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
Round 3 funding in 2014 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a 
% of total funding in 2014. 
 
4.3.5.9 Round 3 funding, 2015 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2015 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 8.540, p = .0043. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.080, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2015. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2015 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2015 = (Round 3 funding %, 2015)(-0.172) + 4.905 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2015 reduced crowdfunding received in 2015 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2015 on Round 3 funding in 2015 are presented in Table 71, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (6.91)          (4.11)   
_cons               4.806***        2.998***
                                   (4.85)   
1.techtype                          4.274***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.34)          (0.16)   
riii               -0.134          0.0155   
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Table 71: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2015 on Round 3 Funding in 2015, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.279% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2015, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2015 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2015. 
 
4.3.5.10 Round 3 funding, 2016 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2016 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 6.130, p = .015. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2016 had an effect size of 0.058, indicating that roughly 6% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2016. 
The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and Round 3 
funding in 2016 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2016 = (Round 3 funding %, 2016)(-0.183) + 5.054 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2016 reduced crowdfunding received in 2016 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2016 on Round 3 funding in 2016 are presented in Table 72, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (13.47)          (9.27)   
_cons               4.905***        3.199***
                                   (8.38)   
1.techtype                          3.279***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.92)         (-0.11)   
riii               -0.173**      -0.00520   
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                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 72: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2016 on Round 3 Funding in 2016, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 1.699% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2016, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2016 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2016. 
 
4.3.5.11 Round 3 funding, 2017 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2017 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 12.440, p = .0006. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.113, indicating that roughly 11.3% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding 
in 2017. The regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and 
Round 3 funding in 2017 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2017 = (Round 3 funding %, 2017)(-0.164) + 4.750 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from Round 3 funding in 
2017 reduced crowdfunding received in 2017 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2017 on Round 3 funding in 2017 are presented in Table 73, which also includes the 
results of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.27)          (7.33)   
_cons               5.054***        4.255***
                                   (2.45)   
1.techtype                          1.699*  
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-2.48)         (-1.39)   
riii               -0.184*         -0.110   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 73: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2017 on Round 3 Funding in 2017, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.531% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2017, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace Round 3 funding in 2017 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2017. 
 
4.3.6 All funding’s Sub-RQ2.6 Results 
Sub-RQ 2.6 was as follows: Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on all other kinds of funding 
combined? 
 
4.3.6.1 All funding, all years 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding was statistically significant, F(1, 998) 
= 48.360, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding had an effect size 
of 0.046, indicating that roughly 4.6% of the variation in crowdfunding could be 
explained by variation in total funding. The regression equation for the relationship 
between crowdfunding and total funding was as follows: 
Crowdfunding % = (Total Funding %)(-0.043) + 6.466 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding reduced 
crowdfunding by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding on 
total funding are presented in Table 74 below, which also includes the results of the 
original regression. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (14.73)         (12.97)   
_cons               4.751***        2.926***
                                  (14.16)   
1.techtype                          3.531***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.53)          (0.69)   
riii               -0.164***       0.0204   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 74: Regression of Crowdfunding on Total Funding, No Covariate & Tech Covariate Models (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.286% more of their funding as crowdfunding, 
and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong enough to 
displace total funding as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding. The adjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of 
crowdfunding on total funding was 0.046, but this regression did not meet the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity of errors through the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test, χ2 = 31.710, p < .001. However, the same results were obtained through 
a RSE regression, so the findings reported above are statistically reliable. 
  
4.3.6.2 All funding, 2008. 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2008 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 20.380, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2008 
had an effect size of 0.172, indicating that roughly 17.2% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2008. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2008 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2008 = (Total funding %, 2008)(-0.046) + 6.553 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2008 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2008 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2008 on total funding in 2008 are presented in Table 75, which also includes the results 
of the original regression. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                    1000            1000   
                                            
                  (17.33)          (7.11)   
_cons               6.466***        2.873***
                                  (15.78)   
1.techtype                          3.286***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-6.95)          (0.84)   
tnonc             -0.0438***      0.00541   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 75: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2008 on Total Funding in 2008, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.129% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2008, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace total funding in 2008 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2008. 
 
4.3.6.3 All funding, 2009 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2009 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.980, p = .3241. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2009 
had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2009. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2009 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2009 = (Total funding %, 2009)(-0.019) + 5.365 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2009 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2009 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2009 on total funding in 2009 are presented in Table 76, which also includes the results 
of the original regression. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.79)          (5.50)   
_cons               6.554***        2.708***
                                  (12.34)   
1.techtype                          3.129***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-4.51)          (0.84)   
tnonc             -0.0467***      0.00656   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 76: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2009 on Total Funding in 2009, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
Thus, technology companies received 2.361% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2009, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
total funding in 2009 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2009. 
 
4.3.6.4 All funding, 2010 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2010 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 25.570, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2010 
had an effect size of 0.207, indicating that roughly 20.7% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2010. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2010 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2010 = (Total funding %, 2010)(-0.049) + 6.490 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2010 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2010 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2010 
on total funding in 2010 are presented in Table 77, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (4.66)          (2.22)   
_cons               5.365***        2.886*  
                                   (3.49)   
1.techtype                          2.361***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.99)          (0.69)   
tnonc             -0.0193          0.0144   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 77: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2010 on Total Funding in 2010, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.854% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2010, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace total funding in 2010 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2010. 
 
4.3.6.5 All funding, 2011 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2011 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 26601, p = .1064. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2011 
had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2011 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2011. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 2011 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2011 = (Total funding %, 2011)(-0.063) + 7.883 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2011 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2011 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2011 
on total funding in 2011 are presented in Table 78, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (10.95)          (6.51)   
_cons               6.491***        3.189***
                                  (11.25)   
1.techtype                          2.854***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-5.06)         (-0.37)   
tnonc             -0.0497***     -0.00286   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
                                            
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 192 
Table 78: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2011 on Total Funding in 2011, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 5.643% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2011, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
total funding in 2011 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2011. 
 
4.3.6.6 All funding, 2012 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2012 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 19.740, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2012 
had an effect size of 0.167, indicating that roughly 16.7% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2012. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2012 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2012 = (Total funding %, 2012)(-0.059) + 7.242 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2012 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2012 by roughly the amount indicated above.  
The results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 
2012 on total funding in 2012 are presented in Table 79, which also includes the results 
of the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (3.46)          (0.95)   
_cons               7.884***        2.387   
                                   (4.03)   
1.techtype                          5.643***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.63)          (0.30)   
tnonc             -0.0639          0.0125   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 79: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2012 on Total Funding in 2012, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.284% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2012, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace total funding in 2012 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2012. 
 
4.3.6.7 All funding, 2013 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2013 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 25.210, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2013 
had an effect size of 0.204, indicating that roughly 20.4% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2013. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2013 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2013 = (Total funding %, 2013)(-0.042) + 6.215 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2013 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2013 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2013 
on total funding in 2013 are presented in Table 80, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (9.45)          (5.90)   
_cons               7.242***        3.440***
                                  (11.97)   
1.techtype                          3.284***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-4.44)         (-0.76)   
tnonc             -0.0596***     -0.00727   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 80: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2013 on Total Funding in 2013, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.263% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2013, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace total funding in 2013 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2013. 
 
4.3.6.8 All funding, 2014 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2014 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 2.660, p = .0046. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2014 
had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2014 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2014. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 2014 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2014 = (Total funding %, 2014)(-0.046) + 6.645 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2014 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2014 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2014 
on total funding in 2014 are presented in Table 81, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                  (11.82)          (5.58)   
_cons               6.215***        3.129***
                                   (8.05)   
1.techtype                          2.263***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-5.02)         (-0.01)   
tnonc             -0.0427***    -0.000104   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 81: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2014 on Total Funding in 2014, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 4.185% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2014, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
total funding in 2014 as a statistically insignificant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2014. 
 
4.3.6.9 All funding, 2015 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2015 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 13.180, p = .0005. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2015 
had an effect size of 0.118, indicating that roughly 12% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2015 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2015. The regression 
equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 2015 was as 
follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2015 = (Total funding %, 2015)(-0.053) + 7.100 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2015 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2015 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2015 
on total funding in 2015 are presented in Table 82, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (4.03)          (2.02)   
_cons               6.646***        3.336*  
                                   (4.74)   
1.techtype                          4.185***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-1.63)         (-0.15)   
tnonc             -0.0465        -0.00405   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 82: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2015 on Total Funding in 2015, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.188% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2015, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace total funding in 2015 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2015. 
 
4.3.6.10 All funding, 2016  
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2016 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.260, p = .06098. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2016 
had an effect size of 0.003, indicating that roughly a third of 1% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2016. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2016 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2016 = (Total funding %, 2016)(-0.010) + 4.693 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2016 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2016 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2016 
on total funding in 2016 are presented in Table 83, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (8.16)          (4.52)   
_cons               7.100***        3.644***
                                   (7.99)   
1.techtype                          3.188***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.63)         (-0.61)   
tnonc             -0.0540***     -0.00785   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 83: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2016 on Total Funding in 2016, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 2.637% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2016, but the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing did not change 
total funding in 2016 as a statistically significant predictor of crowdfunding as a % of 
total funding in 2016. 
 
4.3.6.11 All funding, 2017 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2017 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 12.810, p = .0005. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2017 
had an effect size of 0.116, indicating that roughly 11.6% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2017. The 
regression equation for the relationship between crowdfunding and total funding in 
2017 was as follows: 
Crowdfunding %, 2017 = (Total funding %, 2017)(-0.040) + 6.139 
Thus, every additional percentage a company’s total finding from total funding in 2017 
reduced crowdfunding received in 2017 by roughly the amount indicated above. The 
results of adding technology company status to the regression of crowdfunding in 2017 
on total funding in 2017 are presented in Table 84, which also includes the results of 
the original regression. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (3.62)          (0.94)   
_cons               4.693***        1.454   
                                   (3.49)   
1.techtype                          2.637***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-0.51)          (1.40)   
tnonc             -0.0109          0.0333   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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Table 84: Regression of Crowdfunding in 2017 on Total Funding in 2017, Tech Covariate (Source: Author) 
 
Thus, technology companies received 3.531% more of their funding as crowdfunding 
in 2017, and the effect of being a technology company on outsourcing was strong 
enough to displace total funding in 2017 as a statistically significant predictor of 
crowdfunding as a % of total funding in 2017. 
 
4.4 RQ3 Results 
RQ3 was as follows: What is the potential impact on the traditional financing market of 
a shift in SME financing demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms? 
RQ3 was important insofar as, while RQ2 identified the existence of a trade-off 
between crowdfunding and traditional funding (such that SMEs decreased their 
reliance on traditional funding in the presence of added crowdfunding), RQ3 explored 
the impact of this trade-off through expert opinions. RQ2 did not identify any reasons 
for the trade-off between crowdfunding and traditional funding, because RQ3 was 
designed for this specific purpose. RQ3 was answered by means of the Delphi Method 
as described in Chapter 3. The following questions were posted in order to elicit data 
for RQ3: 
 
1. What do you feel about the importance of crowdfunding in the overall funding 
strategy of SMEs? Is crowdfunding likely to be important or unimportant? If so, 
why? 
2. If crowdfunding should become more important as a funding strategy, what 
kinds of effects might this increasing importance have on traditional funding and 
the traditional funding marketplace? Please explain your reasoning. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                            
N                     100             100   
                                            
                   (8.98)          (6.00)   
_cons               6.140***        2.762***
                                  (14.12)   
1.techtype                          3.531***
                                      (.)   
0.techtype                              0   
                  (-3.58)          (0.67)   
tnonc             -0.0407***      0.00491   
                                            
                    cfund           cfund   
                      (1)             (2)   
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3. Please discuss what you consider to be plausible future scenarios about the 
possible changes to traditional funding that might be wrought by increased 
crowdfunding. What are some plausible scenarios? Which scenario do you 
consider to be the most likely? 
4. Please discuss how you see crowdfunding as changing over time. Is it becoming 
more or less prevalent? Why? 
5. Having seen what some of your colleagues think about the impact of 
crowdfunding on traditional funding, have you changed your own opinions? Why 
or why not?  
6. Please respond to any of your colleagues’ claims or answers that you find 
interesting—whether because you agree or disagree with them.  
A number of themes emerged from the RQ3 results. These themes have been 
discussed below, with each discussion containing representative quotes, an 
exploration of the theme itself, and notes on the agreement and disagreement with the 
theme across the sample of Delphi experts assembled for RQ3. 
 
4.4.1 Theme #1: Crowdfunding is a Niche 
The first theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ3 was the theme of crowdfunding being a niche. Of the 46 experts who contributed 
data for RQ3, 15 were explicit in identifying crowdfunding as a niche, that is, as a form 
of funding that was still in its infancy and of limited importance, both to companies in 
Germany and in the global context. None of the 46 experts who contributed data for 
RQ3 were against this claim; thus, there were no discrepant data to be considered as 
part of the theme of crowdfunding being a niche, and none of the 15 experts who 
supported this interpretation of the importance of crowdfunding changed in their minds 
in the second wave of the Delphi analysis for RQ3.  
Table 85 below contains quotes from select participants who indicated their belief that 
crowdfunding was a niche. 
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Table 85: Table of Representative Comments, RQ3: Crowdfunding is a Niche (Source: Author) 
Participant # Comment 
 
7 
 
If you look at the existing data, crowdfunding is a niche option. It’s 
just starting out. The fact, it hasn’t displaced traditional methods of 
funding yet, so I wouldn’t describe it as being important for SMEs. 
 
15 Of course, there are examples of successful crowdfunding, but 
those are very limited. I don’t think I would describe crowdfunding 
as an important funding strategy. I’d like to think it’s more of a 
novelty, although that could change. 
 
25 I’m not an evangelist of crowdfunding. I don’t think it’s widespread 
or viable for the vast, vast majority of companies or individual 
investors. 
 
29 The wisdom of crowds theory is all well and good, but the public 
isn’t ready to treat crowdfunding with the same kind of trust that 
goes into buying existing, lower-risk instruments with closer 
guidance from advisors and other third parties. There’s too much 
risk in crowdfunding, so it’s a small financing alternative right now. 
 
41 Crowdfunding is a nascent funding approach. 
 
45 Crowdfunding is far from mature.  
 
 
The theme of crowdfunding as a niche strategy was synthesized from the types of 
keywords that are represented in Table 85 above, that is, niche, limited, [not] 
widespread, small, nascent, and far from mature. Thus, content analysis, facilitated by 
NVivo 12.1 software, succeeded in synthesizing the theme of crowdfunding being a 
niche approach from the bottom up, through analysis of text keywords. Subsequent 
researcher examination of the comments in their context supported the synthesis of 
the theme of crowdfunding as a niche funding approach. In terms of the first theme 
associated with RQ3, that of crowdfunding being a niche strategy, 
there was unanimous consensus among the experts assembled via the Delphi Method 
that crowdfunding was not yet equal to traditional funding sources in terms of its 
importance. 
 
4.4.2 Theme #2: Crowdfunding: A Limited Future 
The second theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied 
to RQ3 was the theme of the limited future of crowdfunding. Of the 46 experts who 
contributed data for RQ3, 13 were explicit in identifying crowdfunding as having a 
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limited future, that is, as a form of funding that is unlikely to grow beyond a modest 
potential, both with respect to companies in Germany and globally. None of the 46 
experts who contributed data for RQ3 were against this claim; thus, there were no 
discrepant data to be considered as part of the theme of crowdfunding having a limited 
future, and none of the 13 experts who supported this interpretation of the importance 
of crowdfunding changed in their minds in the second wave of the Delphi analysis for 
RQ3. The Table 86 below contains quotes from select participants who indicated their 
belief that crowdfunding had a limited future. 
 
Table 86: Table of Representative Comments, RQ3: Crowdfunding Has a Limited Future (Source: Author) 
Participant # Comment 
 
7 
 
There’s definitely a ceiling that crowdfunding hasn’t reached yet. I 
think that’s more true in Europe than in the United States. In the 
future, I can see SMEs getting maybe a tenth of their funding from 
crowdfunding, simply because individual investors are going to 
appreciate skipping commissions and chasing higher returns by 
investing in SMEs in their early stages. 
 
15 Does crowdfunding have a bright future? It depends on what we 
mean by a bright future! Is crowdfunding going to really displace 
traditional funding? No. I’ll explain my reasons for this below. But 
let me just note that I do expect crowdfunding to increase its 
relative share against traditional means of funding. 
 
29 Crowdfunding can get so far, and no farther. 
 
 
The theme of crowdfunding having a limited future was synthesized from the types of 
keywords that are represented in Table 86 above, that is, ceiling, relative share, and 
no farther. 
 
Thus, content analysis, facilitated by NVivo 12.1 software, succeeded in synthesizing 
the theme of crowdfunding having a limited future from the bottom up, through analysis 
of text keywords. Subsequent researcher examination of the comments in their context 
supported the synthesis of the theme of crowdfunding as having a limited future. In 
terms of the second theme associated with RQ3, that of crowdfunding having a limited 
future, there was unanimous consensus among the experts assembled via the Delphi 
Method that crowdfunding was not likely to become equal to traditional funding sources 
in terms of its importance. 
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4.4.3 Theme #3: Crowdfunding: Limited Market Impact 
The third theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ3 was the theme of the crowdfunding having a limited impact on the market. This 
theme was the third and final theme for RQ3 in that it built directly on the first and 
second themes. RQ3 was as follows: What is the potential impact on the traditional 
financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial institutions to 
crowdfunding platforms? Essentially, the theme of limited market impact posed the 
answer that there is going to be a limited impact of crowdfunding on finance because 
(a) crowdfunding is currently niche and (b) crowdfunding is expected to remain niche. 
From reasons (a) and (b), therefore, it can be inferred that, according to the experts 
surveyed for RQ3, market impact will be limited. This point was made explicitly by 15 
of the 46 experts who submitted data for RQ3. None of the 46 experts who contributed 
data for RQ3 were against this claim; thus, there were no discrepant data to be 
considered as part of the theme of crowdfunding having a limited impact on the market, 
and none of the 15 experts who supported this interpretation of the importance of 
crowdfunding changed in their minds in the second wave of the Delphi analysis for 
RQ3.  
 
One representative quote, from Participant #1, nearly summarized the third theme in 
its entirety: 
If—and that’s a big if—the demand for crowdfunding increases radically, then you’d 
probably see traditional funding sources either take some steps back or somehow 
insert themselves into the crowdfunding process. But I want to emphasize that I won’t 
believe in this if. For a lot of reasons—and not even primarily because of regulations 
or laws—crowdfunding is going to have a minimal impact on the market, because there 
are all kinds of game-theoretic reasons that crowdfunding will never constitute more 
than a small percentage of funding for the vast majority of SMEs. Crowdfunding isn’t 
there today, I mean, as a true alternative to traditional funding, so it’s already having a 
limited impact on the market. What I’m claiming is that crowdfunding won’t be there 
tomorrow either, so that big market impact’s never coming. Some incremental changes 
and challenges are all we can reliably expect.  
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Participant #7 had a somewhat different approach, one that was rooted in a 
consideration of regulation, but one that culminated in the same general conclusion as 
that offered by Participant #1. 
 
The bottom line is, just about wherever you are in the world, there’s going to be a cap 
on crowdfunding imposed by regulation, which is why I want to emphasize my belief 
that crowdfunding isn’t going to have a much bigger impact on the marketplace than 
it’s already having today—which is to say, a modest impact. If you look at the U.S., 
where crowdfunding really began and which is still the biggest market for crowdfunding, 
you can see the involvement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is 
imposing caps on the amount of crowdfunding that can be obtained by any one 
company. Closely related to this issue of regulation is that of market structure. 
Regulation’s creating pathways for companies to draw on crowdfunding as a kind of 
adjunct to traditional funding. None of that’s going to affect the traditional funding 
market. The traditional players and the crowdfunding players are kind of siloed off, 
each in their worlds, and these worlds aren’t going to meet. You might see a small 
displacement of traditional funding if crowdfunding claims a greater relative share, but 
you won’t really see crowdfunding altering the traditional funding marketplace in any 
meaningful way. 
 
In terms of the third theme associated with RQ3, that of crowdfunding having a limited 
market impact, there was unanimous consensus among the experts assembled via the 
Delphi Method that crowdfunding was not likely to have a significant market impact 
because of various limitations on the growth and prominence of this type of finding. 
 
4.5 RQ4 Results 
RQ4 was as follows: In the context of crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps 
that could lead to systematic risk? RQ4 has been subdivided into two distinct sub-
research questions. The presentation of RQ4 results has been subdivided accordingly. 
RQ4 was answered by means of the Delphi Method as described in Chapter 3 The 
following questions were posted in order to elicit data for RQ4: 
1. Please discuss regulatory gaps that you believe to exist in the current 
environment of crowdfunding, both in a German and a global context.  
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2. Do you believe that regulatory gaps that might exist in the current environment 
of crowdfunding, both in a German and a global context, will lead to some form 
of systematic risk? If so, please identify each risk and discuss the possible 
reasons for its existence.  
3. How important is it to reduce regulatory gaps in the current environment of 
crowdfunding, both in Germany and globally? Why? 
4. Which regulatory gaps are the most important? Why? 
5. What are the costs of allowing current regulatory gaps to continue, both in 
Germany and globally? 
6. What are the benefits of allowing current regulatory gaps to continue, both in 
Germany and globally? 
7. Having seen what some of your colleagues think about crowdfunding, regulatory 
gaps, and systemic risk, have you changed your opinion(s)? Why or why not?  
8. Please respond to any of your colleagues’ claims or answers that you find 
interesting—whether because you agree or disagree with them.  
The answers to RQ4 follow below, as part of the sub-research questions. 
 
4.5.1 Sub-RQ4.1 Results 
Sub-RQ 4.1 was as follows: In the context of crowdfunding, what is the relative 
importance of potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? A number 
of themes emerged from the Sub-RQ 4.1 results. These themes have been discussed 
below, with each discussion containing representative quotes, an exploration of the 
theme itself, and notes on the agreement and disagreement with the theme across the 
sample of Delphi experts assembled for Sub-RQ 4.1. 
 
4.5.1.1 Theme #1: Risk is well-managed.  
The first theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ 4.1 was the theme of risk being well-managed by regulation. Of the 41 experts who 
contributed data for RQ 4.1, 11 were explicit in identifying the appropriate management 
of crowdfunding risk through regulation. None of the 41 experts who contributed data 
for RQ 4.1 were against this claim; thus, there were no discrepant data to be 
considered as part of the theme of risk being well-managed through regulation, and 
none of the 11 experts who supported this interpretation of the importance of 
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crowdfunding changed in their minds in the second wave of the Delphi analysis for RQ 
4.1. 
There were several rich responses to this theme. Participant #11, for example, had the 
following to contribute: 
Now, I don’t know about any Wild West environments out there. There could be 
countries with no crowdfunding regulations whatsoever, so I want to make it clear that 
my comments are delimited to the environments and climates with which I’m most 
familiar. Now, in Germany, we see that the regulatory gaps have been closed over the 
past several years. The greatest danger used to be that, when the gaps were indeed 
present, a company seeking to benefit from crowdfunding might have been able to 
solicit investment without making the right information, in the sufficient quantities, 
available to prospective investors. We’re not seeing that any longer. Even through 
there are still exceptions in which a whole prospectus doesn’t have to be issued, I don’t 
consider that a major regulatory gap for Germany, and certainly not one that’s going to 
promote systemic risk. I mean, there are many crowdfunding investor safeguards in 
place regardless of the size of the company soliciting funds and other underlying 
factors. Bear in mind that investment is an inherently risk activity, so what I’m 
concerned with is examining the question of whether, in Germany in particular, the 
risks associated with regulatory gaps in crowdfunding are greater than ordinary 
investment risks. Based on my knowledge, I would argue that the risks of crowdfunding 
are essentially the same risks, both in quality and magnitude, that occur elsewhere in 
the German investment environment. That is why I would argue that, while there are 
probably remaining regulatory gaps in Germany, these gaps aren’t that important, and 
they’re not likely to be the basis for systemic risk. Also, remember that over-regulation 
as a means of reducing gaps is going to chill investment, and no one wants that 
outcome either. I think Germany has struck the right balance between demanding 
transparency and thoroughness from the companies seeking crowdfunding and the 
need to enliven the marketplace by allowing these kinds of investments to take place. 
Al of that are well covered by the newest 2017 amendment of the KWG (Kredit risk 
Law Germany).  
 
The sentiments expressed by Participant #11 were echoed by 10 other participants in 
the Delphi survey. However, Participant #11’s response was the longest and most 
explanatorily powerful, so it has been excerpted in detail. 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 206 
In terms of the first theme associated with RQ 4.1, that of risk being well-managed, the 
participants, each addressing themselves to the investment environment with which 
they were the most familiar, argued that, in Germany and other countries, crowdfunding 
was regulated in a manner since 2017 that continued to encourage investment while 
also providing necessary protections for investors and thereby managing risk in an 
appropriate manner 
 
4.5.1.2 Theme #2: Gaps exist, but are unlikely to be important.  
The second theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied 
to RQ 4.1 was the theme of risk existing, but not being of importance as understood 
from the perspective of systemic risk. Of the 41 experts who contributed data for RQ 
4.1, 12 were explicit in acknowledging risks associated with crowdfunding but arguing 
that these risks did not collectively represent a systemic risk. None of the 41 experts 
who contributed data for RQ 4.1 were against this claim; thus, there were no discrepant 
data to be considered as part of the theme of existing risk not rising to the level of 
systemic risk, and none of the 12 experts who supported this interpretation of the 
importance of crowdfunding changed in their minds in the second wave of the Delphi 
analysis for RQ 4.1.  
There were several rich responses to this theme. Participant #30, for example, had the 
following to contribute: 
 
I’m not necessarily sanguine about the regulatory environment. Outside Europe and 
North America, there are big gaps, and, even within these two geographies, there are 
going to be local gaps, difficulties in interpretation, and other real problems. Rather 
than dwell on the exact nature of these gaps, though, I’d like to dwell on another point, 
which is that the risks don’t really add up to what you’re calling systemic risk. Given 
how small the volume of crowdfunding is to be, even major gaps in regulation are 
hardly going to create systemic risk. Is there a place for unscrupulous companies to 
take advantage of under informed investors? Certainly, but on one hand not at a 
volume sufficient to threaten the marketplace and on the other hand not in any manner 
that doesn’t already exist outside crowdfunding. Many big companies with shiny 
prospectuses end up bilking investors.  
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The sentiments expressed by Participant #30 were echoed by 11 other participants in 
the Delphi survey. However, Participant #40’s response was the longest and most 
explanatorily powerful, so it has been excerpted in detail.  
In terms of the first theme associated with RQ 4.1, that of existing risk not rising to the 
level of systemic risk, the participants cited both the limited volume of crowdfunding 
and the existence of larger risks in other domains of the investment climate in order to 
make the argument that regulatory gaps in crowdfunding did not constitute, and were 
unlikely to constitute, systemic risk. 
 
4.5.2 Sub-RQ4.2 Results 
Sub-RQ 4.2 was as follows: In the context of crowdfunding, what are the costs and 
benefits of closing potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? A 
number of themes emerged from the Sub-RQ 4.2 results. These themes have been 
discussed below, with each discussion containing representative quotes, an 
exploration of the theme itself, and notes on the agreement and disagreement with the 
theme across the sample of Delphi experts assembled for Sub-RQ 4.2. 
 
4.5.2.1 Theme #1: Encouraging investment vs. protecting investors 
The only theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ 4.2 was the theme of the costs and benefits of crowdfunding as being 
understandable through the prism of encouraging investment vs. protecting investors.  
  
A major cost of strengthening the regulatory climate is going to be dampening 
investment. That’s the fulcrum on which this cost-benefit issue turns, in fact. If the 
regulatory authority goes too far in demanding not just prospectuses but other material 
from SMEs, particularly on the smaller end, looking for access to the crowdfunding 
market, then the problem that could arise is that these companies—many of which 
really are likely to make contributions to the economy, especially in this new-economy 
climate—are not going to get access to some quantum of their needed funds. The 
same problem affects investors, but from the other side. By now, most investors are 
aware of how, in the current technological and economic climate, tech companies in 
particular come out of people’s garages and become these huge companies. What if 
you want access to that and your name isn’t Peter Thiel? Crowdfunding is the right 
alternative to you, but, if the kind of companies you want to invest in are buried under 
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heavy regulations, then you won’t have access to the companies. We’ll all lose, 
because maybe the next Apple or Google will fail to launch. I know it’s a far-fetched 
scenario, but the point is that we need an environment in which not just the VCs and 
big movers and shakers can have early-stage access to great companies and great 
ideas. Once you can open up this landscape to ordinary investors, everyone will 
benefit. Now, on the other side of that is the issue that, if there aren’t regulations, or if 
the regulations are too weak, you’ve created a bad environment, once that 
unscrupulous companies and individuals can take advantage of. Therefore, the cost-
benefit issue really comes down to staking out a place somewhere midway between 
the need to facilitate an open investment climate and the need to protect investors. I 
can’t say exactly where that line is; I suspect we’ll have to find it through trial and error.   
Participant #55 addressed the topic of costs and benefits related to the closing of 
regulatory gaps related to crowdfunding in the following manner: 
A good way to dive into this topic is to ask why crowdfunding exists. Obviously, there’s 
a need for investment that falls below the radar of traditional investment, where you 
have a prospectus and well-heeled investors being wooed by a large company. In fact, 
we know that there’s a need for this kind of investment, because angel investors and 
an early-stage funding climate already exists. Now, when we look at the VC 
community, I think there’s a possibility that they don’t necessarily represent the market 
as a whole. Remember, VCs have their own specific tastes and preferences. What’s 
powerful about crowdfunding is that, by taking your case to the market as an SME, 
you’re in a position to tap into the broader tastes and preferences of the market. It 
would be self-defeating to clap very tight regulations on SMEs seeking to crowdfund, 
because, after all, companies that are able and willing to rise to that threshold are going 
to choose traditional funding. It could also be the case that SMEs are using 
crowdfunding just as a complement to their other investing channels, in which case the 
informed crowdfunder has an opportunity to due diligence. The point is that 
crowdfunding isn’t meant to exist outside regulatory constraints, but, shall we say, 
below them. An SME seeking crowdfunding shouldn’t be asked to meet the regulatory 
burden that exists in other funding channels—whether as driven by government 
regulations, VC requirements, or whatever. There should be a space for companies 
and investors to come together in a grassroots manner, with the minimal necessary 
regulatory burden, and let crowdfunding happen. I’m a believer in keeping a regulatory 
burden on crowdfunding, but just enough of one to let this exciting channel achieve its 
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potential. The cost of increasing the regulatory burden is the cost of shutting down 
crowdfunding altogether. 
  
In terms of the only theme associated with RQ 4.2, that of costs and benefits of 
crowdfunding as being understandable through the prism of encouraging investment 
vs. protecting investors, the consensus appeared to be for the regulatory burden on 
crowdfunding to be reduced to the optimal point necessary to stimulate investment 
while protecting investors; however, participants did not specify where this optimal 
point might be. In Chapter 5, potential means of identifying an optimal point of 
regulation between market stimulation and investor protection in future studies have 
been discussed. 
 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to present the results of the study. The results were 
presented in order of the research questions of the study. The main results of the study 
were as follows. 
 
As part of RQ1, it was found that technology companies are more reliant on 
crowdfunding, as a percentage of all funding, than are non-technology companies. 
There was a statistically significant difference between technology SMEs’ reliance on 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (6.41%. SD = 4.30) and nontechnology 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (3.20%. SD = 1.46), 
t(998) = 17.575, p < .001. Technology companies had a higher reliance on 
crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding than did non-technology companies. 
However, because the variable of reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all 
funding was distributed abnormally (Shapiro-Wilk W = 0.460, p < .001), it was 
necessary to triangulate the parametric independent samples t-test with the non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test 
confirmed that mean reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding was 
higher for technology companies than for non-technology companies, z = 21.488, p < 
.001. 
  
As part of RQ2, several weak and negative correlations between crowdfunding and 
other kinds of finding, both across the entire sample and in specific years. Only 
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aggregate results (that is, results for all years combined) have been reported in the 
conclusion. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding was statistically 
significant, F(1, 998) = 33.440, p < .001.  
 
The first theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ3 was the theme of crowdfunding being a niche. In terms of the first theme 
associated with RQ3, that of crowdfunding being a niche strategy, there was 
unanimous consensus among the experts assembled via the Delphi Method that 
crowdfunding was not yet equal to traditional funding sources in terms of its 
importance. 
 
The second theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied 
to RQ3 was the theme of the limited future of crowdfunding. In terms of the second 
theme associated with RQ3, that of crowdfunding having a limited future, there was 
unanimous consensus among the experts assembled via the Delphi Method that 
crowdfunding was not likely to become equal to traditional funding sources in terms of 
its importance. 
 
The third theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ3 was the theme of the crowdfunding having a limited impact on the market. This 
theme was the third and final theme for RQ3 in that it built directly on the first and 
second themes. In terms of the third theme associated with RQ3, that of crowdfunding 
having a limited market impact, there was unanimous consensus among the experts 
assembled via the Delphi Method that crowdfunding was not likely to have a significant 
market impact because of various limitations on the growth and prominence of this 
type of finding. 
 
The first theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ 4.1 was the theme of risk being well-managed by regulation. In terms of the first 
theme associated with RQ 4.1, that of risk being well-managed, the participants, each 
addressing themselves to the investment environment with which they were the most 
familiar, argued that, in Germany and other countries, crowdfunding was regulated in 
a manner that continued to encourage investment while also providing necessary 
protections for investors and thereby managing risk in an appropriate manner.    
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The second theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied 
to RQ 4.1 was the theme of risk existing, but not being of importance as understood 
from the perspective of systemic risk. In terms of the first theme associated with RQ 
4.2, that of existing risk not rising to the level of systemic risk, the participants cited 
both the limited volume of crowdfunding and the existence of larger risks in other 
domains of the investment climate in order to make the argument that regulatory gaps 
in crowdfunding did not constitute, and were unlikely to constitute, systemic risk.  
 
The only theme to emerge from the data gathered for the Delphi Method as applied to 
RQ 4.2 was the theme of the costs and benefits of crowdfunding as being 
understandable through the prism of encouraging investment vs. protecting investors. 
In terms of the only theme associated with RQ 4.2, that of costs and benefits of 
crowdfunding as being understandable through the prism of encouraging investment 
vs. protecting investors, the consensus appeared to be for the regulatory burden on 
crowdfunding to be reduced to the optimal point necessary to stimulate investment 
while protecting investors; however, participants did not specify where this optimal 
point might be. 
  
Chapter 5 contains a full discussion of the meaning of the RQ4 findings, their relation 
to theory and past empirical findings, and their implication for future studies and for 
practice. 
 
4.6.1 Transition 
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to present the findings of the study. The findings were 
presented in order of the four research questions of the study (and their associated 
sub-research questions): (1) What is the percentage of crowdfunding in the overall 
funding of SMEs? (2) Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ 
reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on other—that is, traditional—forms of 
financing? (3) What is the potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift 
in SME financing demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms? (4) In 
the context of crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to 
systematic risk? Both the quantitative and qualitative findings associated with these 
research questions were presented. In Chapter 5, the findings presented in Chapter 4 
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will be discussed with reference to both theories and existing empirical knowledge, 
acknowledged in terms of their limitations, utilized as a basis from which to make 
recommendations for future academic study, and utilized as a basis from which to 
make recommendations for practice and policy related to crowdfunding. In addition, 
possible ways of expanding the findings and making new contributions to knowledge 
about crowdfunding in both Germany and globally have been discussed in Chapter 5. 
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5 CHAPTER DISCUSSION 
5.1 Meaning of the Findings 
The purpose of this section of Chapter 5 is to discuss the meaning of the findings. As 
there are several findings in the study, the meaning of each finding has been discussed 
separately. The meaning of the findings prevents a basis on which to discuss the 
findings. 
 
5.2 Meaning of the Findings 
The purpose of this section of Chapter 5 is to discuss the meaning of the findings. As 
there are several findings in the study, the meaning of each finding has been discussed 
separately. The meaning of the findings prevents a basis on which to discuss the 
findings. 
 
5.2.1 Meaning of RQ1 Findings 
The first research question of the study was as follows: What is the percentage of 
crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? The main finding for this research 
question was that there was a statistically significant difference between technology 
SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (6.41%. SD = 4.30) and 
nontechnology SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding (3.20%. 
SD = 1.46), t(998) = 17.575, p < .001. The likely meaning of this finding is that 
technology companies are more reliant on crowdfunding, for reasons that have been 
discussed subsequently in this chapter. 
 
5.2.2 Meaning of RQ2 Findings 
The second research question of the study was as follows: Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing? Although several regressions were 
conducted for this research question, the main finding was that there were several 
weak and negative correlations between crowdfunding and other kinds of finding. The 
likely meaning of this finding is that crowdfunding is actively replacing other kinds of 
funding; companies that have a larger portion of their funding from crowdfunding have 
a smaller portion of funding from other kinds of funding. 
 
5.2.3 Meaning of RQ3 Findings 
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The third research question of the study was as follows: What is the potential impact 
on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial 
institutions to crowdfunding platforms? The main findings for RQ3 were as follows: (a) 
Crowdfunding is a niche, (b) crowdfunding has a limited future, and (c) crowdfunding 
is having and will have a limited impact on the funding market. The integrated meaning 
of these findings is that the potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift 
in SME financing demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms is small. 
 
5.2.4 Meaning of RQ4 Findings 
The fourth research question of the study was as follows: In the context of 
crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? 
The main findings for RQ4 were as follows: (a) The risks of crowdfunding are well-
managed by regulation, (b) the risk of crowdfunding is not important from the 
perspective of systemic risk, and (c) the costs and benefits of crowdfunding can be 
understood through the prism of encouraging investment vs. protecting investors. The 
integrated meaning of these findings is that there are in fact some regulatory gaps, but 
not gaps that are associated with high levels of risk. 
 
5.3 Discussion of the Findings 
The purpose of this section of Chapter 5 is to discuss the findings with reference to 
theory and past findings. As there are several findings in the study, each finding has 
been discussed separately. The discussion of findings encompasses theories that 
appear to possess explanatory power with respect to the specific findings of the study. 
 
5.3.1 Discussion of RQ1 Findings 
The first research question of the study was as follows: What is the percentage of 
crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? The finding that a low percentage of all 
funding is crowdfunding can be explained through a path-dependency approach, 
meaning that existing financiers exert a form of power over the marketplace that is 
difficult for crowdfunding platforms to displace (G.L. Clark, 2007; Kourtidis, Šević, & 
Chatzoglou, 2011). Investors such as venture capitalists and angel investor have had 
much longer to develop and enforce institutional power (G.L. Clark, 2007; Kourtidis et 
al., 2011) in comparison to crowdfunding platforms. 
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However, the findings for RQ1 can be examined more critically. It is possible that a low 
percentage of crowdfunding as a source of overall funding indicates that crowdfunding 
is relatively unimportant as a funding strategy. However, it is also of note that 
crowdfunding was part of the funding strategy of every company in the sample, and 
also that crowdfunding might have increased in relative prominent over the past several 
years, so that SMEs that had no reliance on crowdfunding in the past have become 
open to this funding strategy in more recent times. Thus, the findings from RQ1 can be 
understood from more than one perspective, highlighting the importance of further 
research.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the importance of crowdfunding to SMEs, quantified as a 
percentage of all funding, does not appear to have been discussed in the previous 
literature, which has focused instead on the conceptual importance of crowdfunding. 
For example, Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) and Mauritzen (2016) noted that 
crowdfunding was a means of exposing SMEs to more investors through the medium 
of the Internet, thus offering an alternative to traditional funding. Andersen and 
Mauritzen (2016) noted that crowdfunding is particularly important to SMEs because 
of the possibility of retaining equity. These kinds of observations are not directly related 
to any quantification of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding, but they are 
directly relevant to RQ2 and have therefore been discussed in greater detail as part of 
the discussion of the second research question following below.  
 
RQ1 closed an important gap in knowledge pertaining to the proportion of SME funding 
that can be traced to crowdfunding. While crowdfunding has been discussed in many 
previous studies, the literature search conducted for the current study failed to identify 
an previous quantifications of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding for SMEs. 
Therefore, the results to RQ1 provide a novel measurement of the relative importance 
of crowdfunding for SMEs.  
 
5.3.2 Discussion of RQ2 Findings 
The second research question of the study was as follows: Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing? The main finding for this research 
question is that there is a significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on 
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crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance on traditional forms of financing, such that 
companies that received crowdfunding were less likely to receive traditional funding. 
There are several possible reasons for this finding. Hollas noted that one of the 
possible reasons is that certain companies are ceasing to appreciate the trade-off 
between funding and equity in traditional approaches: “entrepreneurs have become 
warier of less-than-favourable terms in dealing with venture capital (VC) firms or even 
angel investment groups, being urged to concede a considerable amount of equity in 
exchange for funding” (Hollas, 2013, p. 27). 
 
Hollas’s (2013) findings can be discussed in theoretical terms related to game theory. 
Gilles (2010) offered a definition of two kinds of game theory, that is, cooperative and 
non-cooperative theory:  
The non-cooperative approach…assumes that each player in a game is driven 
by a well-formulated goal. This goal is formalized as the player’s payoff 
function…Each player now optimizes her payoff by selecting actions that are 
under her control…non-cooperative game theory is the most pristine expression 
of the principle of methodological individualism that lies at the foundation of most 
of contemporary microeconomics. The second fundamental approach is known 
as cooperative game theory and allows players to write binding contracts. This 
changes the analysis and interpretation of a game radically. Indeed, if binding 
agreements can be written, all players collectively will pursue the maximization 
of the total wealth that can be generated within the social decision situation at 
hand. A binding contract then determines how this generated wealth is 
distributed among the various players in this interaction decision situation. 
(Gilles, 2010, p. 5). 
 
It is possible that the positioning of VCs, angel investors, and traditional sources of 
investment in the funding marketplace can be understood as part of a non-cooperative 
approach, whereas crowdfunding can be understood as an example of cooperative 
game theory. For VCs, angel investors, and other agents in the traditional funding 
marketplace, investment is provided in exchange for equity—often, as Hollas (2013) 
argued, excessive equity. In crowdfunding, each individual contributor is too small to 
be able to demand equity in return for investment. Both crowdfunding participants and 
traditional funders are in search of a return on investment, but, because traditional 
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funders can obtain greater leverage through the larger amounts controlled by a smaller 
number of funding parties, they are able to demand equity. The demand for equity is, 
in the sense described by Gilles (2010), non-cooperative, because it is possible for 
equity to be cashed out without the company that has been invested in to remain 
solvent. For example, parties with equity can strip a company’s intellectual property, 
sell it, and gut the company (Basich, 2014; Bernstein, Giroud, & Townsend, 2015; 
Cochrane, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, someone who contributes to crowdfunding can only obtain a return 
on investment if the company in which he or she has invested is able to continue 
operating; the revenues and profits drawn by successful companies—not equity— are 
used to pay back crowdfunders, so both crowdfunders and the companies in which 
they invest want the same thing, viz., the success of the company (Basich, 2014; 
Bernstein et al., 2015; Cochrane, 2005). It is therefore possible to describe the 
relationship between crowdfunders and the companies in which they invest as 
cooperative and the relationship between venture capitalists and the companies in 
which they invest as noncooperative. Even if venture capitalists, angels, and other 
providers of traditional funding are not interested in stripping a company of its 
intellectual property or other resources, the struggle for equity is still an example of 
what Gilles (2010) described as a non-cooperative game. In an ordinary situation, there 
is a limited amount of equity—100%--available in any company. Thus, the gain of n% 
equity by any party can only occur if n% equity is lost by another party. Gilles described 
this form of non-cooperative game theory as being a zero-sum game, that is, a game 
in which the gain of one party necessarily comes at the cost of another party.  
 
The relationship between companies and the crowdfunders that invest in it cannot be 
described as zero-sum, because there is no equity involved. Rather, the rewards scale 
to both parties. If a crowdfunder’s investment is deemed worthy of n% of net profits, 
then, the more that a company profits, the more money is obtained both by: 
a. crowdfunders  
b. the company itself. 
Thus, crowd funders and the companies in which they invest can be described as 
participating in a cooperative relationship that is built on scaling benefits to both parties, 
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whereas the relationship between traditional funders and the companies in which they 
invest can be described as non-cooperative. 
 
This distinction between crowdfunding and other kinds of funding can help to explain 
the main finding for RQ2, which is the existence of negative correlations between 
crowdfunding and other kinds of funding. If the discussion of cooperative and non-
cooperative theory provided above is accurate, then it would be in the best economic 
interest of a company to maximize the proportion of money that can be raised by 
crowdfunding, because, in doing so, a company would be less obliged to trade equity 
for funding (as would be the case given the involvement of venture capitalists, angels, 
and other traditional investors). 
 
The results of RQ2, like the results of RQ2, cannot be directly discussed in terms of 
past empirical findings, as both RQ1 and RQ2 gathered novel data. No previous 
researchers appear to have either (a) quantified the total proportion of funding obtained 
from crowdfunding or (b) quantified the correlation between crowdfunding and 
traditional funding. RQ3, being an attempt to explain the findings obtained in RQ2, is 
more amenable to discussion with reference to past studies and theories. 
 
RQ2 closed a gap in literature related to the dynamics of the crowdfunding-traditional 
funding trade-off. As noted in detail in Chapter 2, there are good theoretical reasons to 
believe that companies reliant on crowdfunding will reduce their reliance on traditional 
funding, as doing so will allow companies to retain more of their equity. However, there 
do not appear to have been previous empirical validations of this theoretical prediction. 
RQ2 closed this gap not only with respect to all funding but with respect to five different 
rounds or kinds of funding, indicating that the trade-off between crowdfunding and 
traditional funding is pervasive and not limited to another particular round of funding.  
 
5.3.3 Discussion of RQ3 Findings 
The third research question of the study was as follows: What is the potential impact 
on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial 
institutions to crowdfunding platforms? The main findings for RQ3 were as follows:  
a. Crowdfunding is a niche,  
b. crowdfunding has a limited future, and  
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c. crowdfunding is having and will have a limited impact on the funding 
market.  
The integrated meaning of these findings is that the potential impact on the traditional 
financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial institutions to 
crowdfunding platforms is small.  
 
This finding can also be discussed in terms of game theory. As Gilles (2010) has 
argued, and on the basis of the mathematical theorems presented by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007), the responses of competitive 
parties in game theory will depend on: 
a. what each party possesses,  
b. what each party has to gain, and  
c. what each party has to lose.  
In the context of RQ1, it was discovered that crowdfunding currently constitutes a small 
percentage of total funding for companies in Germany. There is no evidence of a 
tipping in the marketplace resulting in the superiority of crowdfunding as a source of 
funding; rather, crowdfunding represents a very limited percentage of funding. One 
interpretation of this finding is that traditional funders are simply not threatened by 
crowdfunding in a manner that would result in traditional funders making concessions 
to the companies they invest in.  
 
In game theory terms, a true tipping of the marketplace in favour of crowdfunding would 
represent a sufficient threat to potential funders that could result in a recalculation of 
the amount of equity demanded per investment dollar. In the absence of such tipping, 
there is no game-theoretic incentive for providers of traditional funding to demand 
lesser amounts of equity in exchange for funding, which would be an economically 
rational response to the threat of crowdfunding. Therefore, the current non-
responsiveness of traditional funders to crowdfunding’s position in the marketplace is 
economically rational. 
 
The consensus among the experts surveyed for RQ3 appeared to be that, while 
exerting a downward influence on the proportion of traditional funding obtained by 
SMEs, crowdfunding is limited. This finding can be understood in light of the nature of 
the overall investment system. Large investors (be they individuals or institutions) have 
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certain built-in advantages in terms of access to investment outlets, and this access 
can be understood in terms of both regulation and open markets. Gilles (2010) noted 
that, in open markets, participants will have the opportunity to control or constrain the 
behaviour of partners based on the principle of competition; investors can, for example, 
direct their funding to companies that exchange equity for investment, creating 
pressures on companies that seek investment without equity. To the extent that the 
interests of large investors are also represented by the regulatory state, the traditional 
investment system is likely to predominate over crowdfunding because of the various 
mechanisms that exist to facilitate and encourage traditional investment, versus the 
existence of a relatively immature regulatory system to facilitate and encourage 
crowdfunding (Dushnitsky et al., 2016). 
 
Data analysis for RQ3 offers an opportunity to more closely link quantitative and 
qualitative findings, because RQ3 was a qualitative exploration of a relation that was 
quantitatively analysed as part of RQ2. Specifically, the data analysis accompanying 
RQ2 found that there a negative correlation between (a) crowdfunding as a percentage 
of all funding and (b) traditional funding as a percentage of all funding, and the 
qualitative analyses for RQ3 indicated that this trade-off is likely to be limited in scope 
because of the intrinsic limits to crowdfunding. Thus, the answers to RQ3 indicated 
that the trade-off between crowdfunding and traditional funding, while significant and 
genuine, is not likely to grow much further, and the analyses for RQ3 also indicated 
that the implications of the negative correlation between crowdfunding as a percentage 
of all funding and traditional funding as a percentage of all funding were also likely to 
be limited.  
 
RQ3 did not contribute to knowledge in the same manner as RQs 1 and 2, which 
contributed novel and basic data. RQ3 can be considered more in the light of a 
synthesis of knowledge  
 
5.3.4 Discussion of RQ4 Findings 
The fourth research question of the study was as follows: In the context of 
crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? 
The main findings for RQ4 were as follows:  
a. The risks of crowdfunding are well-managed by regulation,  
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b. the risk of crowdfunding is not important from the perspective of systemic 
risk, and  
c. the costs and benefits of crowdfunding can be understood through the 
prism of encouraging investment vs. protecting investors.  
The integrated meaning of these findings is that there are in fact some regulatory gaps, 
but not gaps that are associated with high levels of risk.  
 
One means of discussing the RQ4 findings is from the perspective of de-risking, which 
has been defined as “a general phenomenon in which an organization seeks to limit its 
exposure to risk by ceasing activities in a wholesale rather than case-by-case fashion” 
(Ramachandran, Collin, & Juden, 2008, p. 238). If crowdfunding became subject to 
higher levels of regulatory control and scrutiny, there might be added risks to 
companies that attempt to raise money through crowdfunding, and one possible 
response to this added risk could be the abandonment of crowdfunding as a funding 
strategy.  
One current regulatory gap in crowdfunding involves the tracking of money. Because 
crowdfunding connects many individuals to companies through investment, there is a 
possibility that crowdfunding could become an avenue for money laundering, insofar 
as unregulated individuals could transfer their illegitimately gotten funds into 
crowdfunding platforms. One means of closing this regulatory gap could be through 
the use of blockchain: 
There have also been attempts by industry to reduce de-risking by reducing the 
costs of compliance. These range from low-tech process fixes such as better 
messaging standards and the more rapid adoption of the Legal Entity Identifier 
scheme through to high-tech so-called FinTech [financial technology] solutions. 
There is some hope that the leveraging of technological solutions, especially 
those built on blockchain technology might reduce costs to the point at which 
nuanced, case-by-case analysis of individual clients based on rich datasets is 
affordable. (Ramachandran et al., 2008, p. 258). 
 
Blockchain has been described as a means of keeping accurate and minute track of 
the relationships between individuals and hubs—such as, for example, companies that 
are seeking to attract investment through crowdfunding. As the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States has noted,  
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Blockchains are immutable digital ledger systems implemented in a distributed 
fashion (i.e., without a central repository) and usually without a central authority. 
At their most basic level, they enable a community of users to record 
transactions in a ledger that is public to that community, such that no transaction 
can be changed once published. In 2008, the blockchain idea was combined in 
an innovative way with several other technologies and computing concepts to 
enable the creation of modern cryptocurrencies: electronic money protected 
through cryptographic mechanisms instead of a central repository….Each 
participant can keep a full record of all transactions, making the network resilient 
to attempts to alter that record (or forge transactions) later. (NIST, 2018, p. 1). 
The use of blockchain, while not discussed by the Delphi experts in the context 
of this study, could be a means of closing current regulatory gaps in blockchain. 
 
One of the themes raised by the Delphi experts in the context of RQ4 was that of 
financial inclusion. Financial inclusion refers to the ability of a financial system to 
include as many people as possible (Chibba, 2009; Soederberg, 2013). In the practice 
of investment, financial inclusion refers to the ability of as many individuals as possible 
to invest in a company (Chibba, 2009; Soederberg, 2013). Crowdfunding promotes 
financial inclusion insofar as it is relatively easy and cheap for the majority of individuals 
to join and contribute to a crowdfunding platform; often, investments as low as $1 can 
be made (Hollas, 2013), and crowdfunding platforms can be accessed from a variety 
of devices. To the extent that regulatory pressure on crowdfunding is increased, 
financial inclusion could be threatened, because (a) many investors might choose not 
to participate in crowdfunding if they have to meet higher thresholds for participation 
and (b) many companies might cease to solicit funds through crowdfunding because 
of the fear that doing so could cause them to violate anti-money laundering or counter-
terrorism policies (Hollas, 2013). Thus, the themes discussed in RQ4 can be 
understood through the perspective of both financial inclusion and de-risking. 
 
RQ4, like RQ3, can be considered in terms of the quantitative findings of the study, 
that is, the findings for RQs 1 and 2. In terms of RQ1, which sought to measure the 
reliance on crowdfunding, the answers to RQ4 suggest that the relatively percentage 
of all funding that is obtained through crowdfunding does not reflect the influence of 
higher risk to investors; rather, when combined with the insights from RQ3, the answers 
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to RQ4 indicate that the currently measured reliance on crowdfunding does not 
represent risk to investors, but rather the intrinsic limits on crowdfunding that were 
identified as part of the analysis of RQ3. In terms of RQ2, which measured the trade-
off between reliance on crowdfunding and reliance on traditional funding among SMEs, 
the results of RQ4 indicated both that this trade-off is limited and that the reasons for 
its existence are not primarily based in risk considerations.  
 
RQ4’s contributions to knowledge were similar to the contributions made by RQ3. In 
neither case was entirely new knowledge contributed; however, in both cases, the 
insights of experts were synthesized into a single explanatory framework. Specifically, 
the findings for RQ4 suggested the likelihood that crowdfunding does not present 
significant risk problems, a finding echoed in the work of Hervé et al. (2016) but more 
detailed than previous findings in terms of rich descriptions of risk and regulation as 
relevant to SME crowdfunding.  
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6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 comprises the conclusion of the study. The chapter has been structured as 
follows. First, the limitations of the study have been acknowledged. Second, 
recommendations for practice have been made. Third, recommendations for future 
scholarship have been made. Fourth and finally, a summative conclusion of the study 
has been provided.  
 
6.2 Limitations of the Findings 
The purpose of this section of Chapter 6 is to acknowledge the limitations of the 
findings. As there are several findings in the study, each finding has been discussed 
separately in terms of its limitations. 
 
6.2.1 Limitations of RQ1 Findings 
The first research question of the study was as follows: What is the percentage of 
crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? Because RQ1 was analysed through 
statistical means, the limitations of RQ1 can be evaluated in statistical terms.RQ1, 
RQ2, and RQ3 were all subject to the same general limitation of statistical findings, 
which, based in Roodman’s (2007) discussion of Leamer’s (1983) seminal critique of 
econometrics, is as follows: 
These studies differ not only in their conclusions but in their specifications as 
well…Although probably none of the choices are made on a whim; these 
differences appear to be examples of what Leamer called “whimsy.” From 
Leamer’s point of view the studies together represent a small sampling of 
specification space. And few include much robustness testing. Without further 
analysis, it is hard to know whether the results reveal solid underlying 
regularities in the data or are fragile artefacts of particular specification choices. 
(Roodman, 2007, p. 56). 
It is possible that the importance of crowdfunding cannot be adequately understood 
through the operational terms utilized in this study. What Roodman referred to as the 
specification space of crowdfunding is likely to broader than capturable in a definition 
of crowdfunding as a percentage of total funding. In addition, the existence of no 
covariates others than industry in RQ1 constitutes a limitation, as it is possible that the 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 225 
percentage of crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding is likely to depend on more 
factors than the industry to which a company belongs. 
 
6.2.2 Limitations of RQ2 Findings 
The second research question of the study was as follows: Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding and SMEs’ reliance 
on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing? Because RQ2 was analysed through 
statistical means, the limitations of RQ2 can be evaluated in statistical terms. In 
particular, the limitations of the RQ2 findings can be understood in terms of statistical 
Power, a measure of the likelihood of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis. The lower 
the Power, the lower the reliability of any particular set of statistical findings; therefore, 
low Power is an important statistical limitation. For RQ2, a post hoc Power analysis 
was carried out for each of the regressions reported in Chapter 4, based on  
a. the observed correlation,  
b. the standard deviation of the residual, and  
c. the standard deviation of the predictor (x) in each regression. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding on all years was statistically 
significant, F(1, 998) = 33.440, p < .001. The regression of crowdfunding on seed 
funding had an effect size of 0.032, indicating that roughly 3.2% of the variation in 
crowdfunding could be explained by variation in seed funding. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.981; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2008 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 8.41, p = .0046. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2008 
had an effect size of 0.079, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2008 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2008. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.953; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2009 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 2.310, p = .1322. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2009 
had an effect size of 0.023, indicating that roughly 2.3% of the variation in crowdfunding 
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in 2009 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2009. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.948; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2010 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 8.46, p = .0045. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2010 
had an effect size of 0.080, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2010 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2010. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.940; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2011 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 1.860, p = .1783. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2011 
had an effect size of 0.008, indicating that roughly 0.8% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2011 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2011. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.934; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2012 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 25.830, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2012 
had an effect size of 0.208, indicating that roughly 21% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2012 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2012. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.983; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2013 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 17.400, p = .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2013 
had an effect size of 0.150, indicating that roughly 15% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2013 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2013. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.953; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2014 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.930, p = .3369. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2014 
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had an effect size of 0.009, indicating that roughly a tenth of a percent of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2014. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.936; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2015 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 10.420, p = .0017. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2015 
had an effect size of 0.0961, indicating that roughly 9.6% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2015. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.951; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2016 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.260, p = .6119. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2016 
had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2016 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2016. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.965; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2017 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 9.910, p = .0022. The regression of crowdfunding on seed funding in 2017 
had an effect size of 0.0918, indicating that roughly 9% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2017 could be explained by variation in seed funding in 2017. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.984; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in all years was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 998) = 2.560, p = .1099. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in 
crowdfunding could be explained by variation in start-up funding. The obtained 
statistical Power of this regression was 0.944; therefore, statistical power was not a 
limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
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The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2008 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 2.330, p = .1302. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.0232, indicating that roughly 2.3% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2008. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.985; therefore, statistical 
power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low 
effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.080, p = .7779. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2009 had an effect size of 0.0008, indicating that very little of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2009. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.981; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2010 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 4.190, p = .0433. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2010 
had an effect size of 0.0410, indicating that roughly 4% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2010 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2010. The obtained 
statistical Power of this regression was 0.966; therefore, statistical power was not a 
limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2011 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.290, p = .5893. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.003, indicating that roughly 0.3% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2011. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.954; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2012 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 4.450, p = .0374. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2012 
had an effect size of 0.0434, indicating that roughly 4.3% of the variation in 
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crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2012. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.982; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2013 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.310, p = .2552. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.0132, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2013. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.955; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.100, p = .7569. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2014. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.981; therefore, statistical 
power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low 
effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2015 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.120, p = .2935. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.011, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 2015. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.939; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2016 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.130, p = .7146. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2016 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2016. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.977; therefore, statistical 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 230 
power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low 
effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on start-up funding in 2017 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.110, p = .7442. The regression of crowdfunding on start-up 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in start-up funding in 
2017. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.981; therefore, statistical 
power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low 
effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in all years was statistically 
significant, F(1, 998) = 9.630, p = .0020. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding had an effect size of 0.010, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation in 
crowdfunding could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding. The obtained 
statistical Power of this regression was 0.973; therefore, statistical power was not a 
limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2008 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 7.750, p = .0064. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.073, indicating that roughly 7.3% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2008. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.973; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.200, p = .6518. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2009 had an effect size of 0.002, indicating that roughly a fifth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding 
in 2009. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.987; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
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The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2010 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 9.390, p = .0028. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2010 had an effect size of 0.087, indicating that roughly 8.7% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2010. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.959; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2011 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.010, p = .9185. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.0001, indicating that very little the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2011. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.936; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2012 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.450, p = .2312. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2012 had an effect size of 0.014, indicating that roughly 1.4% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2012. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.952; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2013 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 4.030, p = .0476. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.039, indicating that roughly 3.9% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2013. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.990; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 3.920, p = .0504. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.038, indicating that roughly 3.8% of the variation 
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in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2014. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.975; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2015 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.230, p = .2695. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.012, indicating that roughly 1.2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2015. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.935; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2016 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.150, p = .7002. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2016 had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding 
in 2016. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.976; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 funding in 2017 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 6.800, p = .0106. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 1 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.064, indicating that roughly 6.4% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in Round 1 funding in 2017. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.961; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in all years was statistically 
significant, F(1, 998) = 4.040, p = .0446. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding had an effect size of 0.004, indicating that roughly a half of 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding. The obtained 
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statistical Power of this regression was 0.974; therefore, statistical power was not a 
limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2008 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.990, p = .1612. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.020, indicating that roughly 2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2008. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.983; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) < 0.001, p = .9675. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2009 had an effect size < .0001, indicating that very little of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2009. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.940; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2010 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.190, p = .6653. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2010 had an effect size of 0.002, indicating that roughly a fifth of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2010. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.961; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2011 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.340, p = .5631. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.003, indicating that roughly a third of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2011. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.983; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
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The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2012 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 1.570, p = .2131. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2012 had an effect size of 0.016, indicating that roughly 1.6% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2012. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.977; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2013 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 7.370, p = .0078. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.070, indicating that roughly 7% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2013. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.947; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.400, p = .5285. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.004, indicating that roughly a half of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2014. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.942; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2015 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 3.280, p = .0734. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.032, indicating that roughly 3.2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2015. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.976; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2016 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.010, p = .9296. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
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funding in 2016 had an effect size < 0.001, indicating that very little of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding in 2016. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.990; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 funding in 2017 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 0.380, p = .5377. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 2 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.004, indicating that roughly a half of 1% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in Round 2 funding 
in 2017. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.975; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in all years was statistically 
significant, F(1, 998) = 46.140, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding had an effect size of 0.044, indicating that roughly 4.4% of the variation in 
crowdfunding could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding. The obtained 
statistical Power of this regression was 0.985; therefore, statistical power was not a 
limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2008 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 7.520, p = .0073. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2008 had an effect size of 0.071, indicating that roughly 7.1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2008. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.948; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2009 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.040, p = .3093. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2009 had an effect size of 0.010, indicating that roughly 1% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2009. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.984; therefore, statistical power 
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was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2010 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 8.850, p = .0037. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2010 had an effect size of 0.082, indicating that roughly 8%.2 of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2010. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.976; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2011 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 6.100, p = .015. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2011 had an effect size of 0.058, indicating that roughly 5.8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2011 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2011. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.986; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2012 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 9.960, p = .0021. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2012 had an effect size of 0.092, indicating that roughly 9.2% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2012. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.973; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2013 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 14.410, p = .0003. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2013 had an effect size of 0.128, indicating that roughly 13% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2013. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.945; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 237 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2014 was statistically 
insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.800, p = .1832. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2014 had an effect size of 0.079, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2014 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2014. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.981; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2015 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 8.540, p = .0043. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2015 had an effect size of 0.080, indicating that roughly 8% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2015 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2015. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.931; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2016 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 6.130, p = .015. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2016 had an effect size of 0.058, indicating that roughly 6% of the variation 
in crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding in 2016. 
The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.953; therefore, statistical power 
was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect 
size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 funding in 2017 was statistically 
significant, F(1, 98) = 12.440, p = .0006. The regression of crowdfunding on Round 3 
funding in 2017 had an effect size of 0.113, indicating that roughly 11.3% of the 
variation in crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in Round 3 funding 
in 2017. The obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.978; therefore, 
statistical power was not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had 
a low effect size. 
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The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in all years was statistically significant, 
F(1, 998) = 48.360, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding had an 
effect size of 0.046, indicating that roughly 4.6% of the variation in crowdfunding could 
be explained by variation in total funding. The obtained statistical Power of this 
regression was 0.966; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of this 
regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2008 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 20.380, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2008 
had an effect size of 0.172, indicating that roughly 17.2% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2008 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2008. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.930; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2009 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.980, p = .3241. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2009 
had an effect size of 0.001, indicating that roughly a tenth of 1% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2009 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2009. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.931; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2010 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 25.570, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2010 
had an effect size of 0.207, indicating that roughly 20.7% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2010 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2010. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.941; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2011 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 26601, p = .1064. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2011 
had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2011 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2011. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.956; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
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The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2012 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 19.740, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2012 
had an effect size of 0.167, indicating that roughly 16.7% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2012 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2012. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.970; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2013 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 25.210, p < .0001. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2013 
had an effect size of 0.204, indicating that roughly 20.4% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2013 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2013. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.980; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2014 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 2.660, p = .0046. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2014 
had an effect size of 0.026, indicating that roughly 2.6% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2014 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2014. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.985; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2015 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 13.180, p = .0005. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2015 
had an effect size of 0.118, indicating that roughly 12% of the variation in crowdfunding 
in 2015 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2015. The obtained statistical 
Power of this regression was 0.989; therefore, statistical power was not a limitation of 
this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2016 was statistically insignificant, 
F(1, 98) = 0.260, p = .06098. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2016 
had an effect size of 0.003, indicating that roughly a third of 1% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2016 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2016. The 
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obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.983; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2017 was statistically significant, 
F(1, 98) = 12.810, p = .0005. The regression of crowdfunding on total funding in 2017 
had an effect size of 0.116, indicating that roughly 11.6% of the variation in 
crowdfunding in 2017 could be explained by variation in total funding in 2017. The 
obtained statistical Power of this regression was 0.976; therefore, statistical power was 
not a limitation of this regression, even though the regression had a low effect size. 
 
6.2.3  Limitations of RQ3 Findings 
The third research question of the study was as follows: What is the potential impact 
on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing demand from financial 
institutions to crowdfunding platforms? Because RQ3 was analysed through statistical 
means (in addition to qualitative means), the limitations of RQ3 can be evaluated in 
statistical terms. In qualitative terms, RQ3 was limited by the positioning of the Delphi 
experts in the study. Of the 46 experts who contributed data for RQ3, only four experts 
were associated with crowdfunding platforms, whereas 26 experts were associated 
with traditional funding (whether in terms of consulting, academic specialization, or 
actual investment practice). Therefore, the results for RQ3—, which emphasized the 
low impact of crowdfunding on SME financing demand—might over-represent the 
views of a large majority of Delphi experts who were institutionally skeptical of the 
impact of crowdfunding on SME demand for financing. 
 
6.2.4 Limitations of RQ4 Findings 
The fourth research question of the study was as follows: In the context of 
crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? 
Because RQ4 was analysed through qualitative means, the limitations of RQ4 also 
have to be discussed in qualitative terms. RQ4 was limited by the positioning of the 
Delphi experts in the study. Of the 41 experts who contributed data for RQ4, only four 
experts were associated with crowdfunding platforms, whereas 27 experts were 
associated with traditional funding (whether in terms of consulting, academic 
specialization, or actual investment practice). Therefore, the results for RQ4—, which 
emphasized low risks of regulatory gaps—might over-represent the views of a large 
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majority of Delphi experts who were not deeply vested in either the details or the 
trajectory of regulation for crowdfunding. 
 
6.3 Recommendations for Practice 
The purpose of this section of Chapter 6 is to make recommendations for practice. One 
recommendation is for companies to explore the use of crowdfunding as part of a 
funding strategy. The main reason for doing so, according to Hollas (2013), is that 
crowdfunders lack the kind of leverage and power to demand equity in the same 
manner as traditional investors. From the perspective of companies that are seeking 
investment, an ideal situation would be one in which the maximum amount of 
investment is received for the minimum amount of equity. In a crowdfunding situation 
in which no equity is demanded, a company is free to obtain as much investment as 
possible without having to surrender equity in the company, which would mean a loss 
of control. One recommendation that can be made to crowdfunding platforms is to 
aggregate their investing power into equity. If, for example, a large crowdfunding 
perform is able to provide 10% of a company’s total investment needs, then the 
platform should consider leveraging this position into a demand for increased equity. 
  
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The purpose of this section of Chapter 6 is to make recommendations for future 
scholarship. One of the main recommendations for future scholarship is for empirically 
oriented researchers to add more covariates to their statistical models. The addition of 
covariates would allow a more thorough exploration and explanation of quantitative 
findings. It could be the case, for example, that the percentage of a company’s funding 
that comes from crowdfunding depends on a number of possible factors, including the 
experience of the company’s principals, the amount of money that has already been 
raised, the total investment requirement, and other factors. In the absence of such 
covariates, the findings of any empirical study are necessarily limited. However, in 
order to be able to gather the data necessary to include these covariates in their 
statistical models, future researchers should work with samples that are small enough 
to allow more detailed analysis. The sample of the current study (n = 1,000) was too 
large to allow manual coding of covariates representing different aspects of a 
company’s operations. In addition, future researchers should consider working with 
samples that span countries. The current study was delimited to Germany; it is possible 
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that the dynamics of crowdfunding, particularly with respect to other aspects of funding, 
are different for other countries. One significant aspect to research might be the fact 
that in terms of the well-regulated German market Crowdfunding platforms tend to 
relocate there business activities in non-regulated markets like Cyprus, Cayman 
Islands and others. As Investors, as well as financial institutions as well as SMEs are 
often not able to identify the business location of a crowdfunding platform during a 
funding process it might occur an additional risk, which might be worth to investigate. 
 
6.5 Summative Conclusion 
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to answer the following four questions: 
(RQ1) What is the percentage of crowdfunding in the overall funding of SMEs? (RQ2) 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding 
and SMEs’ reliance on other—that is, traditional—forms of financing? (RQ3) What is 
the potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing 
demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms? (RQ4) In the context of 
crowdfunding, what are potential regulatory gaps that could lead to systematic risk? All 
of questions 1 and 2, and some of question 3, were quantitatively answered on the 
basis of data obtained from 1,000 German SMEs; some of question 3, and all of 
question 4, was qualitatively answered on the basis of data from 46 experts assembled 
as part of a Delphi methodology.  
 
The main finding for RQ1 was that there was a statistically significant difference 
between technology SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a percentage of all funding 
(6.41%. SD = 4.30) and nontechnology SMEs’ reliance on crowdfunding as a 
percentage of all funding (3.20%. SD = 1.46), t(998) = 17.575, p < .001. The likely 
meaning of this finding is that technology companies are more reliant on crowdfunding, 
for reasons that have been discussed subsequently in this chapter. The main finding 
for RQ2 was that there were several weak and negative correlations between 
crowdfunding and other kinds of finding. The likely meaning of this finding is that 
crowdfunding is actively replacing other kinds of funding; companies that have a larger 
portion of their funding from crowdfunding have a smaller portion of funding from other 
kinds of funding.  
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The main findings for RQ3 were as follows: (a) Crowdfunding is a niche, (b) 
crowdfunding has a limited future, and (c) crowdfunding is having and will have a 
limited impact on the funding market. The integrated meaning of these findings is that 
the potential impact on the traditional financing market of a shift in SME financing 
demand from financial institutions to crowdfunding platforms is small. The main 
findings for RQ4 were as follows: (a) The risks of crowdfunding are well-managed by 
regulation, (b) the risk of crowdfunding is not important from the perspective of 
systemic risk, and (c) the costs and benefits of crowdfunding can be understood 
through the prism of encouraging investment vs. protecting investors. The integrated 
meaning of these findings is that there are in fact some regulatory gaps, but not gaps 
that are associated with high levels of risk.  
 
The findings were examined in terms of game theory, de-risking, and financial 
inclusion. Game theory was utilized as a means of explaining how and why companies 
might prefer crowdfunding to other kinds of funding. De-risking and financial inclusion 
were utilized to explore the findings related to regulation. Companies were 
recommended to seek higher proportions of crowdfunding as a means of avoiding the 
equity demands that accompany traditional investment. Crowdfunding platforms were 
recommended to explore means of aggregating the investment power of their 
members into demands for equity. Further research directions on crowdfunding were 
recommended in order to build what little is known about crowdfunding as an emerging 
investment platform. Collectively, the findings of the study suggest that crowdfunding 
has a modest but meaningful role in the funding strategies of SMEs. Because of the 
ability of crowdfunding to extend the benefits of investment to smaller investors, the 
findings of the study suggest the likelihood that, in future, the crowdfunding mechanism 
will more equitably distribute both the risks and rewards of investment. However, 
because of the limited knowledge base on crowdfunding, more research on this topic 
is still necessary.  
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Appendix A: Financial Crowdfunding Data Sample 
 
year ind Comp cfund techtype seed su ri rii riii tnonc 
2008 
Financial 
Services 37 3,160000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2400 14,1000 6,5100 14,4700 5,3800 60,7000 
2008 Education 78 2,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3400 6,3600 4,4500 15,0300 9,2900 52,4700 
2008 Tech 6 6,46999979 
Tech 
Company 9,9700 15,6700 14,3000 12,5700 4,1900 56,7000 
2008 
Financial 
Services 38 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,8000 7,0100 14,3600 14,8000 2,0300 62,0000 
2008 Manufacturing 28 2,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,7100 30,4600 5,0400 12,8200 6,9000 71,9300 
2008 Retail 86 2,890000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,3100 8,1000 13,2500 15,5400 3,0800 52,2800 
2008 Education 63 3,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6300 22,9900 17,5100 6,2400 12,1900 79,5600 
2008 
Financial 
Services 33 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,0500 25,8000 19,6100 12,9600 5,1700 80,5900 
2008 Retail 69 4,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6800 6,6100 15,1500 15,9300 8,4000 63,7700 
2008 Retail 87 3,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,9200 11,5100 18,8000 3,9500 0,9500 53,1300 
2008 Retail 60 3,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,4300 4,0100 19,2200 4,8800 10,8800 63,4200 
2008 Entertainment 29 4,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7400 23,0500 16,9100 6,9600 1,7800 63,4400 
2008 Entertainment 45 1,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,5600 25,3000 18,3100 15,1800 0,6900 69,0400 
2008 Education 91 4,28000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7200 23,1900 9,0800 14,8800 4,1800 69,0500 
2008 Tech 19 7,869999886 
Tech 
Company 12,6200 13,1800 1,2800 1,7400 3,4400 32,2600 
2008 Tech 42 7,510000229 
Tech 
Company 16,2300 10,7000 12,3000 1,6100 0,6700 41,5100 
2008 Entertainment 62 2,430000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,3000 15,2400 18,1600 15,2000 3,1700 66,0700 
2008 Tech 9 6,650000095 
Tech 
Company 7,9700 3,9500 9,3500 9,6800 5,9500 36,9000 
2008 Education 18 1,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,6300 16,5500 3,8100 4,2600 0,9800 45,2300 
2008 Tech 10 7,079999924 
Tech 
Company 20,8300 7,1600 1,3600 1,2000 2,9900 33,5400 
2008 Retail 14 2,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2400 4,8200 4,6600 7,0500 7,6300 44,4000 
2008 Retail 27 4,269999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,2200 23,8500 18,7800 7,9800 8,4000 74,2300 
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2008 Entertainment 96 1,919999957 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,7200 30,3800 2,9100 1,8500 1,0500 56,9100 
2008 Retail 76 3,99000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,2300 24,2900 8,4500 13,4400 2,1400 66,5500 
2008 Tech 4 6,510000229 
Tech 
Company 12,9300 3,6100 3,5400 0,4500 3,7600 24,2900 
2008 Manufacturing 54 3,119999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 6,5200 28,5700 15,1700 7,6900 2,7300 60,6800 
2008 Entertainment 56 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3700 23,3000 16,8000 15,3900 7,4300 78,2900 
2008 Retail 15 3,089999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7300 7,6400 17,2700 1,2600 7,1900 51,0900 
2008 Tech 7 7,059999943 
Tech 
Company 12,6400 22,3700 2,0900 4,1500 0,5800 41,8300 
2008 Manufacturing 46 3,720000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,0200 12,0100 18,0900 9,8300 3,6100 71,5600 
2008 Manufacturing 26 3,039999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,2600 21,0400 10,3800 14,4900 6,9700 70,1400 
2008 Tech 52 6,889999866 
Tech 
Company 6,2900 5,4700 5,5400 6,9300 0,9200 25,1500 
2008 
Financial 
Services 90 3,650000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,3000 18,4500 9,5000 3,0500 10,5200 55,8200 
2008 Entertainment 72 2,49000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,9500 9,7400 20,2700 15,4100 12,9500 73,3200 
2008 
Financial 
Services 55 4,090000153 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5100 26,5400 10,3100 13,1900 1,5300 72,0800 
2008 Manufacturing 31 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,8500 18,7700 14,7500 1,1300 9,0600 66,5600 
2008 
Financial 
Services 44 2,450000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,7600 5,7500 13,0200 2,9900 4,8400 37,3600 
2008 Entertainment 49 2,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,2600 3,6700 8,3600 2,1000 0,4700 36,8600 
2008 Manufacturing 82 3,25999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8800 26,5800 9,1600 6,4800 10,6900 71,7900 
2008 Education 67 1,529999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3600 16,8000 10,6700 14,5300 2,6700 62,0300 
2008 
Financial 
Services 92 2,599999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,9800 5,7200 20,4500 6,3600 9,6900 58,2000 
2008 Manufacturing 81 2,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,5100 25,8600 19,0300 4,1900 5,9000 78,4900 
2008 Tech 8 4,130000114 
Tech 
Company 15,7600 6,5500 15,2600 13,5700 1,4200 52,5600 
2008 Tech 1 5,039999962 
Tech 
Company 14,7800 4,0300 14,5500 0,5900 1,7100 35,6600 
2008 Education 61 3,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,0700 11,3700 7,9400 4,8100 2,4100 38,6000 
2008 Tech 51 5,440000057 
Tech 
Company 20,1900 3,9300 10,4300 8,6500 4,3200 47,5200 
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2008 Retail 66 3,299999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,3000 18,1600 20,2800 6,7100 3,0100 60,4600 
2008 Manufacturing 21 3,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,0700 9,5000 9,8100 9,4100 1,1500 43,9400 
2008 Entertainment 71 4,53000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5300 21,1300 4,3700 3,0700 10,9500 60,0500 
2008 Tech 25 7,300000191 
Tech 
Company 7,7400 15,6300 7,2200 10,5300 1,6000 42,7200 
2008 Education 43 1,909999967 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,5600 30,1900 18,6200 11,6300 7,0200 77,0200 
2008 
Financial 
Services 65 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3700 18,0000 17,1400 10,0800 6,2500 66,8400 
2008 Manufacturing 84 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,6500 18,3000 20,1700 13,4000 8,4600 81,9800 
2008 Tech 48 7,699999809 
Tech 
Company 10,0100 12,0300 8,7800 10,3700 0,7900 41,9800 
2008 
Financial 
Services 74 3,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5700 25,0200 4,1100 6,3600 2,4700 54,5300 
2008 Manufacturing 30 4,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,9500 21,7500 14,4100 10,0600 12,5700 82,7400 
2008 
Financial 
Services 88 1,620000005 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,4100 21,1500 8,8800 11,0200 1,6700 61,1300 
2008 Tech 95 4,929999828 
Tech 
Company 15,7700 19,2000 11,4200 1,1900 3,6700 51,2500 
2008 Retail 73 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,9700 26,9200 7,3200 15,4200 0,4300 75,0600 
2008 Education 24 4,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 31,2300 11,2800 3,6400 5,3200 3,0600 54,5300 
2008 Manufacturing 79 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,6900 11,0100 9,5800 8,4200 2,3800 50,0800 
2008 Education 94 3,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6600 22,9800 6,8500 12,8300 4,7000 65,0200 
2008 Tech 32 5,71999979 
Tech 
Company 14,8000 13,0100 5,1900 12,1600 4,5500 49,7100 
2008 
Financial 
Services 93 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 7,5500 20,7900 13,8800 2,1400 0,1100 44,4700 
2008 Tech 3 4,269999981 
Tech 
Company 12,5300 10,3900 8,9900 10,4600 3,3000 45,6700 
2008 Manufacturing 58 2,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,3500 21,4500 7,4400 1,8500 11,4800 69,5700 
2008 Tech 70 7,28000021 
Tech 
Company 15,2100 14,3100 12,9400 11,3800 2,4200 56,2600 
2008 
Financial 
Services 59 3,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,0300 8,7400 14,3900 6,0600 12,0500 61,2700 
2008 
Financial 
Services 53 2,920000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,2000 18,6300 2,0600 14,3100 10,2000 60,4000 
2008 
Financial 
Services 41 2,099999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,4200 8,0300 8,9900 8,3300 2,1000 50,8700 
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2008 Retail 64 3,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6100 6,7800 14,9400 11,0600 9,7800 57,1700 
2008 Manufacturing 89 3,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,4900 14,4200 10,8500 7,8500 12,9700 73,5800 
2008 Retail 47 2,289999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,4800 14,2700 4,5100 12,0800 11,1300 62,4700 
2008 
Financial 
Services 39 3,049999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,9000 9,2200 18,9900 9,3900 10,9300 70,4300 
2008 Tech 23 5,139999866 
Tech 
Company 13,3200 16,1300 0,0400 13,8900 4,3700 47,7500 
2008 Tech 40 4,539999962 
Tech 
Company 8,5600 6,6300 1,7200 11,6700 0,1200 28,7000 
2008 Manufacturing 35 2,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,8400 8,4400 7,3200 11,7500 2,7000 55,0500 
2008 Manufacturing 99 3,49000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,6200 28,9900 19,0600 6,2400 12,7700 83,6800 
2008 Tech 2 4,389999866 
Tech 
Company 13,3600 17,9600 4,0900 7,5400 0,1200 43,0700 
2008 
Financial 
Services 13 2,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,9300 29,3500 9,6600 8,5000 0,8900 57,3300 
2008 Entertainment 34 4,050000191 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,3500 5,5100 15,4700 7,9400 8,0700 63,3400 
2008 Manufacturing 16 2,299999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0200 4,2300 2,5600 8,2300 6,8000 42,8400 
2008 Entertainment 80 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,1000 3,0800 12,9000 3,1000 9,2800 40,4600 
2008 Tech 5 5,139999866 
Tech 
Company 12,1500 16,5100 1,1100 5,4400 0,9100 36,1200 
2008 Tech 97 8,229999542 
Tech 
Company 10,6000 21,4600 4,9000 8,3600 3,6500 48,9700 
2008 
Financial 
Services 17 2,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7100 16,2400 15,3700 13,2400 4,7400 64,3000 
2008 Manufacturing 68 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,4000 25,9200 14,6600 11,6600 11,6700 77,3100 
2008 Entertainment 98 3,549999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6600 7,4300 4,7900 5,6700 4,7900 43,3400 
2008 Entertainment 100 2,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,0400 8,2000 17,9100 5,7600 12,0300 67,9400 
2008 Tech 50 5,849999905 
Tech 
Company 20,2200 13,8400 6,4700 13,9700 3,8800 58,3800 
2008 
Financial 
Services 83 2,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,7900 10,2700 2,6900 4,9600 0,3800 29,0900 
2008 Tech 11 6,920000076 
Tech 
Company 19,5500 7,1900 3,9300 5,9200 3,1300 39,7200 
2008 Entertainment 77 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0300 7,1800 17,2500 14,8600 2,5200 62,8400 
2008 Retail 36 4,929999828 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0800 28,1400 18,5900 4,4200 2,8400 77,0700 
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2008 Manufacturing 57 3,299999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,7300 3,7500 4,5000 14,4600 1,5800 40,0200 
2008 
Financial 
Services 75 3,299999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,8700 12,8400 12,2500 2,8400 6,1300 55,9300 
2008 Tech 12 6,260000229 
Tech 
Company 18,3600 15,3700 16,2300 10,0500 3,1300 63,1400 
2008 Tech 85 4,860000134 
Tech 
Company 17,3200 18,8000 2,1600 12,3700 0,8900 51,5400 
2008 Entertainment 22 3,099999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,1800 7,1700 9,6500 8,8500 10,5200 59,3700 
2008 Education 20 1,590000033 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,6500 23,4100 14,6900 6,1600 8,9000 75,8100 
2009 Education 169 4,28000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,6900 9,1900 8,8900 4,2800 4,9600 55,0100 
2009 Education 156 3,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,9100 8,2500 11,9900 4,7700 10,5900 55,5100 
2009 Entertainment 188 3,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,0000 13,7200 16,8900 9,0000 12,6200 78,2300 
2009 
Financial 
Services 153 3 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,3500 22,2900 16,7000 12,0600 5,0200 76,4200 
2009 Entertainment 167 2,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,3100 16,7100 10,4100 3,7500 8,7900 47,9700 
2009 Entertainment 162 3,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,4900 7,4400 16,9600 9,9600 8,5300 58,3800 
2009 Entertainment 122 3,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,8000 5,4500 16,1000 3,9600 6,2500 57,5600 
2009 
Financial 
Services 158 18,10000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,4600 20,3800 13,4900 5,5600 8,4900 66,3800 
2009 Retail 148 5,199999809 
Non-
Tech 
Company 5,2700 8,7400 11,6000 7,3500 4,1400 37,1000 
2009 
Financial 
Services 151 3,630000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,2000 26,6500 6,3200 12,1400 10,3400 66,6500 
2009 Manufacturing 199 3,549999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,1200 28,8600 20,3000 14,5600 2,0800 83,9200 
2009 Entertainment 157 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,4600 18,5900 20,0200 12,4500 6,9500 70,4700 
2009 Manufacturing 159 2,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,2300 10,5700 13,9000 6,7300 2,7200 50,1500 
2009 Tech 175 6,71999979 
Tech 
Company 12,8700 6,0100 12,5700 4,1700 2,6000 38,2200 
2009 Manufacturing 198 2,950000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8200 20,2600 11,2900 4,2800 11,0900 66,7400 
2009 Entertainment 136 3,089999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 35,6100 9,7600 19,4500 6,2800 3,7200 74,8200 
2009 Retail 197 3,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7100 7,6900 16,5200 15,2100 8,1900 65,3200 
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2009 Manufacturing 185 3,680000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4700 21,0900 15,1100 2,4800 0,8100 61,9600 
2009 Retail 135 4,110000134 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,5500 30,8900 18,0500 7,6700 10,5000 93,6600 
2009 Tech 104 7,559999943 
Tech 
Company 13,4400 11,2500 16,4200 4,4500 5,0500 50,6100 
2009 Entertainment 118 20 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0800 13,6600 20,4200 15,9000 4,9100 77,9700 
2009 Education 133 2,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,9100 12,9200 15,2200 13,6300 4,9000 58,5800 
2009 Tech 109 4,409999847 
Tech 
Company 15,7000 21,3000 15,9800 0,8600 5,4000 59,2400 
2009 Education 193 2,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3700 17,0400 11,6800 1,1100 7,7100 53,9100 
2009 Manufacturing 200 1,370000005 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2100 9,5300 16,5200 9,2500 1,4500 55,9600 
2009 Tech 125 6,179999828 
Tech 
Company 18,0500 15,2100 12,7100 2,1500 1,3000 49,4200 
2009 Tech 183 4,829999924 
Tech 
Company 9,6600 21,9600 7,1500 3,9000 0,7900 43,4600 
2009 Retail 186 4,760000229 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,6000 27,5300 14,2200 4,5000 7,8400 67,6900 
2009 Entertainment 165 2,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6600 15,5400 18,3000 7,6600 9,7200 68,8800 
2009 Entertainment 173 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,8000 25,6500 4,5600 13,1200 11,6800 70,8100 
2009 Retail 139 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,1800 18,2700 2,3000 9,8700 12,2700 64,8900 
2009 
Financial 
Services 177 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,3100 18,6400 8,0700 15,4300 9,1400 64,5900 
2009 Tech 106 4,050000191 
Tech 
Company 14,2300 12,6300 11,7600 8,7600 2,8500 50,2300 
2009 Education 138 3,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,4100 10,2900 20,2200 13,6300 4,3800 72,9300 
2009 Tech 112 4,599999905 
Tech 
Company 19,2300 15,1500 14,7400 8,7500 1,1000 58,9700 
2009 Manufacturing 160 2,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,1900 28,6000 5,0000 2,1900 8,7400 60,7200 
2009 Manufacturing 117 3,049999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0800 11,3000 17,0100 5,3900 10,2300 65,0100 
2009 Education 191 10,06000042 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6700 26,3300 9,7200 6,5400 5,3300 65,5900 
2009 
Financial 
Services 123 3,74000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 29,4700 7,7900 5,2300 12,1800 4,6300 59,3000 
2009 Tech 121 4,570000172 
Tech 
Company 15,7900 22,0000 16,6700 10,8500 5,0000 70,3100 
2009 Entertainment 192 2,559999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,2000 15,5700 18,3200 7,8900 5,4700 75,4500 
2009 Tech 102 6,699999809 
Tech 
Company 11,4800 15,8500 1,4700 10,5900 2,9200 42,3100 
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2009 Entertainment 141 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,9700 8,3600 12,1700 5,1600 6,1800 41,8400 
2009 Entertainment 161 2,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,0700 9,6600 5,0200 4,7800 10,6200 52,1500 
2009 Entertainment 172 2,029999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,0000 3,4700 15,5200 6,2300 2,4700 37,6900 
2009 Retail 180 3,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,5400 27,0300 3,2000 5,1200 3,3600 51,2500 
2009 Retail 181 2,849999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3600 22,2300 7,0600 8,6900 8,3500 62,6900 
2009 Education 142 3,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3300 16,0500 12,5200 5,6200 6,1700 57,6900 
2009 Entertainment 152 4,320000172 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,1300 25,8300 10,6000 4,1100 8,8700 74,5400 
2009 Tech 108 9,159999847 
Tech 
Company 11,3000 15,9300 2,8100 6,2400 1,8800 38,1600 
2009 Retail 114 3,130000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,6800 10,6100 2,7600 6,4500 6,1600 47,6600 
2009 Entertainment 137 2,74000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,7600 5,1900 3,3900 5,4700 0,4600 33,2700 
2009 Manufacturing 196 3,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3300 19,7200 14,3800 13,8700 7,6700 71,9700 
2009 Entertainment 155 2,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,8600 6,6100 20,9300 10,2800 6,8600 67,5400 
2009 Entertainment 132 4,510000229 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,4000 13,1100 14,1000 12,6200 7,2900 75,5200 
2009 Manufacturing 140 2,900000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,7800 23,8300 14,7800 1,4400 8,3700 76,2000 
2009 Entertainment 163 2,890000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,0000 23,8600 20,8000 14,2000 2,9400 87,8000 
2009 Education 131 2,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,1400 21,9800 17,0800 10,2600 3,5700 71,0300 
2009 Tech 147 5,929999828 
Tech 
Company 10,5400 16,1700 7,7800 11,9900 5,7300 52,2100 
2009 Retail 120 3,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,2400 15,5000 19,7900 2,8300 2,8600 58,2200 
2009 Retail 170 4,03000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,0100 21,5500 4,9500 9,3400 2,5600 46,4100 
2009 Entertainment 145 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,9800 11,7900 11,3800 14,3900 9,5800 76,1200 
2009 Tech 103 5,079999924 
Tech 
Company 9,9500 18,8900 11,8000 5,4500 5,0100 51,1000 
2009 Tech 195 7,449999809 
Tech 
Company 19,2800 22,2600 3,3700 13,1300 0,8600 58,9000 
2009 Retail 179 3,680000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,8500 21,2800 3,2600 8,9000 9,8400 65,1300 
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2009 Manufacturing 115 2,00999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,9000 19,8300 18,9900 3,4200 5,3800 63,5200 
2009 Education 189 4,449999809 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2900 9,9300 11,5800 10,9800 0,0600 51,8400 
2009 Retail 127 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,8700 4,4800 2,9600 9,5000 8,0900 45,9000 
2009 
Financial 
Services 149 1,899999976 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,5100 13,1300 18,5000 13,5700 1,9100 74,6200 
2009 Retail 144 3,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,5500 18,9500 12,0700 7,7700 4,5800 56,9200 
2009 Tech 182 7,010000229 
Tech 
Company 5,9000 10,4000 1,5700 6,7900 5,8500 30,5100 
2009 Tech 174 3,309999943 
Tech 
Company 12,7500 13,2000 10,3500 4,0100 4,0800 44,3900 
2009 Retail 171 2,130000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,3700 21,3300 3,3200 8,4900 7,6600 54,1700 
2009 Retail 113 3,279999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,0600 4,0300 10,6000 9,1500 2,2800 37,1200 
2009 Education 187 3,829999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 30,3000 18,8000 5,6400 5,9300 2,8900 63,5600 
2009 Manufacturing 116 3,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,1000 28,3600 7,9600 6,8500 8,4500 68,7200 
2009 Entertainment 126 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7500 13,3200 4,8500 8,2200 1,6200 42,7600 
2009 Entertainment 164 3,819999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,1000 4,4400 5,8400 5,4000 12,7000 39,4800 
2009 Education 178 4,639999866 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,9100 3,6700 2,6600 8,7000 7,9900 39,9300 
2009 Education 154 2,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,3900 18,8200 19,3900 4,6700 2,8200 66,0900 
2009 Tech 110 6,400000095 
Tech 
Company 14,2600 16,2300 9,8300 6,3200 0,3600 47,0000 
2009 Entertainment 190 4,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,7800 19,8500 15,0400 2,0900 12,0100 74,7700 
2009 Education 134 3,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,2300 9,1400 9,3500 12,5200 2,0100 44,2500 
2009 Retail 128 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6300 15,6400 8,4800 15,9900 1,9000 62,6400 
2009 Entertainment 130 2,769999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,2000 17,3300 9,6600 13,2400 1,3000 63,7300 
2009 Manufacturing 129 2,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,9300 22,8100 11,9200 7,3600 3,1100 59,1300 
2009 Tech 146 6,78000021 
Tech 
Company 12,8200 19,2000 15,6900 3,2900 1,5300 52,5300 
2009 Tech 168 6,650000095 
Tech 
Company 12,6500 16,1500 8,2900 3,1400 4,2700 44,5000 
2009 Retail 143 3,130000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,5800 4,0900 16,1200 8,5500 2,2100 55,5500 
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2009 Tech 105 9,210000038 
Tech 
Company 0,4700 8,4100 7,6300 2,5300 0,7700 19,8100 
2009 
Financial 
Services 184 3,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6800 27,9900 3,3400 1,9100 11,1700 59,0900 
2009 Education 176 2,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,6800 13,2300 11,1300 4,2400 0,7800 53,0600 
2009 Retail 166 3,980000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5600 5,2100 12,5700 7,5300 8,6400 54,5100 
2009 Tech 111 4,199999809 
Tech 
Company 15,1000 11,4000 8,6700 2,8400 4,7600 42,7700 
2009 Tech 107 5,599999905 
Tech 
Company 20,0100 6,5800 0,4500 3,5000 1,5000 32,0400 
2009 Education 150 4,320000172 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,7400 12,1200 8,2000 1,7400 12,7500 50,5500 
2009 Tech 194 5,590000153 
Tech 
Company 12,1000 13,4100 3,1000 4,9000 3,3600 36,8700 
2009 Tech 101 3,859999895 
Tech 
Company 15,3300 8,3000 3,5500 10,6000 3,5500 41,3300 
2009 Manufacturing 119 2,980000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6200 7,9100 8,3900 9,0500 4,7400 44,7100 
2009 Education 124 2,849999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,8400 24,4600 3,8300 8,4700 3,2500 61,8500 
2010 
Financial 
Services 283 2,029999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,1100 10,1300 16,3500 3,4500 2,2900 45,3300 
2010 
Financial 
Services 243 3,539999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 7,9500 23,4500 3,7800 1,7500 7,4500 44,3800 
2010 Retail 298 2,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9100 22,3400 13,8100 7,9100 10,7600 67,7300 
2010 Education 282 2,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,0100 26,2300 11,8000 1,0500 11,0300 65,1200 
2010 Education 228 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0700 14,5500 3,4900 13,1600 4,8800 57,1500 
2010 Tech 253 4,110000134 
Tech 
Company 13,9300 19,7500 5,5100 10,2200 2,9300 52,3400 
2010 Manufacturing 266 3,49000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,4300 19,7300 9,3900 5,4800 6,6000 65,6300 
2010 Entertainment 214 4,559999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,5400 26,2400 8,4800 12,2500 6,3700 65,8800 
2010 Tech 201 4,349999905 
Tech 
Company 24,5800 5,4400 14,4200 6,9000 1,5600 52,9000 
2010 Tech 210 6,110000134 
Tech 
Company 13,6200 6,7300 14,4800 11,4600 2,3000 48,5900 
2010 Retail 231 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,3300 23,9000 4,8900 8,1000 0,7600 61,9800 
2010 Tech 296 5,329999924 
Tech 
Company 14,7700 17,7300 1,1700 11,4700 2,2900 47,4300 
2010 Retail 234 3,039999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2600 24,7700 12,5500 8,3100 10,7200 75,6100 
2010 
Financial 
Services 256 2,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2600 6,2700 10,9700 10,3600 5,4100 53,2700 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 266 
2010 Manufacturing 275 2,549999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,1700 19,4400 17,9700 1,2300 8,8300 63,6400 
2010 
Financial 
Services 227 4,289999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,4200 5,0400 7,6700 6,7800 9,6200 45,5300 
2010 
Financial 
Services 288 3,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7500 27,0000 12,2200 8,5100 2,1700 64,6500 
2010 Entertainment 278 3,269999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,6900 28,6500 9,7900 2,5100 7,4200 68,0600 
2010 Manufacturing 289 3,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,0700 4,5600 11,3500 11,0700 9,6700 48,7200 
2010 Entertainment 259 2,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,7300 16,0500 14,2800 11,1700 7,6700 67,9000 
2010 Tech 206 5,010000229 
Tech 
Company 12,8700 11,6000 13,5300 3,9700 1,0700 43,0400 
2010 Retail 299 2,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,2800 15,1300 11,5700 14,9800 0,4600 63,4200 
2010 Education 230 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,7500 22,3200 9,9300 10,7000 4,1200 55,8200 
2010 Retail 238 2,99000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,4900 14,3300 7,6400 6,5000 7,6500 59,6100 
2010 Manufacturing 258 3,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,1300 7,3500 18,9500 12,9800 12,0800 70,4900 
2010 Retail 216 3,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,5100 24,9900 10,4600 12,2500 8,8200 74,0300 
2010 Entertainment 233 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,7600 22,3000 10,0900 15,4000 0,2900 70,8400 
2010 Retail 274 2,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,6300 18,8400 3,5100 2,5700 10,6400 58,1900 
2010 Entertainment 255 2,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7800 16,5800 15,1200 5,5400 8,6200 60,6400 
2010 Tech 205 7,960000038 
Tech 
Company 22,8400 12,3100 9,6600 10,7600 1,1000 56,6700 
2010 Retail 226 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,7500 24,1800 5,7200 13,3300 0,0200 66,0000 
2010 Education 280 2,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2100 20,3700 19,4000 4,2200 3,3700 67,5700 
2010 Tech 208 7,239999771 
Tech 
Company 14,6000 10,4700 0,7500 0,0500 5,1800 31,0500 
2010 Tech 212 6,960000038 
Tech 
Company 18,3400 11,6700 1,7700 3,7400 3,5600 39,0800 
2010 
Financial 
Services 250 1,720000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5100 4,9800 20,0100 6,8600 11,9500 60,3100 
2010 Education 267 2,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6600 24,1100 12,1300 3,1700 0,5100 60,5800 
2010 Tech 271 6,150000095 
Tech 
Company 12,7300 22,6400 16,6600 11,2500 3,3800 66,6600 
2010 Education 260 2,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,2700 15,9600 13,7800 13,1400 10,8400 74,9900 
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2010 Retail 294 2,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,6400 24,5100 11,9600 4,7200 2,2600 57,0900 
2010 Retail 262 2,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,7900 28,8200 17,9000 9,7000 3,7700 84,9800 
2010 Tech 207 7,300000191 
Tech 
Company 14,4900 9,5500 0,5800 4,5100 4,5200 33,6500 
2010 Tech 211 8,350000381 
Tech 
Company 9,5600 22,3800 9,9600 13,7800 0,5700 56,2500 
2010 Tech 293 5,679999828 
Tech 
Company 7,5300 11,4000 1,9500 5,8000 1,6400 28,3200 
2010 Education 222 4,21999979 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7300 12,2500 6,5700 7,9900 11,8100 56,3500 
2010 
Financial 
Services 285 4,260000229 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,7300 22,5500 11,0300 11,8000 11,1900 69,3000 
2010 Retail 279 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,4900 11,0500 11,5100 6,7400 12,9700 66,7600 
2010 Education 276 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8100 6,7200 12,8100 12,9800 10,1900 62,5100 
2010 Retail 264 2,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,0600 22,3800 20,2600 13,9600 1,1000 73,7600 
2010 Tech 300 5,840000153 
Tech 
Company 12,2600 7,0300 3,9000 11,3000 5,1300 39,6200 
2010 
Financial 
Services 240 2,430000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,2000 18,4600 6,9500 10,3700 3,7100 63,6900 
2010 Retail 257 1,879999995 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,5900 5,6100 9,2000 8,4500 9,3800 50,2300 
2010 
Financial 
Services 221 3,359999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5300 21,1300 17,8400 15,9600 2,5600 76,0200 
2010 Entertainment 248 2,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,3200 23,5100 15,5000 9,6100 0,1300 61,0700 
2010 
Financial 
Services 277 3,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,2800 13,6300 11,8400 5,2100 9,0500 66,0100 
2010 Entertainment 215 1,860000014 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,6800 19,5100 4,2300 12,5000 1,5300 66,4500 
2010 Manufacturing 249 2,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,8600 5,8200 15,9300 13,9400 5,6100 66,1600 
2010 Retail 247 2,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,0600 13,4300 7,8700 15,2000 3,6200 57,1800 
2010 Manufacturing 281 3,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,6000 26,9900 10,2300 6,2100 5,2500 62,2800 
2010 Tech 272 4,960000038 
Tech 
Company 22,0000 16,7300 9,1600 3,8900 0,5000 52,2800 
2010 Retail 254 2,890000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,1200 22,3800 16,2000 4,1600 1,4600 69,3200 
2010 Education 291 2,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,5700 12,7200 15,2600 6,9300 8,7900 63,2700 
2010 Manufacturing 229 3,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0800 13,8200 9,7300 14,0300 10,2500 68,9100 
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2010 Retail 270 3,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8800 13,1300 20,0500 2,1500 9,7500 63,9600 
2010 Entertainment 252 2,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,1800 4,5800 5,3500 3,1200 8,8000 37,0300 
2010 Entertainment 268 1,940000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,8900 24,5700 8,3500 3,5100 5,7300 54,0500 
2010 
Financial 
Services 225 4,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,9100 7,2600 3,9400 4,1100 1,5900 42,8100 
2010 Education 217 2,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,9500 8,9900 7,9900 6,1000 8,4000 48,4300 
2010 Manufacturing 273 2,960000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,4400 13,1300 11,1100 10,9500 12,7300 66,3600 
2010 Tech 203 3,480000019 
Tech 
Company 13,0600 18,9500 7,9300 4,1900 1,0400 45,1700 
2010 Tech 204 4,679999828 
Tech 
Company 10,1400 10,1000 14,2900 5,7800 4,3700 44,6800 
2010 
Financial 
Services 263 2,829999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,7300 27,8400 11,1400 13,2800 10,1800 73,1700 
2010 Entertainment 236 2,319999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3400 28,0700 19,3000 12,4800 8,3500 89,5400 
2010 Manufacturing 290 2,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,6700 10,9100 7,7000 12,0900 3,7100 46,0800 
2010 Education 246 2,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,2200 10,8700 2,4400 6,9200 5,2700 37,7200 
2010 Retail 251 3,25999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6700 5,7900 7,5700 10,5300 12,7000 57,2600 
2010 Manufacturing 244 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,6000 16,9100 4,1300 11,2900 12,9200 63,8500 
2010 
Financial 
Services 295 2,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8200 30,6600 12,5500 8,8200 5,6000 77,4500 
2010 Education 224 3,549999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,1900 19,3000 7,2000 9,2100 10,9200 65,8200 
2010 
Financial 
Services 269 4,53000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,1000 26,9100 13,2900 6,2800 2,3400 64,9200 
2010 
Financial 
Services 292 3,819999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,9300 5,0600 18,7800 12,2000 12,3100 70,2800 
2010 Tech 239 7,110000134 
Tech 
Company 13,6600 9,9400 4,7200 3,8600 5,9200 38,1000 
2010 Entertainment 219 2,549999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,1400 4,4100 8,2500 3,6700 7,6200 43,0900 
2010 
Financial 
Services 287 2,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,4200 26,0300 19,3600 15,1500 10,5700 80,5300 
2010 Retail 286 2,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,7700 18,3900 3,4600 8,9500 3,7300 54,3000 
2010 Education 284 3,160000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 31,8600 12,3600 16,7200 11,4400 2,4100 74,7900 
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2010 Education 213 3,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,0100 24,7800 4,6800 1,1100 9,3000 63,8800 
2010 
Financial 
Services 297 2,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,8000 21,1300 7,0500 5,1500 8,3100 58,4400 
2010 Tech 209 6,210000038 
Tech 
Company 10,2400 3,7300 5,4300 9,8000 3,1700 32,3700 
2010 Education 241 1,529999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,8000 6,7100 5,1500 10,1400 12,5300 55,3300 
2010 Education 218 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,1900 25,5100 18,7300 11,2800 3,2800 76,9900 
2010 Tech 202 5,559999943 
Tech 
Company 6,1700 11,4700 8,4400 11,9500 0,3500 38,3800 
2010 Manufacturing 235 4,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,6800 22,6900 8,8400 7,9100 11,1800 62,3000 
2010 Manufacturing 261 3,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9900 12,0400 11,4500 1,1500 4,6800 42,3100 
2010 Retail 232 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5800 30,9700 17,8900 11,9500 8,5600 89,9500 
2010 
Financial 
Services 265 2,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,4500 29,1800 14,9600 7,2000 11,3900 74,1800 
2010 Retail 223 3,74000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,4800 9,1000 2,1700 12,3000 9,5700 42,6200 
2010 Education 237 2,980000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,7100 10,2300 3,6700 14,1400 0,7600 47,5100 
2010 Retail 220 2,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,1400 17,3500 14,0300 2,1100 11,0200 60,6500 
2010 Manufacturing 242 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,0800 18,7100 16,5100 6,9600 0,4100 52,6700 
2010 Manufacturing 245 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8100 8,6800 6,9900 13,6900 10,3700 58,5400 
2011 Education 383 3,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 31,4000 22,8100 8,2300 7,4100 7,8300 77,6800 
2011 Entertainment 359 3,650000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,4400 8,0500 17,3200 7,4200 7,8000 52,0300 
2011 Education 329 2,25999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,9200 22,8900 16,1100 15,7000 3,2500 76,8700 
2011 
Financial 
Services 397 2,720000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,2000 12,9000 9,7300 6,0000 5,5700 56,4000 
2011 Entertainment 315 2,319999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,7900 13,4300 16,6200 13,1000 9,4200 69,3600 
2011 Tech 347 56,68999863 
Tech 
Company 14,9300 16,1800 10,6700 6,9900 0,5200 49,2900 
2011 
Financial 
Services 399 5,21999979 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3900 12,1100 8,3400 6,0700 4,7800 53,6900 
2011 Entertainment 366 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,6200 9,0200 6,0700 2,1600 5,4600 45,3300 
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2011 Entertainment 396 1,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,7000 19,7200 11,4300 3,3700 2,4100 56,6300 
2011 Tech 307 7,639999866 
Tech 
Company 12,5900 18,4400 12,0700 10,6100 2,5800 56,2900 
2011 
Financial 
Services 355 2,950000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 29,2500 27,4800 11,6800 15,8100 4,1000 88,3200 
2011 Tech 304 6,429999828 
Tech 
Company 13,0800 5,2900 12,1000 13,0100 0,9100 44,3900 
2011 
Financial 
Services 330 3,559999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,5100 5,9700 4,3200 13,8800 12,3500 50,0300 
2011 Manufacturing 369 1,149999976 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,4400 26,4200 11,6700 15,4200 7,8400 82,7900 
2011 Education 385 4,449999809 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,5200 23,6600 4,6800 2,4000 11,0200 67,2800 
2011 Entertainment 325 4,21999979 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,9800 29,1800 14,0700 15,6800 10,7600 81,6700 
2011 Manufacturing 376 2,049999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,8300 10,8900 11,3600 8,0100 6,1700 62,2600 
2011 Entertainment 317 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8300 27,5800 2,7100 3,7900 3,8800 56,7900 
2011 Retail 378 2,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,7800 11,0600 18,8800 7,7900 8,6500 71,1600 
2011 Retail 338 4,340000153 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,4900 29,3200 5,1100 11,0100 8,4100 66,3400 
2011 Tech 310 7,309999943 
Tech 
Company 6,8800 7,1000 16,5300 1,3500 0,3900 32,2500 
2011 Education 372 4,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,2300 26,0900 13,1800 1,4800 5,9000 59,8800 
2011 Manufacturing 393 3,109999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,3200 17,2800 10,8600 1,3600 5,6800 54,5000 
2011 Tech 365 4,420000076 
Tech 
Company 8,0800 20,7300 7,5500 7,5400 5,1900 49,0900 
2011 Tech 301 6,380000114 
Tech 
Company 8,4300 13,3500 15,2300 6,4800 0,0500 43,5400 
2011 Manufacturing 345 2,960000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 29,1100 14,5400 9,5300 5,0800 7,8000 66,0600 
2011 Retail 354 3,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,2700 22,0600 3,6700 2,3000 9,3900 64,6900 
2011 Manufacturing 357 2,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,2400 28,7400 3,1200 8,9000 1,8400 64,8400 
2011 Manufacturing 398 3,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 29,9500 8,4300 8,0300 9,5600 7,3400 63,3100 
2011 Retail 391 3,25999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,1900 18,9200 9,1000 9,8200 1,9200 58,9500 
2011 Manufacturing 373 3,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,9900 8,7600 13,5400 4,5600 10,5400 61,3900 
2011 Tech 311 5,300000191 
Tech 
Company 13,0600 11,2800 1,8600 11,9700 2,6400 40,8100 
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2011 Retail 333 3,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,9900 17,5300 2,8700 5,9300 6,6400 51,9600 
2011 Retail 328 3,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,9900 10,4200 17,2100 6,5200 9,1800 52,3200 
2011 Tech 334 6,260000229 
Tech 
Company 13,5200 18,6200 7,5200 1,8800 1,0500 42,5900 
2011 Manufacturing 375 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,4700 21,6400 15,9700 1,9400 9,6400 61,6600 
2011 Tech 342 6,400000095 
Tech 
Company 15,2300 6,1800 9,1300 0,6800 1,1200 32,3400 
2011 Manufacturing 335 4,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,1600 6,2500 7,7300 14,0000 4,2400 49,3800 
2011 Retail 323 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,4600 19,3800 12,3500 10,7400 1,3100 61,2400 
2011 Education 384 4,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8100 20,5400 9,2800 6,9000 1,8100 57,3400 
2011 Entertainment 380 1,840000033 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,5400 8,4000 5,2100 2,6200 12,9800 51,7500 
2011 Manufacturing 321 3,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,5200 27,3900 4,2700 11,9000 3,6100 70,6900 
2011 Entertainment 390 3,319999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,9300 26,1600 9,0300 2,9900 1,9200 54,0300 
2011 Tech 332 4,210000038 
Tech 
Company 14,9300 3,4600 8,5500 8,3900 1,3500 36,6800 
2011 Tech 302 6,059999943 
Tech 
Company 18,1900 4,2900 5,9600 5,3500 3,2000 36,9900 
2011 Tech 360 6,28000021 
Tech 
Company 20,1800 18,8800 9,3700 9,6100 2,6800 60,7200 
2011 
Financial 
Services 322 4,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,1200 26,5200 9,6800 5,0600 9,0200 72,4000 
2011 Retail 318 3,539999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5200 12,9600 2,1100 5,0100 12,0000 50,6000 
2011 Tech 388 6,659999847 
Tech 
Company 8,4100 4,2900 0,4900 0,2700 4,6000 18,0600 
2011 Manufacturing 339 3 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,4500 24,4800 5,2300 6,4900 10,3700 60,0200 
2011 Manufacturing 349 2,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,7400 9,7200 8,2200 4,9600 4,7300 49,3700 
2011 Manufacturing 346 2,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5400 15,0600 19,7200 8,0500 7,0600 66,4300 
2011 Entertainment 392 2,960000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,4300 15,7000 3,1900 6,3200 4,0400 49,6800 
2011 Retail 313 2,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,3400 8,4800 3,1500 2,6300 10,2500 37,8500 
2011 Retail 324 3,049999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,4500 16,2600 4,3800 1,8400 4,8300 43,7600 
2011 Entertainment 314 2,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,9100 6,2000 6,2800 11,6500 0,2900 45,3300 
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2011 
Financial 
Services 353 2,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,0800 25,3600 4,9600 4,0600 3,7600 49,2200 
2011 
Financial 
Services 320 1,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,9700 26,4700 16,2500 10,1500 10,0400 85,8800 
2011 Manufacturing 351 3,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,3100 23,3000 9,7400 2,6300 9,2100 59,1900 
2011 Retail 370 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,3100 6,2000 6,9300 13,4900 12,3100 57,2400 
2011 Tech 312 5,670000076 
Tech 
Company 7,8100 12,6800 8,8400 13,9300 4,7200 47,9800 
2011 Retail 377 2,799999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,6300 23,1400 14,5200 1,2900 4,9400 52,5200 
2011 Tech 303 5,679999828 
Tech 
Company 9,1500 6,7100 15,0600 3,6400 3,3600 37,9200 
2011 Entertainment 352 3,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,7700 18,3100 4,4400 9,8000 11,4200 63,7400 
2011 
Financial 
Services 344 2,430000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,7100 21,4500 2,5200 5,9900 6,5000 56,1700 
2011 Manufacturing 364 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,5700 11,1700 14,6100 11,7000 7,2800 66,3300 
2011 Manufacturing 374 2,430000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 5,2100 15,5100 5,9000 14,3100 0,9800 41,9100 
2011 Tech 306 6,940000057 
Tech 
Company 11,8500 16,7400 8,0700 0,2700 5,7700 42,7000 
2011 
Financial 
Services 326 2,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,1200 14,8200 15,5000 10,0500 3,6200 61,1100 
2011 Education 337 3,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,9600 22,1400 13,3900 10,6000 7,5700 64,6600 
2011 Education 341 2,519999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,2700 3,4600 17,9000 13,3000 7,2000 58,1300 
2011 Manufacturing 361 2,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,6600 24,9700 19,7000 5,5700 7,2600 66,1600 
2011 Retail 362 3,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9400 24,4000 19,9200 14,2500 5,5400 77,0500 
2011 
Financial 
Services 400 3,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,5300 7,5900 10,6800 13,1000 10,4900 52,3900 
2011 Entertainment 371 3,279999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,4000 6,8100 3,6100 7,3700 9,2400 41,4300 
2011 Retail 331 3,140000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2900 28,7200 19,4800 7,7800 1,9700 78,2400 
2011 Tech 308 5,409999847 
Tech 
Company 16,3000 13,6400 13,7000 1,4400 4,6400 49,7200 
2011 Manufacturing 327 3,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,3200 4,1300 7,3200 5,9200 8,8000 39,4900 
2011 
Financial 
Services 348 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,4300 7,5300 15,6700 4,6700 0,6100 41,9100 
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2011 Manufacturing 367 2,980000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,3800 4,0900 2,4300 2,9600 7,5400 29,4000 
2011 
Financial 
Services 368 2,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7200 9,9100 2,6600 9,7200 9,1000 49,1100 
2011 
Financial 
Services 389 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,8400 9,8100 18,1100 11,9100 3,9000 59,5700 
2011 Manufacturing 386 4,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,3400 4,1700 15,2400 11,4000 2,6200 47,7700 
2011 
Financial 
Services 319 2,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,0300 15,4300 4,1000 2,9200 11,5600 62,0400 
2011 Manufacturing 340 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3500 25,8700 18,4200 3,3800 7,9100 71,9300 
2011 Retail 350 3,289999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9200 4,3800 2,5800 9,4800 3,2700 32,6300 
2011 Entertainment 382 3,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4300 20,8400 2,5400 2,2500 5,0000 53,0600 
2011 Education 336 3,410000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,2300 10,4300 9,4900 4,2200 6,7900 54,1600 
2011 Tech 305 7,929999828 
Tech 
Company 20,1700 15,3100 13,6600 12,6700 4,7400 66,5500 
2011 Manufacturing 343 1,669999957 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,7300 29,5200 4,6100 12,8400 4,6000 72,3000 
2011 Tech 394 6,260000229 
Tech 
Company 5,3100 9,0100 15,4400 5,5900 0,9800 36,3300 
2011 Tech 309 6,099999905 
Tech 
Company 19,9600 16,9800 6,9900 8,2300 1,5000 53,6600 
2011 
Financial 
Services 358 4,53000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8900 19,9200 4,8000 13,5900 3,1500 61,3500 
2011 Manufacturing 387 1,99000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,1800 27,3600 20,5800 13,0100 12,4300 99,5600 
2011 Retail 316 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5700 13,9000 11,1500 5,3300 0,9200 51,8700 
2011 Tech 356 6,139999866 
Tech 
Company 20,7200 16,3600 7,1700 2,9400 0,1400 47,3300 
2011 Retail 363 2,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,9700 20,5600 6,7300 10,7200 5,0200 64,0000 
2011 Retail 381 2,920000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 29,2200 25,1500 2,9500 7,0700 11,0400 75,4300 
2011 
Financial 
Services 395 3,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,4400 16,7600 6,3500 12,0000 3,1100 53,6600 
2011 Entertainment 379 2,900000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,1400 25,7200 19,3200 9,2300 3,2900 77,7000 
2012 Tech 415 3,730000019 
Tech 
Company 10,2300 4,6900 14,0200 9,1300 0,5900 38,6600 
2012 Retail 442 3,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6600 7,4100 15,2800 4,3000 3,8100 45,4600 
2012 Retail 491 4,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,2000 11,1800 2,2600 4,0100 11,6100 41,2600 
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2012 Tech 411 7,449999809 
Tech 
Company 16,5700 4,4600 14,6300 12,2500 0,3700 48,2800 
2012 
Financial 
Services 423 2,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,1300 4,0300 9,6500 2,0200 12,2000 48,0300 
2012 Retail 424 4,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,9900 6,7700 19,5300 7,8900 5,3200 59,5000 
2012 Retail 482 1,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3900 16,5100 10,1900 6,2500 1,5600 49,9000 
2012 
Financial 
Services 487 2,769999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,4700 18,8600 4,5300 6,5300 11,2800 58,6700 
2012 Manufacturing 497 2,160000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,2000 14,4400 6,6200 3,4500 1,5000 44,2100 
2012 Education 470 3,599999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6200 25,9700 10,0300 9,3300 12,1100 73,0600 
2012 Entertainment 413 2,559999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8100 24,2900 12,0500 11,5900 5,0500 72,7900 
2012 Tech 412 4,78000021 
Tech 
Company 14,2900 11,3300 14,9300 9,6700 4,0100 54,2300 
2012 
Financial 
Services 477 2,599999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,2500 6,6700 7,1800 9,8200 1,0500 40,9700 
2012 Retail 492 2,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,7400 19,6100 20,1800 12,4200 10,6400 79,5900 
2012 Manufacturing 450 1,419999957 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,3600 18,6800 11,8900 13,5000 10,6300 79,0600 
2012 Retail 483 4,099999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,2100 9,4300 11,4900 13,3500 8,5500 51,0300 
2012 Entertainment 447 3,74000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,9300 10,2800 10,9800 8,7500 5,9200 47,8600 
2012 Manufacturing 419 3,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,1800 4,4100 7,8900 2,7300 0,3000 28,5100 
2012 Entertainment 464 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,1700 11,3200 20,6600 9,9200 12,3100 71,3800 
2012 Tech 406 6,090000153 
Tech 
Company 8,0600 22,1700 15,5500 1,4100 2,2200 49,4100 
2012 Tech 456 10,30000019 
Tech 
Company 13,3300 10,9900 11,9700 11,4100 0,2700 47,9700 
2012 Entertainment 444 4,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,1300 5,0400 19,4500 7,3900 9,6500 60,6600 
2012 Tech 468 6,730000019 
Tech 
Company 4,2500 15,6600 8,1800 0,9400 5,4700 34,5000 
2012 Manufacturing 417 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6600 19,4800 5,0500 14,6000 6,2200 61,0100 
2012 Retail 495 2,430000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 34,2300 7,0100 12,5700 10,2100 2,2700 66,2900 
2012 Manufacturing 466 1,350000024 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,9300 11,4300 5,1500 9,8300 2,1900 52,5300 
2012 
Financial 
Services 453 1 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,9500 4,3300 15,7700 2,9000 4,8400 41,7900 
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2012 Manufacturing 428 3,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,1300 15,3100 19,8400 3,5100 11,9400 68,7300 
2012 Tech 407 7,199999809 
Tech 
Company 17,4200 19,6900 8,2600 9,3700 5,3100 60,0500 
2012 
Financial 
Services 454 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,6800 3,9400 2,8600 5,8100 5,8300 40,1200 
2012 Tech 448 7,960000038 
Tech 
Company 15,1200 6,3200 14,8200 9,2300 3,7900 49,2800 
2012 Manufacturing 476 3,450000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3300 10,3500 12,1100 2,6300 7,0800 47,5000 
2012 Tech 434 5,619999886 
Tech 
Company 5,7500 8,4800 9,7400 12,4100 1,8200 38,2000 
2012 Retail 459 3,849999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,4600 11,6000 4,9300 9,0100 1,1500 48,1500 
2012 Tech 403 5,809999943 
Tech 
Company 15,4000 12,5000 10,7100 2,6400 0,8100 42,0600 
2012 
Financial 
Services 489 3,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,5400 13,5200 14,7200 8,0500 7,8400 65,6700 
2012 Retail 479 2,289999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,3700 29,0400 13,8200 1,6300 5,4700 69,3300 
2012 Entertainment 484 2,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,8200 9,5800 11,9000 4,0400 12,1500 58,4900 
2012 Education 414 2,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,2700 5,7700 13,9500 4,2300 4,7400 50,9600 
2012 Manufacturing 458 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,9800 3,5800 16,0700 10,2500 9,4100 50,2900 
2012 
Financial 
Services 471 3,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,6500 23,4500 13,3200 4,8000 10,4300 61,6500 
2012 
Financial 
Services 499 3,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,8700 7,0700 20,2200 9,3300 6,4400 59,9300 
2012 Entertainment 480 4,110000134 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5100 15,3700 6,2600 11,6200 4,5300 58,2900 
2012 Manufacturing 446 3,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,6100 26,8000 11,8900 1,0700 8,5700 67,9400 
2012 Entertainment 445 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3900 8,1600 9,1300 4,3100 0,9000 44,8900 
2012 Tech 439 6,079999924 
Tech 
Company 14,2300 7,4500 14,5200 7,2200 3,2600 46,6800 
2012 Retail 474 3,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5600 27,9800 16,8400 9,0100 4,7200 79,1100 
2012 
Financial 
Services 441 2,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,8900 28,3500 9,7700 12,4700 6,9900 70,4700 
2012 
Financial 
Services 467 3,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0900 7,0200 18,1800 9,1400 3,9600 59,3900 
2012 Entertainment 469 3,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3800 11,1800 20,6900 7,2500 5,3200 61,8200 
2012 
Financial 
Services 451 2,74000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,3200 25,7700 6,0400 11,9500 2,0200 64,1000 
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2012 Tech 405 5,639999866 
Tech 
Company 12,4000 22,6100 12,5700 0,9300 4,6100 53,1200 
2012 Tech 408 3,660000086 
Tech 
Company 9,9200 20,9000 13,6000 6,1400 2,2600 52,8200 
2012 Entertainment 496 3,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,4600 6,8300 11,6900 5,3200 4,1100 40,4100 
2012 Entertainment 457 3,319999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,7700 5,8000 14,3200 7,3400 7,7800 49,0100 
2012 Retail 465 2,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,2700 5,1100 12,1800 9,3300 6,6000 51,4900 
2012 
Financial 
Services 421 1,960000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,5600 30,7800 15,4600 12,0500 4,3300 82,1800 
2012 Tech 481 6,659999847 
Tech 
Company 9,6000 17,9600 0,2600 12,6800 1,5000 42,0000 
2012 Manufacturing 449 3,109999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,4800 13,8900 3,6300 6,3700 1,8200 53,1900 
2012 
Financial 
Services 462 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,1000 9,7500 19,2600 4,4600 11,4900 59,0600 
2012 Tech 409 8,729999542 
Tech 
Company 17,7100 17,6400 13,4300 9,2100 2,0300 60,0200 
2012 Retail 498 3,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,0700 11,2200 9,6600 3,5200 2,8500 44,3200 
2012 Tech 402 6,480000019 
Tech 
Company 9,2700 3,0100 13,0600 0,8700 1,9400 28,1500 
2012 Entertainment 416 4,199999809 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,8600 15,7800 17,2600 6,1100 10,9500 64,9600 
2012 Tech 429 7,179999828 
Tech 
Company 12,9600 20,7900 11,9000 10,9800 1,3900 58,0200 
2012 
Financial 
Services 431 1,169999957 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0700 29,7400 7,1000 3,5900 9,0600 72,5600 
2012 Tech 404 5,849999905 
Tech 
Company 15,0700 7,4600 7,4800 12,9000 3,2300 46,1400 
2012 Entertainment 436 2,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,0000 15,7300 18,2200 13,4700 7,4800 70,9000 
2012 
Financial 
Services 485 2,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,3300 16,0000 10,2700 1,7800 1,1500 39,5300 
2012 Entertainment 420 4,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,6900 25,4700 7,1400 5,0200 5,7600 72,0800 
2012 Retail 486 2,960000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,1300 8,9600 15,2500 13,8900 4,7800 62,0100 
2012 Tech 438 3,539999962 
Tech 
Company 13,2200 14,3300 6,9500 3,5100 4,9600 42,9700 
2012 Tech 437 7,230000019 
Tech 
Company 13,9400 15,4700 7,1000 13,5100 2,2600 52,2800 
2012 Tech 425 6,769999981 
Tech 
Company 13,0800 6,9900 2,7100 13,7900 2,9800 39,5500 
2012 
Financial 
Services 475 3,119999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,7100 20,8100 11,3300 7,8800 3,0500 63,7800 
2012 Tech 500 8,180000305 
Tech 
Company 7,0200 7,2600 10,5500 13,2200 1,3800 39,4300 
2012 Retail 461 2,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,5700 3,0200 18,1800 11,2900 7,3700 62,4300 
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2012 Retail 418 0,649999976 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,2700 21,2700 10,0800 4,2900 2,7400 56,6500 
2012 
Financial 
Services 455 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,7100 19,7100 14,4600 7,3300 2,9800 68,1900 
2012 
Financial 
Services 472 1,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,7900 16,8500 19,5400 14,8700 4,4500 79,5000 
2012 Manufacturing 427 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,0700 25,3300 3,0800 8,5700 10,9300 72,9800 
2012 Retail 490 2,539999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,6600 27,4200 2,4100 1,2800 0,4700 59,2400 
2012 Manufacturing 463 3,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,9600 22,0600 4,9200 15,0100 5,5000 66,4500 
2012 Entertainment 452 4,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,6600 17,0200 14,4800 4,2800 6,4500 55,8900 
2012 Tech 433 5,289999962 
Tech 
Company 20,0500 4,8900 5,4400 6,8500 3,2200 40,4500 
2012 Tech 410 6,980000019 
Tech 
Company 7,5800 9,5900 2,4200 6,1200 3,8000 29,5100 
2012 Tech 494 5,860000134 
Tech 
Company 11,1900 17,4000 11,6800 3,8700 1,8700 46,0100 
2012 
Financial 
Services 435 2,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,3500 16,7900 14,1700 10,4800 5,4100 75,2000 
2012 
Financial 
Services 440 3,849999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2000 16,4700 9,0400 11,6000 4,1700 60,4800 
2012 Retail 422 3,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,6600 17,6200 9,6900 4,6000 2,7700 51,3400 
2012 Retail 478 1,429999948 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8500 25,6400 16,5100 6,2700 0,0500 68,3200 
2012 Entertainment 426 3,029999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,9900 22,0000 10,5200 14,5500 10,6400 81,7000 
2012 
Financial 
Services 473 3,74000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,8100 18,2000 11,3800 3,8200 0,5100 49,7200 
2012 
Financial 
Services 460 1,919999957 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3000 12,9600 20,0000 6,4100 7,0100 67,6800 
2012 
Financial 
Services 432 2,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,5700 21,5000 12,0800 4,9600 11,3300 71,4400 
2012 Retail 443 2,980000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,1600 26,9800 4,8300 3,3900 4,9400 52,3000 
2012 Tech 430 5,380000114 
Tech 
Company 22,4800 15,3200 13,1100 11,6000 4,3600 66,8700 
2012 Tech 401 7,289999962 
Tech 
Company 15,5800 10,8600 7,5700 7,5600 0,4800 42,0500 
2012 Entertainment 493 3,279999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,8100 15,8600 5,3900 4,7700 11,8100 51,6400 
2012 Retail 488 2,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3100 4,4400 15,2200 3,3400 0,3500 45,6600 
2013 Entertainment 526 2,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6500 17,8700 14,6400 3,0500 5,3900 55,6000 
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2013 Manufacturing 557 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6000 18,1500 4,9000 2,0300 10,5900 50,2700 
2013 
Financial 
Services 598 3,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,8300 20,7400 13,8400 6,0300 3,3900 57,8300 
2013 Education 551 1,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,8000 21,8200 12,7300 15,6700 11,8800 83,9000 
2013 Tech 504 5,289999962 
Tech 
Company 16,8300 17,4600 14,0600 7,0800 1,7500 57,1800 
2013 
Financial 
Services 513 3,779999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,8200 5,1200 12,4000 13,4000 1,2400 49,9800 
2013 Education 529 1,909999967 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3900 7,7200 8,8700 10,8800 6,6800 55,5400 
2013 Entertainment 536 3,779999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8400 17,2500 7,8600 11,3000 9,1400 64,3900 
2013 Tech 510 4,059999943 
Tech 
Company 15,9800 22,5500 12,5800 6,6300 3,3100 61,0500 
2013 Entertainment 524 4,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 30,0800 28,3300 5,4100 9,6800 5,4200 78,9200 
2013 Retail 571 2,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5000 5,5600 9,4400 11,5700 12,8500 57,9200 
2013 Tech 583 6,619999886 
Tech 
Company 19,5000 4,0400 1,7600 5,3600 1,8300 32,4900 
2013 
Financial 
Services 523 1,870000005 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,8500 30,8200 6,9300 13,5200 3,0300 70,1500 
2013 Retail 575 3,140000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,3100 19,4900 7,1400 1,2200 11,9000 65,0600 
2013 Entertainment 596 2,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,5200 21,1100 9,1500 12,8000 1,8100 72,3900 
2013 Entertainment 540 1,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,4300 24,3500 11,0500 9,3900 10,0800 83,3000 
2013 Education 580 3,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,6300 23,1100 8,7100 13,2700 7,6800 75,4000 
2013 Manufacturing 565 3,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6900 22,4100 2,5100 12,2200 5,6600 60,4900 
2013 Manufacturing 550 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,0700 7,5600 19,5500 6,3400 1,6900 50,2100 
2013 Manufacturing 544 3,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6300 25,9200 20,9400 10,7300 7,5100 80,7300 
2013 Tech 589 4,389999866 
Tech 
Company 10,8500 18,6700 13,0500 2,9900 1,5100 47,0700 
2013 Entertainment 595 3,029999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,9700 13,5500 16,9800 1,8900 12,6500 63,0400 
2013 Retail 548 3,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5600 14,7200 3,5800 10,1000 10,0800 55,0400 
2013 Manufacturing 599 3,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,9800 16,3700 20,2400 15,1200 1,4300 73,1400 
2013 Tech 577 5,650000095 
Tech 
Company 12,6200 5,7100 12,2700 12,7300 5,8600 49,1900 
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2013 Education 516 3,029999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,0000 29,0400 19,4500 9,2200 7,5100 80,2200 
2013 Tech 587 5,980000019 
Tech 
Company 14,4500 20,5700 13,8500 0,7500 0,6600 50,2800 
2013 Manufacturing 547 3,25999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,5900 10,6400 13,3000 15,1900 3,6300 66,3500 
2013 
Financial 
Services 593 2,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,7200 13,4400 12,2000 8,3400 10,1000 62,8000 
2013 
Financial 
Services 527 2,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4000 27,5100 7,7400 12,6800 0,4600 70,7900 
2013 Manufacturing 517 3,950000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,8500 30,9000 5,0600 7,0800 6,6600 74,5500 
2013 Tech 501 3,74000001 
Tech 
Company 15,6800 11,2800 0,2600 8,9000 4,6600 40,7800 
2013 Entertainment 584 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,5300 11,5500 18,1000 9,7500 7,4500 62,3800 
2013 Retail 519 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,2900 17,5500 18,2200 7,1100 5,4700 69,6400 
2013 
Financial 
Services 600 1,320000052 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,4900 3,9300 3,3800 3,6500 10,3300 31,7800 
2013 
Financial 
Services 564 2,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,5100 22,2600 13,3100 9,9900 5,7800 77,8500 
2013 Retail 518 2,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,5500 13,3400 16,1400 15,1000 5,5000 76,6300 
2013 Manufacturing 558 3,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,9000 12,2600 13,9400 7,4200 9,3400 53,8600 
2013 Manufacturing 521 3,599999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,7800 26,2700 17,5900 3,4100 8,4000 71,4500 
2013 Manufacturing 528 4,039999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,9300 30,9700 2,5800 12,4600 5,5000 67,4400 
2013 
Financial 
Services 594 2,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,0000 28,8600 9,3200 13,4300 9,9500 81,5600 
2013 
Financial 
Services 553 2,410000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,4100 20,9100 17,8900 4,8000 0,0100 70,0200 
2013 
Financial 
Services 573 1,909999967 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,1900 13,4600 15,8700 14,2800 0,0900 64,8900 
2013 Manufacturing 591 2,119999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,4100 3,4900 14,3400 10,0600 3,6500 50,9500 
2013 
Financial 
Services 578 2,140000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,1900 20,0500 13,9500 9,8500 8,5700 68,6100 
2013 Retail 537 3,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,0300 21,9000 2,1100 14,3600 8,2100 60,6100 
2013 Tech 508 6,03000021 
Tech 
Company 11,4300 20,4800 1,0600 12,6100 2,8200 48,4000 
2013 Entertainment 556 2,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3200 12,5900 9,3800 12,8600 0,6300 51,7800 
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2013 Manufacturing 559 2,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,8900 29,8300 5,4300 15,1100 2,3400 66,6000 
2013 
Financial 
Services 562 4,28000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8200 20,5500 5,4700 2,9500 3,9200 52,7100 
2013 
Financial 
Services 563 3,680000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0500 21,2700 7,4800 2,1000 2,6500 56,5500 
2013 Entertainment 572 3,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2500 21,5400 18,2900 5,5900 8,9100 74,5800 
2013 
Financial 
Services 597 2,359999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,8300 13,0300 3,7300 5,5500 10,9800 58,1200 
2013 Manufacturing 560 4,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,6700 14,7000 10,3500 12,1000 4,9400 60,7600 
2013 Education 582 3,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,6300 29,4800 17,2700 14,4800 10,4400 84,3000 
2013 Education 538 4,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,7100 14,1000 16,7800 12,7900 7,4500 74,8300 
2013 Education 520 4,03000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,1900 18,2900 10,7700 13,7200 9,3300 72,3000 
2013 Manufacturing 568 3,99000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,1500 29,1300 12,4300 4,5300 6,6000 65,8400 
2013 
Financial 
Services 549 2,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,9500 27,8000 18,1000 6,8500 4,3100 75,0100 
2013 Manufacturing 567 2,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3400 17,5300 8,8600 2,6500 1,6600 52,0400 
2013 Tech 512 6,929999828 
Tech 
Company 9,8000 18,9900 9,1500 8,9900 1,1500 48,0800 
2013 Retail 552 4,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,7500 28,5900 17,4200 14,5600 5,8700 83,1900 
2013 Retail 561 4,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,2500 19,9500 17,0100 4,5200 5,5600 63,2900 
2013 Tech 511 4,800000191 
Tech 
Company 7,6600 4,5200 0,4600 7,6300 1,6600 21,9300 
2013 Tech 502 4,889999866 
Tech 
Company 10,4100 5,1800 2,8000 9,0400 4,4600 31,8900 
2013 Entertainment 592 3,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3300 30,3800 2,9300 11,4200 3,4000 69,4600 
2013 Entertainment 585 2,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,2400 25,2400 11,5000 10,9200 12,5700 73,4700 
2013 Retail 531 2,829999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,1200 11,5000 17,5900 13,0500 3,5700 71,8300 
2013 Education 588 2,849999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,4000 5,5800 19,4800 8,4600 6,7800 59,7000 
2013 Tech 506 6,960000038 
Tech 
Company 13,1100 18,3700 3,2300 12,4500 4,1900 51,3500 
2013 Entertainment 515 2,410000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4100 7,5700 11,5100 14,5500 8,2400 64,2800 
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2013 Education 581 5,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,2600 9,7500 13,5800 2,3100 8,4100 46,3100 
2013 Entertainment 543 2,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,0800 30,8700 3,4500 8,3600 3,8800 65,6400 
2013 Tech 576 6,480000019 
Tech 
Company 11,0900 17,1300 0,2600 5,9000 4,9900 39,3700 
2013 Tech 503 3,089999914 
Tech 
Company 10,5700 20,6900 10,7100 4,5300 4,6900 51,1900 
2013 Entertainment 555 4,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,5900 29,9100 18,3200 12,1800 4,6700 91,6700 
2013 Education 530 2,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,7000 16,0900 2,9100 15,9200 12,9100 72,5300 
2013 Retail 590 3,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,6300 8,8700 5,1300 7,4200 9,6700 45,7200 
2013 Tech 507 7,119999886 
Tech 
Company 18,0500 20,9100 10,4600 1,9200 4,4500 55,7900 
2013 Retail 542 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,7600 20,2700 12,3900 7,6300 2,3400 51,3900 
2013 Education 533 5,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2600 22,9400 7,7500 1,5100 5,1600 56,6200 
2013 Entertainment 532 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,8800 11,7500 6,9300 14,3000 3,4500 54,3100 
2013 Entertainment 535 2,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0400 25,5200 6,6900 6,7700 9,8900 66,9100 
2013 Retail 546 2,359999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,7300 4,8400 8,3800 8,8300 12,0900 54,8700 
2013 Tech 566 7,230000019 
Tech 
Company 11,4900 14,3000 12,4100 9,3700 0,7000 48,2700 
2013 Tech 541 4,539999962 
Tech 
Company 15,7900 14,8500 14,3500 12,5300 2,3000 59,8200 
2013 Tech 525 5,590000153 
Tech 
Company 12,3100 19,9900 6,4000 1,4900 4,6900 44,8800 
2013 Manufacturing 574 3,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6000 13,3200 16,4600 5,4300 2,8900 53,7000 
2013 Entertainment 579 3,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,0500 9,1800 15,6700 13,8600 6,1900 63,9500 
2013 Tech 569 3,799999952 
Tech 
Company 15,8500 5,0500 7,1000 10,9800 2,4300 41,4100 
2013 Tech 509 4,289999962 
Tech 
Company 10,2800 5,4200 6,5900 5,8100 0,9500 29,0500 
2013 Tech 586 5,510000229 
Tech 
Company 17,9400 7,4300 8,6100 7,6700 3,1200 44,7700 
2013 Entertainment 545 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0900 6,1500 5,3200 15,2500 9,6500 54,4600 
2013 Tech 539 4,170000076 
Tech 
Company 11,8700 5,7600 5,0400 9,4900 5,5400 37,7000 
2013 Manufacturing 534 2,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,8900 18,2800 4,2500 14,7400 12,9600 74,1200 
2013 Education 514 2,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,9300 19,7500 19,9900 11,4900 2,2400 79,4000 
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2013 Retail 522 2,680000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,1900 12,6700 14,6800 9,3400 7,5700 61,4500 
2013 Tech 505 6,739999771 
Tech 
Company 13,4000 3,0500 4,4700 3,6500 2,0500 26,6200 
2013 
Financial 
Services 570 2,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,8900 23,2900 6,9600 8,2100 2,1300 54,4800 
2013 Entertainment 554 4,090000153 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,2900 15,2400 3,6900 9,1200 8,2700 61,6100 
2014 
Financial 
Services 686 2,630000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2400 11,7700 13,8900 13,6900 5,8300 64,4200 
2014 Tech 610 6,510000229 
Tech 
Company 12,2200 21,7400 2,6400 0,5100 4,8600 41,9700 
2014 Entertainment 628 3,529999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,9800 19,7700 3,8000 13,1400 8,6800 68,3700 
2014 Tech 603 5,130000114 
Tech 
Company 17,1800 22,1400 3,1800 7,5600 0,2800 50,3400 
2014 Manufacturing 623 2,410000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 32,6900 25,0100 13,2800 12,7500 10,6400 94,3700 
2014 Tech 604 6,46999979 
Tech 
Company 15,0500 7,6600 11,2100 12,8900 5,4500 52,2600 
2014 Entertainment 669 3,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,4300 27,7000 10,3500 2,3000 12,9500 74,7300 
2014 Retail 616 2,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7700 8,5300 3,0600 1,0500 9,7600 37,1700 
2014 Retail 692 4,429999828 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,0000 25,0200 6,2600 12,4700 4,7500 76,5000 
2014 Tech 605 7,610000134 
Tech 
Company 18,2600 10,3500 15,9800 8,9200 4,4300 57,9400 
2014 Manufacturing 656 4,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,9600 10,0000 18,3800 11,9500 8,3900 60,6800 
2014 Entertainment 697 3,559999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,5700 8,1200 5,6000 3,4400 7,8600 52,5900 
2014 
Financial 
Services 667 2,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 4,4100 6,0800 12,1900 4,0600 3,9000 30,6400 
2014 Tech 607 5,099999905 
Tech 
Company 13,3700 9,0100 1,1000 1,7700 5,2000 30,4500 
2014 Tech 625 6,449999809 
Tech 
Company 11,1700 22,7200 1,4400 9,8300 5,4100 50,5700 
2014 Retail 681 3,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,9600 26,2200 19,0400 12,3800 2,3700 76,9700 
2014 
Financial 
Services 654 4,510000229 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,8700 20,5600 13,3300 3,7100 1,6000 48,0700 
2014 Retail 678 3,849999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3400 4,5200 20,0400 2,8800 4,1100 46,8900 
2014 Retail 634 2,779999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5800 27,8200 12,1000 7,5200 0,7800 68,8000 
2014 
Financial 
Services 653 2,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,9600 13,4600 9,7600 5,3300 12,7800 62,2900 
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2014 Entertainment 698 2,720000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,9600 23,3200 11,8600 8,3000 9,7700 78,2100 
2014 
Financial 
Services 668 3,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 4,5700 6,3100 5,8800 2,4900 1,4800 20,7300 
2014 
Financial 
Services 652 2,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,0800 10,8900 11,9800 4,2200 3,9300 55,1000 
2014 Entertainment 619 2,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,2100 5,7000 6,8000 15,3700 3,7000 55,7800 
2014 Entertainment 640 3,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3800 23,3000 18,4800 6,1400 3,5400 68,8400 
2014 Retail 626 2,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,7200 7,3500 3,6100 4,8300 6,2500 43,7600 
2014 Manufacturing 693 3,279999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,0400 9,2900 2,6100 1,9100 3,6600 33,5100 
2014 Entertainment 643 2,900000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,1300 9,8300 18,0800 9,1000 3,7800 54,9200 
2014 Retail 696 3,00999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,9700 26,7100 5,2700 11,1100 4,4600 62,5200 
2014 Entertainment 618 3,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,0100 6,1100 12,7400 8,3300 1,5200 40,7100 
2014 Entertainment 621 3,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,2700 22,5800 5,8500 7,1400 4,9800 51,8200 
2014 Tech 609 2,549999952 
Tech 
Company 8,3100 6,3500 13,6600 7,3700 5,3600 41,0500 
2014 Retail 638 3,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,3900 23,5000 15,2000 5,0800 10,5200 72,6900 
2014 Manufacturing 644 4,260000229 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,8600 4,7800 14,6300 7,8000 9,4300 63,5000 
2014 
Financial 
Services 632 3,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 29,4000 21,0300 12,9400 6,1800 11,9800 81,5300 
2014 Manufacturing 646 3,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0000 16,6000 16,0400 1,5400 0,4500 52,6300 
2014 Entertainment 629 3,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,7800 18,1200 3,3500 6,9400 9,7600 57,9500 
2014 Manufacturing 660 3,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,8000 17,5100 4,6300 6,3500 5,8800 57,1700 
2014 Manufacturing 658 4,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,7800 3,1800 3,0600 13,9800 12,2000 56,2000 
2014 Manufacturing 666 3,450000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,0900 9,4800 17,0100 2,9900 5,4000 60,9700 
2014 Retail 645 2,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,3900 3,0500 2,1300 14,5200 8,1200 47,2100 
2014 Tech 649 39,40999985 
Tech 
Company 17,8500 19,2300 2,7800 3,2300 5,6300 48,7200 
2014 Tech 601 5,010000229 
Tech 
Company 23,2400 19,0500 0,8200 11,6800 5,7500 60,5400 
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2014 
Financial 
Services 641 3,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,2800 10,6100 6,6200 1,5100 11,5000 47,5200 
2014 Tech 608 5,46999979 
Tech 
Company 11,4100 8,4500 3,3500 7,4100 4,6900 35,3100 
2014 Tech 655 5,050000191 
Tech 
Company 9,5300 22,1500 8,6400 0,3300 4,8200 45,4700 
2014 
Financial 
Services 615 2,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 35,9700 18,3100 15,2800 1,9600 1,3900 72,9100 
2014 Tech 606 5,210000038 
Tech 
Company 12,5600 5,6500 10,3700 12,5200 0,2700 41,3700 
2014 Retail 670 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,5800 21,2900 7,9100 8,2200 2,1300 52,1300 
2014 Retail 673 4,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,1300 6,3200 15,1000 1,9200 8,4100 53,8800 
2014 Retail 676 3,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5700 19,7500 19,1300 2,6300 12,3500 72,4300 
2014 Manufacturing 687 4,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,9600 27,3600 2,9300 3,9500 0,4000 53,6000 
2014 Retail 674 3,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,1100 19,2500 4,4700 15,7100 9,4500 66,9900 
2014 
Financial 
Services 675 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,8700 10,2200 3,0100 1,4200 1,0400 31,5600 
2014 Retail 684 2,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0800 13,8200 15,0800 15,4100 0,8000 68,1900 
2014 Retail 695 2,109999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,0400 23,1700 4,9100 4,2400 13,0000 65,3600 
2014 Entertainment 630 3,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,7700 12,5000 5,2600 11,2700 1,6900 52,4900 
2014 
Financial 
Services 614 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,2200 15,0300 7,7600 6,3100 4,8600 56,1800 
2014 Retail 663 3,230000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 5,2200 8,0300 17,1700 15,2700 0,4000 46,0900 
2014 Education 635 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,8600 18,3500 17,7500 2,2800 7,4600 62,7000 
2014 Tech 679 6,710000038 
Tech 
Company 15,9200 15,2900 9,7300 7,3000 3,9200 52,1600 
2014 Manufacturing 700 2,829999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0100 22,2400 15,9400 3,8700 6,8200 66,8800 
2014 
Financial 
Services 682 1,889999986 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6100 17,0100 10,2500 8,5200 8,1800 59,5700 
2014 Manufacturing 650 1,919999957 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,7800 23,0400 11,9200 8,4700 11,1400 81,3500 
2014 
Financial 
Services 689 2,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,9400 6,1900 12,7500 13,6000 5,1100 60,5900 
2014 Tech 691 7,099999905 
Tech 
Company 12,5500 15,5200 6,3000 2,2300 3,2400 39,8400 
2014 Education 639 3,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9100 16,2100 19,0800 7,3200 3,7100 59,2300 
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2014 Manufacturing 661 3,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,1900 6,7200 11,3600 13,6300 0,7400 49,6400 
2014 
Financial 
Services 624 3,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,1100 4,4800 3,7300 2,1400 0,0000 25,4600 
2014 Entertainment 651 2,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,4700 5,9800 7,1300 8,0500 10,3000 52,9300 
2014 Education 620 2,950000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,1600 7,0600 8,1300 5,1300 3,2500 46,7300 
2014 Retail 680 2,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,2900 9,6500 9,9200 2,0400 12,1900 52,0900 
2014 
Financial 
Services 677 2,869999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,5900 21,9800 11,9800 2,7600 11,5300 71,8400 
2014 
Financial 
Services 664 2,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,9300 17,1100 14,6400 1,9100 0,5100 49,1000 
2014 Manufacturing 637 3,130000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,1700 9,7500 10,1800 6,5400 4,1300 42,7700 
2014 
Financial 
Services 642 2,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3600 5,5600 18,5800 3,1000 7,7900 57,3900 
2014 Entertainment 636 3,039999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,0800 12,7400 17,7300 3,5800 4,0600 54,1900 
2014 Entertainment 665 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3600 12,7500 18,4800 11,7700 2,8400 61,2000 
2014 
Financial 
Services 647 3,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,9500 9,1800 5,0300 6,6700 11,3500 54,1800 
2014 Retail 613 0,790000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5500 29,7000 14,1700 11,7100 10,0000 84,1300 
2014 Tech 683 9,170000076 
Tech 
Company 14,3700 14,7600 3,9800 11,4800 1,8700 46,4600 
2014 Manufacturing 672 3,359999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4900 22,8600 15,1400 3,8200 12,3500 76,6600 
2014 Tech 694 6,21999979 
Tech 
Company 23,0000 19,1000 12,3100 4,4100 2,2900 61,1100 
2014 Tech 611 6,769999981 
Tech 
Company 6,9800 21,5400 9,3900 7,9900 0,3400 46,2400 
2014 Tech 602 5,880000114 
Tech 
Company 9,6700 8,4200 7,7600 13,9800 1,3300 41,1600 
2014 Tech 671 5,449999809 
Tech 
Company 16,1800 11,1000 8,2700 10,9600 0,6800 47,1900 
2014 Tech 627 4,789999962 
Tech 
Company 18,8500 20,0000 11,6600 7,6600 4,7600 62,9300 
2014 Manufacturing 685 3,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6000 24,0300 2,1800 6,0300 3,6700 53,5100 
2014 Tech 612 3,569999933 
Tech 
Company 15,9900 9,1400 7,8800 8,7800 2,1800 43,9700 
2014 Manufacturing 662 1,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3100 7,0600 16,0100 3,5400 11,4400 53,3600 
2014 Education 617 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3800 23,6500 6,7100 9,8200 8,4500 70,0100 
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2014 Retail 657 1,799999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,0700 25,6900 9,8400 5,4600 10,5500 68,6100 
2014 Retail 688 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 32,3700 10,0900 5,5900 12,6900 1,7000 62,4400 
2014 Manufacturing 633 2,119999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 5,9300 28,1900 14,6500 6,1700 12,5300 67,4700 
2014 Education 690 4,03000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,9000 25,4300 16,1200 4,0300 9,1200 73,6000 
2014 Tech 631 5,550000191 
Tech 
Company 13,2500 22,4400 6,3300 13,4100 3,5100 58,9400 
2014 Retail 699 3,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,4400 3,9200 3,6900 9,1400 9,6900 49,8800 
2014 Entertainment 622 2,319999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,8400 9,4600 7,1400 12,4800 5,7000 46,6200 
2014 Education 648 2,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,8900 30,0600 4,3400 7,6200 6,6200 69,5300 
2014 Manufacturing 659 2,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,0700 28,8600 5,3800 6,5100 8,2800 69,1000 
2015 Manufacturing 792 3,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,3600 12,2600 16,6400 6,6400 0,3900 55,2900 
2015 Retail 786 2,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,4700 19,6000 15,9200 12,5000 7,3800 73,8700 
2015 Education 784 3,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 9,2500 16,6000 3,2700 3,2300 3,0800 35,4300 
2015 Retail 796 2,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,1200 23,1200 8,3100 8,1200 6,6000 68,2700 
2015 Entertainment 721 3,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,6500 20,5300 2,2000 14,6100 6,4900 70,4800 
2015 
Financial 
Services 783 3,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,2800 26,6900 20,0900 10,7300 6,7300 92,5200 
2015 Education 788 1,940000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,3300 11,7500 12,7600 3,6900 6,0300 58,5600 
2015 
Financial 
Services 732 2,970000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3200 14,9700 3,4700 10,2400 2,6400 52,6400 
2015 Tech 707 4,510000229 
Tech 
Company 18,4000 6,1900 12,6300 1,7900 1,8000 40,8100 
2015 Retail 747 3,089999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,7600 22,0300 18,0400 11,7200 6,0100 70,5600 
2015 Manufacturing 780 3,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,8200 10,3600 8,3000 14,1000 0,1700 44,7500 
2015 Tech 750 5,710000038 
Tech 
Company 14,5100 7,2000 10,2800 3,3800 3,9700 39,3400 
2015 Manufacturing 767 3,00999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,9800 12,8800 8,2200 7,7200 1,2400 46,0400 
2015 
Financial 
Services 779 2,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,3000 6,8600 2,6900 3,5000 5,2300 44,5800 
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2015 Tech 701 5,96999979 
Tech 
Company 15,9000 14,5600 9,6600 5,0500 3,4800 48,6500 
2015 Tech 702 6,039999962 
Tech 
Company 12,4100 21,2200 16,4500 7,8800 3,1700 61,1300 
2015 Tech 708 4,110000134 
Tech 
Company 13,3800 19,2200 11,8200 2,2800 3,3400 50,0400 
2015 Manufacturing 730 3,119999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,7900 14,7700 11,8700 6,1200 3,5500 62,1000 
2015 Entertainment 790 3,089999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,1000 11,6900 10,6800 1,8800 1,6400 38,9900 
2015 
Financial 
Services 777 3,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,5900 28,5300 16,6200 3,0600 7,7600 78,5600 
2015 Tech 703 5,820000172 
Tech 
Company 19,0200 7,9700 12,0900 3,5200 3,8300 46,4300 
2015 Entertainment 770 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,5100 15,0600 10,6100 9,6700 12,9800 65,8300 
2015 Tech 713 5,090000153 
Tech 
Company 16,7700 18,0200 16,6400 9,0900 2,8200 63,3400 
2015 Entertainment 727 1,679999948 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,9200 24,9400 14,6000 10,5200 1,2700 72,2500 
2015 Tech 729 5,03000021 
Tech 
Company 11,9500 9,8600 10,2700 13,9500 1,0800 47,1100 
2015 Manufacturing 748 3,130000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,9800 28,3500 5,1300 15,1800 6,5400 79,1800 
2015 Tech 782 6,639999866 
Tech 
Company 20,0900 6,1100 5,9700 8,4800 0,1300 40,7800 
2015 Tech 799 4,739999771 
Tech 
Company 19,7600 5,1100 0,0700 13,1900 1,1300 39,2600 
2015 Retail 775 3,450000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,2100 27,7500 5,6600 3,5600 3,1200 54,3000 
2015 Tech 711 15,18000031 
Tech 
Company 11,1700 16,4700 5,1100 12,8600 3,6300 49,2400 
2015 
Financial 
Services 722 3,5 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,3500 4,1800 5,7600 8,1900 11,5800 45,0600 
2015 Manufacturing 737 3,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2400 4,7100 10,9900 12,7000 12,7700 61,4100 
2015 
Financial 
Services 768 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9600 23,4700 3,9300 4,4300 2,9200 47,7100 
2015 Manufacturing 753 2,940000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3200 12,0400 4,9300 15,9300 4,0000 53,2200 
2015 Manufacturing 778 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,1800 4,1400 14,2600 11,2300 11,6600 52,4700 
2015 Manufacturing 741 3,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,7100 29,6700 17,6500 6,8400 11,1200 91,9900 
2015 Tech 706 4,639999866 
Tech 
Company 12,7400 13,4100 8,8700 9,3600 2,9400 47,3200 
2015 Tech 704 8,829999924 
Tech 
Company 14,9300 16,9800 12,2100 1,0900 3,7400 48,9500 
2015 Manufacturing 720 2,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,2200 14,3300 16,6900 15,5900 8,0300 70,8600 
2015 Tech 736 5,730000019 
Tech 
Company 13,4100 14,5900 1,2200 4,3000 5,9100 39,4300 
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2015 
Financial 
Services 754 2,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,2400 9,3800 10,4000 13,2000 6,2400 55,4600 
2015 Retail 740 3,319999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6500 22,2400 10,9700 14,0200 8,0700 70,9500 
2015 Retail 793 2,5 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,2300 21,7800 2,8300 5,0700 6,3100 47,2200 
2015 Retail 772 3,119999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,9700 19,6400 13,0800 2,6100 3,8700 67,1700 
2015 Tech 717 6,5 
Tech 
Company 10,4600 16,9800 10,3000 3,1400 1,9000 42,7800 
2015 Retail 745 1,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8400 29,7900 12,3300 13,6000 8,9900 83,5500 
2015 Tech 742 15,10999966 
Tech 
Company 12,8000 11,3300 5,5700 0,7400 0,0500 30,4900 
2015 Education 759 4,03000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,7800 25,1700 8,0400 2,8800 5,0900 53,9600 
2015 
Financial 
Services 725 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0000 22,6300 4,4900 11,7700 8,3300 65,2200 
2015 Tech 757 6,96999979 
Tech 
Company 15,5000 6,8900 15,1500 13,5100 2,7400 53,7900 
2015 Manufacturing 739 4,110000134 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,9000 28,3800 4,5500 9,5700 0,9900 72,3900 
2015 Entertainment 781 4,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,0300 18,3000 14,0200 11,8800 3,9900 68,2200 
2015 
Financial 
Services 743 2,650000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7400 18,7900 2,7700 13,2400 4,2500 56,7900 
2015 Education 762 2,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,9700 13,3700 14,2600 3,9400 2,3700 42,9100 
2015 Manufacturing 744 3,529999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,4500 10,8300 13,9000 14,4600 7,6400 70,2800 
2015 Retail 746 2,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6900 14,9000 8,6500 3,6700 5,5900 53,5000 
2015 Education 728 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,6700 9,6100 2,1900 2,5700 5,3100 42,3500 
2015 Entertainment 798 3,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,0900 27,7900 16,8700 5,6700 10,6300 76,0500 
2015 Tech 710 5,900000095 
Tech 
Company 18,4100 17,7200 1,9900 11,7200 4,8900 54,7300 
2015 Tech 766 5,860000134 
Tech 
Company 12,8800 10,3300 9,1000 2,8400 0,5800 35,7300 
2015 Manufacturing 758 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,1000 12,9200 5,3100 3,6000 11,7000 47,6300 
2015 
Financial 
Services 718 2,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0500 13,2400 4,2700 8,4000 4,8000 48,7600 
2015 
Financial 
Services 716 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,4800 21,2900 4,4200 11,1900 4,1800 59,5600 
2015 Manufacturing 719 4,570000172 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,8800 22,1700 3,7700 1,3000 2,5800 43,7000 
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2015 
Financial 
Services 800 3,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,7600 7,0900 18,2300 15,4500 6,6600 61,1900 
2015 Tech 712 7,78000021 
Tech 
Company 15,5900 9,9200 10,5800 10,2500 5,1200 51,4600 
2015 Tech 765 4,199999809 
Tech 
Company 22,2000 15,3000 3,8500 11,3800 5,8300 58,5600 
2015 
Financial 
Services 761 2,920000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3900 7,3400 12,9100 13,1600 4,9000 60,7000 
2015 Retail 774 3,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2100 8,6900 3,7700 6,8700 9,2900 48,8300 
2015 Retail 756 3,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,8900 4,1300 18,8300 11,3200 0,2900 46,4600 
2015 Retail 733 2,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,1600 27,8000 4,3300 14,0700 9,9700 84,3300 
2015 Retail 795 2,140000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,6400 8,0900 3,9800 3,8800 10,6800 51,2700 
2015 
Financial 
Services 755 3,680000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,5700 9,2500 6,2700 6,1500 6,9300 48,1700 
2015 Retail 714 2,829999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3100 10,9300 3,5300 15,9400 6,0400 57,7500 
2015 
Financial 
Services 752 3,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 30,7900 30,6200 14,4500 5,8500 5,2800 86,9900 
2015 Education 724 3,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,2500 19,2600 6,6200 2,7400 1,0100 42,8800 
2015 Entertainment 785 3,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5500 17,1300 19,6900 6,8700 11,1300 73,3700 
2015 Entertainment 715 2,200000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,4700 28,2000 7,5400 6,6800 4,4600 63,3500 
2015 Retail 789 3,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5500 5,5900 18,4900 13,2100 6,3000 62,1400 
2015 Entertainment 769 4,110000134 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,6200 23,5100 16,0900 11,7100 7,8800 71,8100 
2015 
Financial 
Services 751 3,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3500 9,2800 15,3200 8,8300 0,6700 56,4500 
2015 Manufacturing 787 2,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,5400 11,6900 15,2900 8,0600 0,2400 50,8200 
2015 Manufacturing 763 4,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,5700 21,9200 7,7600 6,6700 10,1700 65,0900 
2015 Entertainment 764 3,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,4900 17,2000 9,5600 10,6900 7,1800 70,1200 
2015 Education 731 2,950000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,0300 18,3200 15,9100 8,0400 2,1400 62,4400 
2015 Tech 709 4,889999866 
Tech 
Company 15,1900 22,9300 14,9500 2,2100 1,0900 56,3700 
2015 Tech 794 6,630000114 
Tech 
Company 16,3800 17,7400 2,8000 1,1400 1,9300 39,9900 
2015 Tech 723 4,28000021 
Tech 
Company 15,2700 6,2700 3,4800 6,1000 3,6200 34,7400 
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2015 
Financial 
Services 735 1,730000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,1200 7,4000 2,7400 12,3300 9,8500 54,4400 
2015 
Financial 
Services 760 3,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,8500 5,0500 17,5700 1,2500 0,3500 41,0700 
2015 Education 776 3,160000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3000 26,5000 7,4800 11,1000 10,9200 73,3000 
2015 
Financial 
Services 791 3,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,9700 27,4900 15,0800 4,0700 3,8300 62,4400 
2015 Retail 773 5,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0700 28,0500 5,7500 10,2000 12,2800 79,3500 
2015 Entertainment 797 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8000 11,9800 10,4500 4,0000 2,3000 48,5300 
2015 Retail 749 2,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0300 13,4500 12,5900 9,3700 8,4100 66,8500 
2015 Manufacturing 771 2,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,3100 6,8100 9,6200 3,9700 8,9600 50,6700 
2015 Entertainment 738 2,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,9000 16,5500 17,2300 8,6900 0,1200 60,4900 
2015 Tech 734 4,070000172 
Tech 
Company 16,4700 20,5400 10,0100 12,4300 2,0400 61,4900 
2015 Tech 705 7,849999905 
Tech 
Company 12,2500 10,9100 11,3400 0,9300 0,1400 35,5700 
2015 Retail 726 4,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,8400 17,0400 7,0000 15,8300 8,1500 65,8600 
2016 Retail 829 3,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,7200 28,1000 13,3600 10,7400 4,0400 80,9600 
2016 Tech 805 7,239999771 
Tech 
Company 13,3700 8,1500 15,5300 7,6700 4,3400 49,0600 
2016 Education 868 3,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,9800 22,7500 12,9900 10,3900 12,8800 81,9900 
2016 
Financial 
Services 847 2,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,9900 20,0100 11,4900 11,5600 1,8800 62,9300 
2016 
Financial 
Services 831 4,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,7300 3,5400 20,8300 5,0600 12,2300 58,3900 
2016 
Financial 
Services 824 2,829999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,4700 22,6300 15,5200 6,7400 10,6100 73,9700 
2016 Retail 813 4,21999979 
Non-
Tech 
Company 33,4600 5,7700 6,3800 5,0600 6,8700 57,5400 
2016 
Financial 
Services 822 3,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,3800 3,7600 7,6500 7,1800 2,3800 39,3500 
2016 Manufacturing 882 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4300 23,0000 7,0200 5,2200 7,9100 65,5800 
2016 Retail 879 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,9600 18,7400 12,7000 5,6400 5,4100 65,4500 
2016 Tech 808 6,53000021 
Tech 
Company 11,4700 15,8600 11,4800 6,1000 3,1700 48,0800 
2016 Tech 801 5,28000021 
Tech 
Company 9,6200 11,9700 12,4500 5,0800 1,6100 40,7300 
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2016 Manufacturing 863 3,130000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,3000 10,6500 4,1300 7,7900 12,2400 55,1100 
2016 Manufacturing 849 2,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,6800 27,6800 19,9500 13,8200 11,1000 91,2300 
2016 Tech 875 8,68999958 
Tech 
Company 17,4400 16,0700 16,4900 9,4200 2,0200 61,4400 
2016 Entertainment 817 2,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,4100 17,3000 5,8800 7,8700 8,2400 59,7000 
2016 
Financial 
Services 877 3,569999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2100 9,1900 8,4500 13,9800 7,6700 59,5000 
2016 
Financial 
Services 895 3,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,9800 25,1900 12,2500 11,9700 3,8300 70,2200 
2016 
Financial 
Services 888 3,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,1700 14,0600 8,2400 1,2400 5,0300 43,7400 
2016 Education 859 3,289999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8400 29,5200 8,4500 15,0300 3,6200 75,4600 
2016 Retail 867 2,299999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,3000 18,2500 6,0700 10,5500 11,1200 64,2900 
2016 Manufacturing 860 2,660000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,7200 14,3400 16,1800 6,9900 3,9400 67,1700 
2016 Education 894 3,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,0000 20,1800 14,7700 13,9900 0,9400 62,8800 
2016 
Financial 
Services 844 2,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,2000 10,3300 9,7100 2,8900 7,5800 47,7100 
2016 Education 880 3,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,8600 6,7000 13,5500 11,6300 2,2700 52,0100 
2016 Manufacturing 890 3,680000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,5500 27,3700 3,2100 4,6700 1,6500 64,4500 
2016 Tech 881 6,349999905 
Tech 
Company 16,1400 5,8100 11,9300 12,5100 4,7200 51,1100 
2016 
Financial 
Services 853 3,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2100 7,7900 15,3300 7,7100 1,8300 51,8700 
2016 Retail 866 2,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5600 21,5000 3,0000 2,6200 3,5800 47,2600 
2016 Retail 815 3,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,7700 9,5700 11,5400 6,0200 4,2000 46,1000 
2016 
Financial 
Services 850 3,089999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,0400 9,0400 16,0000 13,4900 11,3200 71,8900 
2016 Retail 861 2,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6400 12,9300 14,0000 5,2400 2,2900 55,1000 
2016 Entertainment 893 28,80999947 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,3700 30,1300 13,7000 10,3100 2,6200 82,1300 
2016 Tech 878 6,679999828 
Tech 
Company 15,3300 8,6200 16,7200 13,2600 2,8800 56,8100 
2016 Retail 858 4,099999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,7500 26,6900 14,2500 10,0700 8,6500 73,4100 
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2016 Tech 835 3,460000038 
Tech 
Company 16,6200 3,3200 7,0600 13,5500 3,8700 44,4200 
2016 Tech 802 5,380000114 
Tech 
Company 14,7400 12,3600 16,1300 0,4400 1,7500 45,4200 
2016 Entertainment 834 3,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,1500 29,2600 14,3300 7,1100 1,1800 62,0300 
2016 Education 836 3,099999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,8400 13,0100 20,1800 4,3700 5,9800 67,3800 
2016 Education 821 3,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,8300 16,1300 12,3900 8,7100 8,1300 64,1900 
2016 Manufacturing 830 2,99000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,6000 22,3000 5,7700 12,2900 12,3600 70,3200 
2016 Entertainment 872 3,799999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3000 19,3000 2,7900 12,3100 2,2000 53,9000 
2016 Retail 841 4,349999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,1600 8,7800 6,8800 3,0200 2,3600 34,2000 
2016 Entertainment 857 2,150000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,6000 15,9700 18,3700 14,0000 10,3300 83,2700 
2016 Retail 838 4,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,8200 18,4900 13,9000 6,6400 11,1700 68,0200 
2016 Manufacturing 900 2,910000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,2300 30,5500 18,4600 1,5700 12,6500 81,4600 
2016 Retail 855 3,410000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,5600 20,7500 19,4500 5,5100 1,6600 61,9300 
2016 
Financial 
Services 862 2,940000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,2400 14,2900 18,3300 9,3300 11,5900 76,7800 
2016 
Financial 
Services 839 4,300000191 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,0400 18,7600 8,6500 1,0200 3,8200 49,2900 
2016 Manufacturing 870 3,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,5400 8,8300 3,8500 5,6300 7,8200 40,6700 
2016 Tech 803 5,449999809 
Tech 
Company 17,7900 5,6600 8,1100 0,9500 1,9000 34,4100 
2016 
Financial 
Services 896 2,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,0700 21,6400 9,4800 11,1900 11,2200 79,6000 
2016 Manufacturing 884 3,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,4400 5,0300 15,2400 9,5400 7,4200 57,6700 
2016 Tech 809 5,510000229 
Tech 
Company 21,0200 15,6800 4,5500 11,7800 5,7500 58,7800 
2016 
Financial 
Services 898 2,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,6100 3,9800 16,2600 11,1100 4,7900 59,7500 
2016 Tech 854 4,75 
Tech 
Company 4,8400 16,8800 12,5200 9,0800 4,4200 47,7400 
2016 Retail 814 3,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,6700 17,2500 14,4400 7,7100 9,5200 73,5900 
2016 Manufacturing 856 2,650000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,0800 30,0800 18,1200 9,0800 6,6900 78,0500 
2016 Manufacturing 864 3,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,5000 19,2100 20,9200 4,5100 9,1300 62,2700 
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2016 
Financial 
Services 842 2,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,7600 27,5200 4,6200 11,8000 10,8400 81,5400 
2016 Manufacturing 832 2,859999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,0100 15,9000 3,2900 13,2900 7,7600 59,2500 
2016 
Financial 
Services 873 3,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,8100 28,0600 2,7200 4,2000 3,2700 54,0600 
2016 
Financial 
Services 871 3,609999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5100 23,3700 2,5400 5,6100 3,9300 55,9600 
2016 
Financial 
Services 899 3,279999971 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,5800 28,4000 5,3500 11,7500 0,1300 72,2100 
2016 Tech 846 5,869999886 
Tech 
Company 11,7900 5,5400 10,5800 12,1600 1,2200 41,2900 
2016 Tech 804 3,869999886 
Tech 
Company 8,1700 8,3100 1,4400 11,6000 0,4800 30,0000 
2016 
Financial 
Services 845 3,769999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,4600 4,9500 20,1500 13,3000 2,4900 53,3500 
2016 Manufacturing 885 2,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,8100 21,7100 3,1800 8,1300 10,1100 65,9400 
2016 Entertainment 816 3,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,2300 24,1700 11,2400 3,3900 3,8700 61,9000 
2016 Tech 806 2,950000048 
Tech 
Company 18,3000 3,3900 13,2200 6,7300 0,9900 42,6300 
2016 Entertainment 823 3,630000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,0800 13,9400 5,9600 1,6600 1,2900 44,9300 
2016 Tech 865 6,260000229 
Tech 
Company 13,5600 9,5000 14,8000 1,5200 2,8000 42,1800 
2016 Tech 810 6,489999771 
Tech 
Company 14,1400 9,3700 0,8200 2,8700 1,4800 28,6800 
2016 Retail 889 2,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,5900 14,8100 7,7900 3,6800 8,8100 58,6800 
2016 Tech 812 5,039999962 
Tech 
Company 14,6400 15,8400 6,8700 3,4500 0,3600 41,1600 
2016 Tech 807 4,409999847 
Tech 
Company 18,6000 5,2000 14,5500 10,8100 4,8000 53,9600 
2016 Retail 876 3,599999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,4500 10,6200 9,1300 2,2700 6,5900 46,0600 
2016 Retail 820 2,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3100 21,2100 14,3600 10,9400 1,5800 70,4000 
2016 Retail 837 3,420000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,8300 8,4900 18,5100 7,0500 10,9900 69,8700 
2016 
Financial 
Services 892 3,170000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,6900 25,5100 18,6800 3,5100 3,2100 70,6000 
2016 Entertainment 818 3,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6500 12,9500 11,5800 3,0500 3,9900 52,2200 
2016 Entertainment 833 3,589999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,4600 29,4200 3,8300 9,3600 5,7400 68,8100 
2016 Tech 811 5,900000095 
Tech 
Company 14,6000 16,1200 6,3900 6,8900 0,3600 44,3600 
2016 Retail 848 2,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,0600 24,9200 14,9300 9,0200 1,6600 60,5900 
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2016 Tech 886 6,400000095 
Tech 
Company 21,0700 17,5700 15,8700 2,1800 5,2500 61,9400 
2016 
Financial 
Services 897 3,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,1000 24,3400 13,0400 13,2400 7,2200 75,9400 
2016 Retail 883 1,309999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,0000 17,1600 18,0000 10,7200 12,5600 81,4400 
2016 Education 869 2,140000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,3300 21,4000 7,8500 8,8300 11,7000 68,1100 
2016 
Financial 
Services 852 4,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,3600 24,5200 8,7400 13,2500 1,7900 67,6600 
2016 
Financial 
Services 887 2,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,4000 29,7800 10,5500 4,5600 4,5000 77,7900 
2016 Retail 840 2,75999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,3700 4,8500 8,1100 3,3200 11,0900 46,7400 
2016 Entertainment 825 4,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0100 25,7900 7,3200 11,6800 12,1200 77,9200 
2016 
Financial 
Services 851 2,769999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,5700 13,2800 11,1300 11,8300 1,5600 64,3700 
2016 Manufacturing 891 4,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,6500 22,7000 19,1600 4,6700 3,1400 65,3200 
2016 Retail 819 4,670000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,7700 18,2300 4,1400 11,6300 4,0000 56,7700 
2016 Retail 826 2,980000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,6100 14,0400 13,1700 2,1800 4,2900 52,2900 
2016 Education 828 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,3300 14,6600 2,9500 6,7800 4,5000 49,2200 
2016 Tech 827 4,920000076 
Tech 
Company 15,4900 15,9300 5,3800 11,2900 4,8200 52,9100 
2016 Tech 874 7,409999847 
Tech 
Company 18,0800 13,4100 7,2500 1,6400 2,7700 43,1500 
2016 Tech 843 4,909999847 
Tech 
Company 18,1100 12,2200 10,2500 4,5000 3,9800 49,0600 
2017 Tech 979 8,470000267 
Tech 
Company 8,5900 20,0500 15,8300 8,9100 0,5000 53,8800 
2017 Manufacturing 913 2,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,1200 25,3600 20,3200 14,7700 10,9700 96,5400 
2017 Retail 976 2,049999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,7400 7,9100 10,2800 7,5100 3,4500 54,8900 
2017 Manufacturing 951 4,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,7800 17,5000 9,4900 8,6500 9,4000 70,8200 
2017 Manufacturing 918 2,819999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,1300 6,6700 20,5300 11,3800 6,1200 68,8300 
2017 Entertainment 925 2,720000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,5500 17,2200 3,2200 12,9500 3,3500 61,2900 
2017 Retail 981 3,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,5900 26,1600 17,5900 2,3100 6,1600 71,8100 
2017 Retail 980 4,5 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,5500 6,8700 15,3100 5,2900 10,2700 63,2900 
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2017 
Financial 
Services 937 2,599999905 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5500 29,6300 10,1600 9,6700 3,0500 69,0600 
2017 
Financial 
Services 916 3,390000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,6500 3,4100 7,4100 3,3700 2,7500 30,5900 
2017 Entertainment 942 2,380000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,4600 3,9900 10,2800 12,2300 10,5000 60,4600 
2017 Tech 904 9,020000458 
Tech 
Company 15,2900 13,9400 1,7200 10,9100 3,3100 45,1700 
2017 Education 949 2,789999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,4800 30,9600 19,0700 6,0400 7,1900 85,7400 
2017 Retail 944 3,109999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,7000 10,2700 15,9000 3,9400 3,6500 49,4600 
2017 Tech 902 5,909999847 
Tech 
Company 13,1800 12,1100 0,9500 3,1200 2,2800 31,6400 
2017 Manufacturing 992 1,649999976 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,0500 3,4400 7,9100 2,6900 7,6200 43,7100 
2017 Retail 928 3,700000048 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,5100 4,6900 9,9300 3,1400 2,2300 39,5000 
2017 Entertainment 927 2,339999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,8800 12,8400 12,4800 11,4400 2,1100 58,7500 
2017 Retail 945 3,440000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,0400 22,6200 2,4900 11,7100 11,9500 68,8100 
2017 
Financial 
Services 972 3,549999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,3000 23,5400 14,7100 15,2800 8,5000 86,3300 
2017 Tech 987 8,020000458 
Tech 
Company 9,8600 21,7600 3,3500 8,8300 4,7500 48,5500 
2017 
Financial 
Services 935 4,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,9900 16,4000 7,1500 15,5900 9,5500 61,6800 
2017 Entertainment 993 4,079999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,1100 26,3100 6,6800 14,0800 8,4200 78,6000 
2017 Entertainment 991 3,059999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,6300 24,8100 13,4800 4,8800 5,0900 71,8900 
2017 
Financial 
Services 958 2,50999999 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,6800 17,8600 7,3600 3,1000 9,9700 60,9700 
2017 Tech 905 6,260000229 
Tech 
Company 13,7700 15,2700 1,9700 7,1200 2,7400 40,8700 
2017 Retail 933 2,619999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,8200 15,2600 13,1200 1,1000 10,8900 68,1900 
2017 Entertainment 948 2,720000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,7000 4,6200 12,3100 13,2100 7,9400 48,7800 
2017 
Financial 
Services 994 2,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 0,6800 10,1500 3,9800 13,6800 2,5800 31,0700 
2017 Retail 983 4,110000134 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3700 5,5700 6,3800 6,7700 5,8400 41,9300 
2017 
Financial 
Services 939 5,090000153 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,5600 18,8800 18,9500 11,4000 6,8100 76,6000 
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2017 
Financial 
Services 1000 3,210000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,5800 10,9600 14,6300 10,5900 12,2000 63,9600 
2017 Entertainment 930 3,180000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 26,8100 16,9400 10,8200 13,1300 0,7500 68,4500 
2017 Tech 910 4,099999905 
Tech 
Company 12,7900 21,9600 14,1900 12,2500 3,0600 64,2500 
2017 Tech 907 7,400000095 
Tech 
Company 17,7600 3,2100 12,4800 0,6600 1,5900 35,7000 
2017 Tech 990 5,860000134 
Tech 
Company 18,2800 12,0900 6,8300 12,3100 4,1100 53,6200 
2017 Tech 986 6,289999962 
Tech 
Company 15,1000 4,6700 7,7700 2,2200 1,2200 30,9800 
2017 Manufacturing 915 4,630000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,5300 28,2600 9,1100 5,1700 8,8200 75,8900 
2017 
Financial 
Services 943 2,960000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,2100 5,3900 6,6800 13,6500 10,5100 59,4400 
2017 
Financial 
Services 929 2,470000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,2900 11,9000 12,2400 4,8800 11,3600 57,6700 
2017 Tech 926 6,650000095 
Tech 
Company 16,8600 20,2000 16,0600 11,3500 3,8900 68,3600 
2017 Retail 971 3,890000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,7500 30,3900 9,1900 13,8700 12,8000 88,0000 
2017 
Financial 
Services 968 1,620000005 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,2200 17,5500 20,1800 5,0300 4,2200 57,2000 
2017 
Financial 
Services 964 3,190000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,6900 11,1200 15,6100 9,6800 11,5000 59,6000 
2017 Retail 946 2,809999943 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,0900 12,9200 9,6000 8,8900 7,7700 67,2700 
2017 Retail 920 1,710000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,2300 13,5300 2,5500 7,9800 5,9700 50,2600 
2017 
Financial 
Services 965 4,25 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,4600 13,5900 16,5400 12,1100 3,8700 65,5700 
2017 
Financial 
Services 931 3,480000019 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,5600 4,3800 15,0700 10,0300 10,7000 56,7400 
2017 Retail 975 3,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,3400 16,1900 8,8100 9,0000 2,5500 58,8900 
2017 Tech 912 6,099999905 
Tech 
Company 19,2500 11,6100 6,9000 11,7800 2,2400 51,7800 
2017 Entertainment 978 3,640000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,1100 12,8100 3,0200 13,5500 8,0400 64,5300 
2017 Tech 901 4,25 
Tech 
Company 17,6500 6,1200 4,6400 0,3000 3,5000 32,2100 
2017 Manufacturing 985 2,539999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,9300 8,4200 17,4000 12,0000 7,2900 59,0400 
2017 Entertainment 953 4,019999981 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,4900 3,6500 4,2000 13,4600 12,2500 50,0500 
2017 
Financial 
Services 950 3,579999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,2900 14,8800 2,8600 7,7500 4,1000 53,8800 
2017 Tech 906 5,699999809 
Tech 
Company 10,3400 17,0200 3,5700 13,8400 2,3100 47,0800 
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2017 Tech 908 6,989999771 
Tech 
Company 17,2200 4,3100 12,1600 0,5700 5,6500 39,9100 
2017 Manufacturing 941 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,9500 19,7300 20,9900 8,3200 10,4700 78,4600 
2017 Entertainment 995 3,160000086 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,1400 6,6000 13,9700 6,5400 9,8900 52,1400 
2017 
Financial 
Services 914 2 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,8100 30,0300 14,1300 9,5000 6,1900 77,6600 
2017 Retail 952 3,930000067 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,6100 21,9400 9,9300 12,9500 6,3700 74,8000 
2017 
Financial 
Services 977 2,819999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,0100 23,7600 20,9300 13,9500 6,2600 85,9100 
2017 Retail 919 2,819999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 14,5400 10,6500 9,2000 11,4700 2,2100 48,0700 
2017 
Financial 
Services 982 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 12,6200 8,6400 8,0000 5,3400 8,6500 43,2500 
2017 Manufacturing 917 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 18,6100 25,4700 19,7700 5,1800 3,6000 72,6300 
2017 Retail 957 2 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,6400 28,4300 12,6400 1,1200 4,0700 67,9000 
2017 Manufacturing 962 2,650000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,6700 18,4900 2,0300 1,0700 4,9700 47,2300 
2017 Retail 955 2,24000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,0000 11,7500 18,4500 8,0200 7,3000 61,5200 
2017 Retail 932 3,109999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,5500 28,2400 2,4100 8,8600 9,4700 70,5300 
2017 Tech 911 6,880000114 
Tech 
Company 15,7900 20,6000 4,7600 1,7700 2,6500 45,5700 
2017 Manufacturing 938 3,069999933 
Non-
Tech 
Company 27,8100 27,6300 6,5600 2,8400 10,1000 74,9400 
2017 Manufacturing 989 2,920000076 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,7500 3,8500 12,4500 8,2900 6,1400 54,4800 
2017 Retail 924 2,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,7900 11,8200 4,8900 15,0300 4,7500 53,2800 
2017 Entertainment 923 2,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 25,3000 26,8100 4,6900 8,5100 8,0100 73,3200 
2017 
Financial 
Services 997 2,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,9600 10,6200 10,3100 14,5000 1,0000 57,3900 
2017 Retail 998 3,039999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 28,4500 8,3800 14,0400 13,2000 2,1700 66,2400 
2017 Education 963 3,049999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,0200 23,8400 6,3300 2,0800 4,2500 52,5200 
2017 Manufacturing 969 3,220000029 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,2200 22,2200 12,7900 13,2000 3,3800 68,8100 
2017 Entertainment 954 3,369999886 
Non-
Tech 
Company 11,3700 22,1200 8,7300 3,3400 12,7600 58,3200 
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2017 Manufacturing 921 2,880000114 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,3500 11,6700 12,6100 10,4600 8,3500 60,4400 
2017 Tech 970 5,829999924 
Tech 
Company 11,8400 17,9700 9,3700 13,8900 2,5900 55,6600 
2017 
Financial 
Services 961 3,460000038 
Non-
Tech 
Company 21,1200 5,2600 12,0900 14,3100 8,0400 60,8200 
2017 Tech 903 8,119999886 
Tech 
Company 20,7800 20,0900 1,5800 7,8100 0,4900 50,7500 
2017 Retail 999 3,329999924 
Non-
Tech 
Company 20,9100 9,2100 15,6600 3,2700 5,5100 54,5600 
2017 
Financial 
Services 988 2,359999895 
Non-
Tech 
Company 10,7900 13,3000 9,0600 4,9100 8,3300 46,3900 
2017 Manufacturing 936 3,539999962 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,3300 26,9800 15,4800 4,3200 9,2200 72,3300 
2017 Tech 996 7,130000114 
Tech 
Company 9,8900 10,6200 8,2100 8,9900 4,7700 42,4800 
2017 Manufacturing 959 2,890000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 16,6300 5,8300 5,9000 14,4300 4,0900 46,8800 
2017 Education 966 2,839999914 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,5200 20,2800 18,9400 6,4300 8,0500 77,2200 
2017 Manufacturing 947 3,400000095 
Non-
Tech 
Company 15,2200 9,9800 13,4200 1,3400 0,6100 40,5700 
2017 Tech 934 4,269999981 
Tech 
Company 8,3500 15,6700 16,5900 4,9800 5,2200 50,8100 
2017 
Financial 
Services 956 2,299999952 
Non-
Tech 
Company 13,3400 14,1700 6,1800 15,3600 4,6900 53,7400 
2017 Entertainment 973 1,690000057 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,4900 17,0100 9,5100 2,3700 8,2100 56,5900 
2017 Entertainment 984 3,49000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 8,5200 4,8900 19,7300 8,7800 7,6500 49,5700 
2017 Tech 909 7,159999847 
Tech 
Company 10,2000 9,9100 4,7100 8,8900 5,4500 39,1600 
2017 
Financial 
Services 974 4,75 
Non-
Tech 
Company 17,7800 10,9000 13,1400 1,7100 2,4700 46,0000 
2017 Entertainment 967 4,03000021 
Non-
Tech 
Company 22,7600 16,0200 3,9900 11,1900 10,2700 64,2300 
2017 Retail 960 2,49000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 24,5700 13,0900 13,4500 14,6700 1,1300 66,9100 
2017 Manufacturing 922 2,49000001 
Non-
Tech 
Company 23,2600 7,7200 14,4000 12,5100 2,9500 60,8400 
2017 Manufacturing 940 2,140000105 
Non-
Tech 
Company 19,9500 12,8000 5,1700 7,1600 10,6000 55,6800 
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Appendix B: Delphi Results 
 
 
 
 
Table of Representative Comments, RQ3: Crowdfunding is a Niche 
Participant # Comment 
 
7 
 
If you look at the existing data, crowdfunding is a niche option. It’s just 
starting out. The fact, it hasn’t displaced traditional methods of funding 
yet, so I wouldn’t describe it as being important for SMEs. 
 
15 Of course, there are examples of successful crowdfunding, but those are 
very limited. I don’t think I would describe crowdfunding as an important 
funding strategy. I’d like to think it’s more of a novelty, although that 
could change. 
 
25 I’m not an evangelist of crowdfunding. I don’t think it’s widespread or 
viable for the vast, vast majority of companies or individual investors. 
 
29 The wisdom of crowds theory is all well and good, but the public isn’t 
ready to treat crowdfunding with the same kind of trust that goes into 
buying existing, lower-risk instruments with closer guidance from 
advisors and other third parties. There’s too much risk in crowdfunding, 
so it’s a small financing alternative right now. 
 
41 Crowdfunding is a nascent funding approach. 
 
45 Crowdfunding is far from mature.  
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Table of Representative Comments, RQ3: Crowdfunding Has a Limited Future 
Participant # Comment 
 
7 
 
There’s definitely a ceiling that crowdfunding hasn’t reached yet. I think 
that’s more true in Europe than in the United States. In the future, I can 
see SMEs getting maybe a tenth of their funding from crowdfunding, 
simply because individual investors are going to appreciate skipping 
commissions and chasing higher returns by investing in SMEs in their 
early stages. 
 
15 Does crowdfunding have a bright future? It depends on what we mean by 
a bright future! Is crowdfunding going to really displace traditional 
funding? No. I’ll explain my reasons for this below. But let me just note 
that I do expect crowdfunding to increase its relative share against 
traditional means of funding. 
 
29 Crowdfunding can get so far, and no farther. 
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Okay, so, if—and that’s a big if—the demand for crowdfunding increases radically, 
then you’d probably see traditional funding sources either take some steps back or 
somehow insert themselves into the crowdfunding process. But I want to emphasize 
that I won’t believe in this if. For a lot of reasons—and not even primarily because of 
regulations or laws—crowdfunding is going to have a minimal impact on the market, 
because there are all kinds of game-theoretic reasons that crowdfunding will never 
constitute more than a small percentage of funding for the vast majority of SMEs. 
Crowdfunding isn’t there today, I mean, as a true alternative to traditional funding, so 
it’s already having a limited impact on the market. What I’m claiming is that 
crowdfunding won’t be there tomorrow either, so that big market impact’s never 
coming. Some incremental changes and challenges are all we can reliably expect.  
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The bottom line is, just about wherever you are in the world, there’s going to be a cap 
on crowdfunding imposed by regulation, which is why I want to emphasize my belief 
that crowdfunding isn’t going to have a much bigger impact on the marketplace than 
it’s already having today—which is to say, a modest impact. If you look at the U.S., 
where crowdfunding really began and which is still the biggest market for 
crowdfunding, you can see the involvement of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which is imposing caps on the amount of crowdfunding that can be 
obtained by any one company. Closely related to this issue of regulation is that of 
market structure. Regulation’s creating pathways for companies to draw on 
crowdfunding as a kind of adjunct to traditional funding. None of that’s going to affect 
the traditional funding market. The traditional players and the crowdfunding players 
are kind of siloed off, each in their worlds, and these worlds aren’t going to meet. You 
might see a small displacement of traditional funding if crowdfunding claims a greater 
relative share, but you won’t really see crowdfunding altering the traditional funding 
marketplace in any meaningful way.  
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Now, I don’t know about any Wild West environments out there. There could be 
countries with no crowdfunding regulations whatsoever, so I want to make it clear that 
my comments are delimited to the environments and climates with which I’m most 
familiar. Now, in Germany, we see that the regulatory gaps have been closed over the 
past several years. The greatest danger used to be that, when the gaps were indeed 
present, a company seeking to benefit from crowdfunding might have been able to 
solicit investment without making the right information, in the sufficient quantities, 
available to prospective investors. We’re not seeing that any longer. Even through 
there are still exceptions in which a whole prospectus doesn’t have to be issued, I 
don’t consider that a major regulatory gap for Germany, and certainly not one that’s 
going to promote systemic risk. I mean, there are many crowdfunding investor 
safeguards in place regardless of the size of the company soliciting funds and other 
underlying factors. Bear in mind that investment is an inherently risk activity, so what 
I’m concerned with is examining the question of whether, in Germany in particular, 
the risks associated with regulatory gaps in crowdfunding are greater than ordinary 
investment risks. Based on my knowledge, I would argue that the risks of 
crowdfunding are essentially the same risks, both in quality and magnitude, that occur 
elsewhere in the German investment environment. That is why I would argue that, 
while there are probably remaining regulatory gaps in Germany, these gaps aren’t that 
important, and they’re not likely to be the basis for systemic risk. Also, remember that 
over-regulation as a means of reducing gaps is going to chill investment, and no one 
wants that outcome either. I think Germany has struck the right balance between 
demanding transparency and thoroughness from the companies seeking crowdfunding 
and the need to enliven the marketplace by allowing these kinds of investments to take 
place.  
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I’m not necessarily sanguine about the regulatory environment. Outside Europe and 
North America, there are big gaps, and, even within these two geographies, there are 
going to be local gaps, difficulties in interpretation, and other real problems. Rather 
than dwell on the exact nature of these gaps, though, I’d like to dwell on another point, 
which is that the risks don’t really add up to what you’re calling systemic risk. Given 
how small the volume of crowdfunding is to be, even major gaps in regulation are 
hardly going to create systemic risk. Is there a place for unscrupulous companies to 
take advantage of underinformed investors? Certainly, but (a) not at a volume 
sufficient to threaten the marketplace and (b) not in any manner that doesn’t already 
exist outside crowdfunding. Lots of big companies with shiny prospectuses end up 
bilking investors.  
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A major cost of strengthening the regulatory climate is going to be dampening 
investment. That’s the fulcrum on which this cost-benefit issue turns, in fact. If the 
regulatory authority goes too far in demanding not just prospectuses but other material 
from SMEs, particularly on the smaller end, looking for access to the crowdfunding 
market, then the problem that could arise is that these companies—many of which 
really are likely to make contributions to the economy, especially in this new-economy 
climate—are not going to get access to some quantum of their needed funds. The same 
problem affects investors, but from the other side. By now, most investors are aware 
of how, in the current technological and economic climate, tech companies in 
particular come out of people’s garages and become these huge companies. What if 
you want access to that and your name isn’t Peter Thiel? Crowdfunding is the right 
alternative to you, but, if the kind of companies you want to invest in are buried under 
heavy regulations, then you won’t have access to the companies. We’ll all lose, 
because maybe the next Apple or Google will fail to launch. I know it’s a far-fetched 
scenario, but the point is that we need an environment in which not just the VCs and 
big movers and shakers can have early-stage access to great companies and great 
ideas. Once you can open up this landscape to ordinary investors, everyone will 
benefit. Now, on the other side of that is the issue that, if there aren’t regulations, or if 
the regulations are too weak, you’ve created a bad environment, once that 
unscrupulous companies and individuals can take advantage of. Therefore, the cost-
benefit issue really comes down to staking out a place somewhere midway between 
the need to facilitate an open investment climate and the need to protect investors. I 
can’t say exactly where that line is; I suspect we’ll have to find it through trial and 
error.   
A good way to dive into this topic is to ask why crowdfunding exists. Obviously, 
there’s a need for investment that falls below the radar of traditional investment, 
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where you have a prospectus and well-heeled investors being wooed by a large 
company. In fact, we know that there’s a need for this kind of investment, because 
angel investors and an early-stage funding climate already exists. Now, when we look 
at the VC community, I think there’s a possibility that they don’t necessarily represent 
the market as a whole. Remember, VCs have their own specific tastes and preferences. 
What’s powerful about crowdfunding is that, by taking your case to the market as an 
SME, you’re in a position to tap into the broader tastes and preferences of the market. 
It would be self-defeating to clap very tight regulations on SMEs seeking to 
crowdfund, because, after all, companies that are able and willing to rise to that 
threshold are going to choose traditional funding. It could also be the case that SMEs 
are using crowdfunding just as a complement to their other investing channels, in 
which case the informed crowdfunder has an opportunity to due diligence. The point is 
that crowdfunding isn’t meant to exist outside regulatory constraints, but, shall we say, 
below them. An SME seeking crowdfunding shouldn’t be asked to meet the regulatory 
burden that exists in other funding channels—whether as driven by government 
regulations, VC requirements, or whatever. There should be a space for companies and 
investors to come together in a grassroots manner, with the minimal necessary 
regulatory burden, and let crowdfunding happen. I’m a believer in keeping a 
regulatory burden on crowdfunding, but just enough of one to let this exciting channel 
achieve its potential. The cost of increasing the regulatory burden is the cost of 
shutting down crowdfunding altogether.  
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Appendix C: Regression Tables 
 
 
___ ____ ____ (R) 
 /__  /  ____/  /  ____/ 
___/  /  /___/  /  /___/  14.2  Copyright 1985-2015 StataCorp LLC 
 Statistics/Data Analysis      StataCorp 
                   4905 Lakeway Drive 
   Special Edition         College Station, Texas 77845 USA 
                   800-STATA-PC    http://www.stata.com 
                   979-696-4600    stata@stata.com 
                   979-696-4601 (fax) 
 
Single-user Stata perpetual license: 
    Serial number: *** 
     Licensed to: User 
             
 
Notes: 
   1. Unicode is supported; see help unicode_advice. 
   2. Maximum number of variables is set to 5000; see help set_maxvar. 
 
. forval i=2008/2017 { 
 2.  
. regress cfund seed if year==`i' 
 3.  
. } 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   8.41 
    Model | 20.4014222     1 20.4014222  Prob > F    =  0.0046 
  Residual | 237.687659    98 2.42538428  R-squared    =  0.0790 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0697 
    Total | 258.089081    99 2.60696042  Root MSE    =  1.5574 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.0865391  .0298382  -2.90  0.005   -.145752  -.0273262 
    _cons |  5.383505  .5364684  10.04  0.000   4.318901  6.448109 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   2.31 
    Model | 16.1644866     1 16.1644866  Prob > F    =  0.1322 
  Residual | 687.209626    98 7.01234313  R-squared    =  0.0230 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0130 
    Total | 703.374113    99 7.10478902  Root MSE    =  2.6481 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.0651988  .0429428  -1.52  0.132  -.1504174  .0200198 
    _cons |  5.409997  .8055038   6.72  0.000   3.811501  7.008493 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   8.46 
    Model | 15.7373109     1 15.7373109  Prob > F    =  0.0045 
  Residual | 182.310018    98 1.86030631  R-squared    =  0.0795 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0701 
    Total | 198.047329    99 2.00047807  Root MSE    =  1.3639 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.0773427  .0265917  -2.91  0.004  -.1301131  -.0245723 
    _cons |  4.904798  .4812044  10.19  0.000   3.949863  5.859732 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.86 
    Model | 55.3950119     1 55.3950119  Prob > F    =  0.1763 
  Residual | 2926.27244    98 29.8599229  R-squared    =  0.0186 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0086 
    Total | 2981.66745    99 30.1178531  Root MSE    =  5.4644 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.1279661  .0939515  -1.36  0.176  -.3144098  .0584777 
    _cons |  6.50952  1.728479   3.77  0.000   3.079408  9.939631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   25.83 
    Model | 70.8821403     1 70.8821403  Prob > F    =  0.0000 
  Residual | 268.890932    98 2.74378502  R-squared    =  0.2086 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.2005 
    Total | 339.773072    99 3.43205123  Root MSE    =  1.6564 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed |  -.157337  .0309555  -5.08  0.000  -.2187671  -.0959069 
    _cons |  6.610358  .5543492  11.92  0.000   5.51027  7.710446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   17.40 
    Model | 26.1874034     1 26.1874034  Prob > F    =  0.0001 
  Residual | 147.500736    98 1.50510955  R-squared    =  0.1508 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.1421 
    Total |  173.68814    99 1.75442565  Root MSE    =  1.2268 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.1028954  .024668  -4.17  0.000  -.1518483  -.0539426 
    _cons |  5.482911  .4578177  11.98  0.000   4.574387  6.391436 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.93 
    Model | 13.7904085     1 13.7904085  Prob > F    =  0.3369 
  Residual | 1451.22659    98 14.8084345  R-squared    =  0.0094 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0007 
    Total | 1465.01699    99 14.7981514  Root MSE    =  3.8482 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.0619417  .0641873  -0.97  0.337  -.1893194  .0654359 
    _cons |  5.146592  1.220762   4.22  0.000   2.724029  7.569156 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   10.42 
    Model | 43.0809393     1 43.0809393  Prob > F    =  0.0017 
  Residual | 405.037323    98  4.1330339  R-squared    =  0.0961 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0869 
    Total | 448.118262    99 4.52644709  Root MSE    =   2.033 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.1352142  .0418807  -3.23  0.002  -.2183251  -.0521033 
    _cons |  6.456278  .7798345   8.28  0.000   4.908722  8.003834 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.26 
    Model |  2.0900946     1  2.0900946  Prob > F    =  0.6119 
  Residual | 790.832371    98 8.06971807  R-squared    =  0.0026 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0075 
    Total | 792.922465    99 8.00931783  Root MSE    =  2.8407 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.0302508  .0594406  -0.51  0.612  -.1482089  .0877072 
    _cons |  4.609484  1.144778   4.03  0.000   2.337709  6.881258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   9.91 
    Model | 24.7400779     1 24.7400779  Prob > F    =  0.0022 
  Residual | 244.691184    98 2.49684881  R-squared    =  0.0918 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0826 
    Total | 269.431262    99  2.7215279  Root MSE    =  1.5801 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    seed | -.0923245   .02933  -3.15  0.002   -.150529   -.03412 
    _cons |  5.464949  .5655255   9.66  0.000   4.342682  6.587216 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. forval i=2008/2017 { 
 2.  
. regress cfund su if year==`i' 
 3.  
. } 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   2.33 
    Model | 5.99148177     1 5.99148177  Prob > F    =  0.1302 
  Residual |  252.0976    98 2.57242449  R-squared    =  0.0232 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0132 
    Total | 258.089081    99 2.60696042  Root MSE    =  1.6039 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0309046  .0202501  -1.53  0.130  -.0710903  .0092811 
    _cons |  4.360759  .3449973  12.64  0.000   3.676123  5.045395 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.08 
    Model | .573469568     1 .573469568  Prob > F    =  0.7779 
  Residual | 702.800643    98 7.17143514  R-squared    =  0.0008 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0094 
    Total | 703.374113    99 7.10478902  Root MSE    =   2.678 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su |  .0108946  .0385266   0.28  0.778  -.0655602  .0873495 
    _cons |  4.086176  .6543226   6.24  0.000   2.787694  5.384657 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   4.19 
    Model | 8.12317955     1 8.12317955  Prob > F    =  0.0433 
  Residual | 189.924149    98 1.93800153  R-squared    =  0.0410 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0312 
    Total | 198.047329    99 2.00047807  Root MSE    =  1.3921 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0376025  .0183667  -2.05  0.043  -.0740505  -.0011544 
    _cons |  4.181894  .3329866  12.56  0.000   3.521093  4.842695 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.29 
    Model | 8.90102798     1 8.90102798  Prob > F    =  0.5893 
  Residual | 2972.76643    98 30.3343513  R-squared    =  0.0030 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0072 
    Total | 2981.66745    99 30.1178531  Root MSE    =  5.5077 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0387292  .0714967  -0.54  0.589  -.1806122  .1031537 
    _cons |  4.897689  1.272994   3.85  0.000   2.371475  7.423904 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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 Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   4.45 
    Model | 14.7582342     1 14.7582342  Prob > F    =  0.0374 
  Residual | 325.014838    98 3.31647794  R-squared    =  0.0434 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0337 
    Total | 339.773072    99 3.43205123  Root MSE    =  1.8211 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0514191  .0243751  -2.11  0.037  -.0997906  -.0030476 
    _cons |  4.664105  .3963453  11.77  0.000   3.877571  5.450639 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.31 
    Model | 2.29094074     1 2.29094074  Prob > F    =  0.2552 
  Residual | 171.397199    98 1.74895101  R-squared    =  0.0132 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0031 
    Total |  173.68814    99 1.75442565  Root MSE    =  1.3225 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0191255  .0167107  -1.14  0.255  -.0522873  .0140363 
    _cons |  3.972066  .3163952  12.55  0.000   3.34419  4.599942 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.10 
    Model | 1.43918958     1 1.43918958  Prob > F    =  0.7569 
  Residual |  1463.5778    98 14.9344674  R-squared    =  0.0010 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0092 
    Total | 1465.01699    99 14.7981514  Root MSE    =  3.8645 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su |  .0157437  .0507156   0.31  0.757  -.0848998  .1163871 
    _cons |  3.786826  .8694408   4.36  0.000   2.061449  5.512203 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.12 
    Model |  5.0439159     1  5.0439159  Prob > F    =  0.2935 
  Residual | 443.074346    98  4.5211668  R-squared    =  0.0113 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0012 
    Total | 448.118262    99 4.52644709  Root MSE    =  2.1263 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0305759  .0289482  -1.06  0.293  -.0880227  .0268708 
    _cons |  4.512867  .5079706   8.88  0.000   3.504816  5.520918 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.13 
    Model | 1.08639262     1 1.08639262  Prob > F    =  0.7146 
  Residual | 791.836073    98 8.07995993  R-squared    =  0.0014 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0088 
    Total | 792.922465    99 8.00931783  Root MSE    =  2.8425 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su |   .0135  .0368167   0.37  0.715  -.0595616  .0865616 
    _cons |  3.822377  .6706244   5.70  0.000   2.491545  5.153209 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.11 
    Model | .294052993     1 .294052993  Prob > F    =  0.7442 
  Residual | 269.137209    98 2.74629805  R-squared    =  0.0011 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0091 
    Total | 269.431262    99  2.7215279  Root MSE    =  1.6572 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     su | -.0070687  .0216024  -0.33  0.744   -.049938  .0358006 
    _cons |  3.861387  .3630175  10.64  0.000   3.14099  4.581783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. forval i=2008/2017 { 
 2.  
. regress cfund ri if year==`i' 
 3.  
. } 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   7.75 
    Model | 18.9238293     1 18.9238293  Prob > F    =  0.0064 
  Residual | 239.165252    98 2.44046176  R-squared    =  0.0733 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0639 
    Total | 258.089081    99 2.60696042  Root MSE    =  1.5622 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0745363  .026767  -2.78  0.006  -.1276545  -.0214181 
    _cons |  4.700994  .3290366  14.29  0.000   4.048031  5.353956 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.20 
    Model | 1.46739333     1 1.46739333  Prob > F    =  0.6518 
  Residual |  701.90672    98 7.16231347  R-squared    =  0.0021 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0081 
    Total | 703.374113    99 7.10478902  Root MSE    =  2.6762 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0215302  .0475665  -0.45  0.652  -.1159243  .0728639 
    _cons |  4.494248  .5924588   7.59  0.000   3.318532  5.669963 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   9.39 
    Model | 17.3168397     1 17.3168397  Prob > F    =  0.0028 
  Residual | 180.730489    98 1.84418867  R-squared    =  0.0874 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0781 
    Total | 198.047329    99 2.00047807  Root MSE    =   1.358 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0798113  .0260455  -3.06  0.003  -.1314978  -.0281248 
    _cons |  4.396652  .3041803  14.45  0.000   3.793016  5.000288 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.01 
    Model | .320225022     1 .320225022  Prob > F    =  0.9185 
  Residual | 2981.34723    98 30.4219105  R-squared    =  0.0001 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0101 
    Total | 2981.66745    99 30.1178531  Root MSE    =  5.5156 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri |  .0106073  .1033878   0.10  0.918  -.1945624  .2157769 
    _cons |  4.172441  1.150242   3.63  0.000   1.889823  6.455059 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.45 
    Model | 4.95973299     1 4.95973299  Prob > F    =  0.2312 
  Residual | 334.813339    98 3.41646264  R-squared    =  0.0146 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0045 
    Total | 339.773072    99 3.43205123  Root MSE    =  1.8484 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0449776  .0373298  -1.20  0.231  -.1190572  .0291021 
    _cons |  4.437325  .4663134   9.52  0.000   3.511941  5.362709 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   4.03 
    Model | 6.85396605     1 6.85396605  Prob > F    =  0.0476 
  Residual | 166.834174    98 1.70238953  R-squared    =  0.0395 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0297 
    Total |  173.68814    99 1.75442565  Root MSE    =  1.3048 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0468968  .0233723  -2.01  0.048  -.0932783  -.0005152 
    _cons |  4.129241  .2751806  15.01  0.000   3.583154  4.675328 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   3.92 
    Model | 56.3926961     1 56.3926961  Prob > F    =  0.0504 
  Residual |  1408.6243    98 14.3737173  R-squared    =  0.0385 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0287 
    Total | 1465.01699    99 14.7981514  Root MSE    =  3.7913 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.1401911  .0707772  -1.98  0.050  -.2806462   .000264 
    _cons |  5.405529  .7918235   6.83  0.000   3.834181  6.976877 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.23 
    Model | 5.56877858     1 5.56877858  Prob > F    =  0.2695 
  Residual | 442.549483    98 4.51581105  R-squared    =  0.0124 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0023 
    Total | 448.118262    99 4.52644709  Root MSE    =   2.125 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0452545  .0407521  -1.11  0.270  -.1261256  .0356166 
    _cons |  4.470406  .4534313   9.86  0.000   3.570587  5.370226 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.15 
    Model | 1.20468847     1 1.20468847  Prob > F    =  0.7002 
  Residual | 791.717777    98 8.07875282  R-squared    =  0.0015 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0087 
    Total | 792.922465    99 8.00931783  Root MSE    =  2.8423 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri |  .0208158  .0539049   0.39  0.700  -.0861567  .1277883 
    _cons |  3.814706  .6608745   5.77  0.000   2.503222   5.12619 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   6.80 
    Model |  17.47703     1  17.47703  Prob > F    =  0.0106 
  Residual | 251.954232    98 2.57096155  R-squared    =  0.0649 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0553 
    Total | 269.431262    99  2.7215279  Root MSE    =  1.6034 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ri | -.0774838  .0297184  -2.61  0.011  -.1364589  -.0185087 
    _cons |  4.569753  .3509894  13.02  0.000   3.873226   5.26628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. forval i=2008/2017 { 
 2.  
. regress cfund rii if year==`i' 
 3.  
. } 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.99 
    Model | 5.14283934     1 5.14283934  Prob > F    =  0.1612 
  Residual | 252.946242    98  2.5810841  R-squared    =  0.0199 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0099 
    Total | 258.089081    99 2.60696042  Root MSE    =  1.6066 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0503491  .0356691  -1.41  0.161  -.1211332   .020435 
    _cons |  4.331731  .3488722  12.42  0.000   3.639406  5.024057 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.00 
    Model | .011975309     1 .011975309  Prob > F    =  0.9675 
  Residual | 703.362138    98 7.17716467  R-squared    =  0.0000 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0102 
    Total | 703.374113    99 7.10478902  Root MSE    =   2.679 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0027801  .0680595  -0.04  0.968  -.1378419  .1322817 
    _cons |  4.27627  .5855912   7.30  0.000   3.114183  5.438357 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.19 
    Model | .379852786     1 .379852786  Prob > F    =  0.6653 
  Residual | 197.667476    98 2.01701506  R-squared    =  0.0019 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0083 
    Total | 198.047329    99 2.00047807  Root MSE    =  1.4202 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0149953  .0345542  -0.43  0.665  -.0835669  .0535764 
    _cons |  3.689641  .3253778  11.34  0.000   3.04394  4.335343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.34 
    Model | 10.2070845     1 10.2070845  Prob > F    =  0.5631 
  Residual | 2971.46037    98 30.3210242  R-squared    =  0.0034 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0067 
    Total | 2981.66745    99 30.1178531  Root MSE    =  5.5065 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0742143  .1279112  -0.58  0.563  -.3280499  .1796214 
    _cons |  4.835969  1.111163   4.35  0.000   2.630902  7.041036 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.57 
    Model | 5.36017337     1 5.36017337  Prob > F    =  0.2131 
  Residual | 334.412899    98 3.41237652  R-squared    =  0.0158 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0057 
    Total | 339.773072    99 3.43205123  Root MSE    =  1.8473 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii |  .0585997  .0467557   1.25  0.213  -.0341854  .1513848 
    _cons |  3.475228  .4011376   8.66  0.000   2.679184  4.271273 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   7.37 
    Model | 12.1496872     1 12.1496872  Prob > F    =  0.0078 
  Residual | 161.538452    98 1.64835156  R-squared    =  0.0700 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0605 
    Total |  173.68814    99 1.75442565  Root MSE    =  1.2839 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii |  -.083421  .0307268  -2.71  0.008  -.1443973  -.0224446 
    _cons |  4.400829  .3072118  14.33  0.000   3.791177  5.010481 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.40 
    Model | 5.95831401     1 5.95831401  Prob > F    =  0.5285 
  Residual | 1459.05868    98 14.8883539  R-squared    =  0.0041 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0061 
    Total | 1465.01699    99 14.7981514  Root MSE    =  3.8585 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0577212  .0912424  -0.63  0.528  -.2387888  .1233464 
    _cons |  4.446172   .76458   5.82  0.000   2.928888  5.963456 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   3.28 
    Model | 14.4918081     1 14.4918081  Prob > F    =  0.0734 
  Residual | 433.626454    98 4.42475973  R-squared    =  0.0323 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0225 
    Total | 448.118262    99 4.52644709  Root MSE    =  2.1035 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0854142  .0471969  -1.81  0.073  -.1790749  .0082465 
    _cons |  4.720829  .4379794  10.78  0.000   3.851673  5.589985 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.01 
    Model | .063439339     1 .063439339  Prob > F    =  0.9296 
  Residual | 792.859026    98 8.09039822  R-squared    =  0.0001 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0101 
    Total | 792.922465    99 8.00931783  Root MSE    =  2.8444 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0063664  .071895  -0.09  0.930  -.1490398   .136307 
    _cons |  4.094777  .6289846   6.51  0.000   2.846577  5.342976 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
 Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   0.38 
    Model | 1.04754413     1 1.04754413  Prob > F    =  0.5377 
  Residual | 268.383718    98 2.73860936  R-squared    =  0.0039 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  -0.0063 
    Total | 269.431262    99  2.7215279  Root MSE    =  1.6549 
 
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 318 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     rii | -.0230138  .0372106  -0.62  0.538  -.0968569  .0508294 
    _cons |  3.952233  .3582797  11.03  0.000   3.241238  4.663227 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. forval i=2008/2017 { 
 2.  
. regress cfund riii if year==`i' 
 3.  
. } 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   7.52 
    Model | 18.3886575     1 18.3886575  Prob > F    =  0.0073 
  Residual | 239.700424    98 2.44592269  R-squared    =  0.0712 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0618 
    Total | 258.089081    99 2.60696042  Root MSE    =  1.5639 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii |  -.111515  .0406705  -2.74  0.007  -.1922242  -.0308057 
    _cons |  4.464341  .2600687  17.17  0.000   3.948243  4.980439 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.04 
    Model | 7.41650847     1 7.41650847  Prob > F    =  0.3093 
  Residual | 695.957604    98 7.10160821  R-squared    =  0.0105 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0004 
    Total | 703.374113    99 7.10478902  Root MSE    =  2.6649 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.0792799  .0775785  -1.02  0.309  -.2332319  .0746722 
    _cons |  4.690397  .5025313   9.33  0.000   3.69314  5.687654 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   8.85 
    Model | 16.3954408     1 16.3954408  Prob > F    =  0.0037 
  Residual | 181.651888    98  1.8535907  R-squared    =  0.0828 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0734 
    Total | 198.047329    99 2.00047807  Root MSE    =  1.3615 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.1011022  .0339943  -2.97  0.004  -.1685627  -.0336416 
    _cons |  4.182579  .2489806  16.80  0.000   3.688485  4.676673 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   6.10 
    Model | 174.777535     1 174.777535  Prob > F    =  0.0152 
  Residual | 2806.88992    98 28.6417339  R-squared    =  0.0586 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0490 
    Total | 2981.66745    99 30.1178531  Root MSE    =  5.3518 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.3789065  .1533871  -2.47  0.015  -.6832983  -.0745148 
    _cons |  6.421179  1.020068   6.29  0.000   4.396888  8.445471 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
  
  
Ph.D. Research - Doctoral Research Programme in Business 
 
Page 320 
 Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   9.96 
    Model | 31.3596332     1 31.3596332  Prob > F    =  0.0021 
  Residual | 308.413439    98 3.14707591  R-squared    =  0.0923 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0830 
    Total | 339.773072    99 3.43205123  Root MSE    =   1.774 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.1570785  .0497605  -3.16  0.002  -.2558266  -.0583304 
    _cons |  4.722255  .3095461  15.26  0.000   4.107971  5.336539 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   14.41 
    Model | 22.2616619     1 22.2616619  Prob > F    =  0.0003 
  Residual | 151.426478    98 1.54516814  R-squared    =  0.1282 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.1193 
    Total |  173.68814    99 1.75442565  Root MSE    =   1.243 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii |  -.133919  .0352818  -3.80  0.000  -.2039347  -.0639033 
    _cons |  4.407777  .2367225  18.62  0.000   3.938009  4.877546 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   1.80 
    Model | 26.3815281     1 26.3815281  Prob > F    =  0.1832 
  Residual | 1438.63547    98 14.6799537  R-squared    =  0.0180 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0080 
    Total | 1465.01699    99 14.7981514  Root MSE    =  3.8314 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii |  -.13408  .1000176  -1.34  0.183  -.3325616  .0644016 
    _cons |  4.806411  .6953024   6.91  0.000   3.426606  6.186216 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   8.54 
    Model | 35.9122134     1 35.9122134  Prob > F    =  0.0043 
  Residual | 412.206049    98 4.20618417  R-squared    =  0.0801 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0708 
    Total | 448.118262    99 4.52644709  Root MSE    =  2.0509 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.1727659  .0591263  -2.92  0.004  -.2901002  -.0554316 
    _cons |  4.905238  .3642637  13.47  0.000   4.182368  5.628107 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
   Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   6.13 
    Model | 46.6663462     1 46.6663462  Prob > F    =  0.0150 
  Residual | 746.256119    98 7.61485836  R-squared    =  0.0589 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.0493 
    Total | 792.922465    99 8.00931783  Root MSE    =  2.7595 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.1839993  .0743267  -2.48  0.015  -.3314983  -.0365003 
    _cons |  5.054189  .4922448  10.27  0.000   4.077345  6.031033 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
    
Source |    SS      df    MS   Number of obs  =    100 
-------------+----------------------------------  F(1, 98)    =   12.44 
    Model | 30.3432645     1 30.3432645  Prob > F    =  0.0006 
  Residual | 239.087997    98 2.43967344  R-squared    =  0.1126 
-------------+----------------------------------  Adj R-squared  =  0.1036 
    Total | 269.431262    99  2.7215279  Root MSE    =  1.5619 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    cfund |   Coef.  Std. Err.   t  P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    riii | -.1643351  .0465978  -3.53  0.001  -.2568069  -.0718634 
    _cons |  4.750848  .3225226  14.73  0.000   4.110812  5.390883 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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Appendix D: Publishing Alexander Schroff 
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